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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the impact that technology has on lawyers’ ethics. It first 
establishes a case for place, drawing on the works of Martin Heidegger and his 
disciples. By analysing legal theory, ethical theory, continental philosophy and 
technology theory, three key elements of place emerge – location, community and 
history. This Heideggerian framework underpins the thesis and addresses the issues 
lawyers face with increased technology use. Lawyers are currently confronted by 
technology that has evolved as a result of globalisation. Their ethical obligations in 
relation to communication, confidentiality, conflicts of interest and litigation are 
challenged.  Place affects lawyers’ ethics to a significant extent. A place based ethical 
perspective fills the gap within community theories of lawyers’ ethics and bridges the 
gap between ethical theories and technology philosophy. By recognising and preserving 
place, lawyers will maintain a stronger connection with their professional duties. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is immersed in place. It offers insight into the importance of place and the 
impact it has on lawyers’ ethics. As the legal profession is embracing new and emerging 
technologies, a coherent account of place will be articulated to deal with issues that are 
beginning to surface in relation to technologies and ethics. The thesis therefore 
addresses three main research questions:  
 
1. What ethical challenges does the use of information technology present to 
lawyers? 
 
2. How do the concepts of space and place affect lawyers’ ethics? 
 
3. In light of a theory informed by an ethical account of space and place, how can 
lawyers facilitate ethical practice when engaging with technology? 
 
This thesis therefore aims to examine the impact that technology has on lawyers’ ethics. 
It will address this aim by focusing on three key areas.  
 
First, information technology provides the basis for the study and extends to the 
practices that incorporate information technologies. Information technology in this 
context will refer to contemporary technology and may be referred to, interchangeably, 
as ‘technology’. Technologies to be assessed include cloud computing,1  electronic 
																																																								
1 Nicholas Hoover, 'Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security and Business Regulation' 
(2013) 8 Journal of Business & Technology Law 255. 
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discovery,2 technologies relating to lawyer communication,3 electronic outsourcing4 
and courtroom technologies.5 Both risks and benefits have been identified from these 
areas, which indicate that technology is capable of affecting the end user – in this case, 
both the lawyer and the lawyer’s clients. Secondly, in broad terms the legal and ethical 
considerations that will be examined in this study include confidentiality 6  and 
communication.7 Finally, the philosophical concepts of space and place,8 community9 
and location10 will be addressed.11 
 
 
 
																																																								
2 Cindy Pham, 'E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What's a Litigant to Do?' (2013) 5(1) Hastings Science 
and Technology Law Journal 139. 
3 Herman Tavani, Ethics and Technology: Ethical Issues in an Age of Information and Communication 
Technology (John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed, 2007). 
4 Chris Merritt, 'Outsourcing Surges on Demand for Price Cuts', The Australian 14 March 2014 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/outsourcing-surges-on-demand-for-price-
cuts/story-e6frg97x-1226854189776?nk=081233683511f58588fa3071d2335ca7>; Mary Lacity, Leslie 
Willcocks and Andrew Burgess, The Rise of Legal Services Outsourcing: Risk and Opportunity 
(Bloomsbury, 2014). 
5 Electronic Trials (eTrials) Queensland Courts (5 October 2012) The State of Queensland (Queensland 
Courts) <http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/information-for-lawyers/electronic-trials-etrials>; Justice Stuart 
Morris, 'Where is Technology Taking the Courts and Tribunals?' (Paper presented at the Court 
Technology - Updates and Developments, Melbourne, 20 October 2004 2004) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/VicJSchol/2004/15.html>; Anne Wallace, 'Virtual Justice in the 
Bush: The Use of Court Technology in Remote and Regional Australia' (2008) 19 Journal of Law, 
Information and Science 1. 
6 Louise Hill, 'Emerging Technology and Client Confidentiality: How Changing Technology Brings 
Ethical Dilemmas' (2010) 16 Journal of Science and Technology Law 1. 
7  Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012). Generally, 
communication is covered in rules 22, 26, 30-35, but it is possible that technology has heightened the 
possibility of errors (r30) and inadvertent disclosure (r 31). 
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Joan Stambaugh trans, State University of New York Press, revised 
ed ed, 2010). 
9 Joseph Grange, 'Community' in Craig Hanks (ed), Technology and Values (Blackwell Publishing, 1st 
ed, 2010) 385; Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier 
(Harper Collins, 1993); Melvin Webber, 'Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity' in J. 
Lowdon Wingo (ed), Cities and Space (John Hopkins Press, 1963) 23. 
10 Bruce Janz, 'Thinking Like A Mountain: Ethics and Place as Travelling Concepts' in Martin Drenthen, 
Jozef Keulartz and James Proctor (eds), New Visions of Nature: Complexity and Authenticity (Springer, 
2009) 181. 
11 The thesis is not a self critique of Heidegger. It recognises that the complexity of Heideggerian 
thought gives rise to a number of perspectives on whether and how Heidegger can be ‘used’ and if it 
can be used, what precisely its implication would be. In this thesis, the perspective of Heidegger that 
has been taken has been adopted by theorists such as Joseph Grange, Hans Jonas and Stephen Moore. 
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II CONTEXT 
 
Although there are many articles relating to the increase in technology use by the legal 
profession, it appears that none yet explicitly recognise place. 12  From research 
undertaken during this thesis, the main observation has been that lawyers are engaging 
a variety of technologies in the course of their work. Further investigation into each of 
these technologies has, so far as the ethical practice of law is concerned, presented a 
number of positive and negative developments.13 
 
The philosophy of Martin Heidegger provides the main reference point for the analysis 
of the connection between technology and ethics in the thesis, and does so at a deep 
level.14 It is Heideggerian thought that brings the concepts of space and place into the 
centre of this analysis.15 Space is viewed as a larger and more general concept in which 
locality is removed. Place by comparison is found within space and is a specific creation 
																																																								
12 Barry Brickner, 'Computer Usage by Michigan Lawyers' (2004) 83 Michigan Bar Journal 40; Jim 
Calloway, 'Moving to a Virtual Practice Model Do you Have the Right Stuff?' (2011) 37 Law Practice 
36; Jennifer Foreshaw, 'Order! Top Law Firm's Positive Verdict is in', Australian IT, The Australian 5 
June 2012, 36; Stewart James, Understanding the Global Risk of Cybercrime The Society for Computers 
and Law <http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed32886>; Jayanth K Krishnan, 'Outsourcing and the 
Globalizing Legal Profession' (Faculty Publications No 311, Indiana University, 2007); Michael H. 
Rubin, 'If Social media is so Appealing, Why are There Any Ethical Concerns for Appellate Lawyers?' 
(Paper presented at the Bar Association of the Fifth Circuit Continuing Legal Education Program, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, 8 October 2013 . 
13 Steven J Harper, The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis (Basic Books, 2013); Richard Susskind, 
Tomorrow's Lawyers (Oxford University Press, 2013). For example, Susskind writes with optimism 
when discussing technological change, focusing on the potential for innovation in regards to business 
structures and role-identity, whereas Harper illustrates the negative effect technology has had on the 
profession in regards to the intensity of legal work and a saturated job market.  
14 Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being (Twayne Publishers, 1st ed, 1958); Martin Heidegger, 
Poetry, Language, Thought (Albert Hofstadter trans, Harper & Row, 1st ed, 1971); Martin Heidegger, 
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (William Lovitt trans, Harper and Row, 1977); 
Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Albert Hofstadter trans, Indiana University 
Press, revised ed ed, 1988); Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Parvis 
Emad and Kenneth Maly trans, Indiana University Press, 1999); Heidegger, above n 8. 
15 This thesis relies significantly on technology theorists such as Joseph Grange, Hans Jonas and 
Stephen Moore. In general these theorists does not accept Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics while 
accepting his insights into the state of technology. The thesis ‘uses’ Heidegger in relation to the place 
of technology in legal ethics and therefore Heidegger is principally available to give insight into the 
significance of place and technology in legal ethics. The thesis is not itself a critique of Heidegger’s 
philosophy.  
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that can be defined by three factors – locality, relation, and spirit.16 Spirit in this context 
is a combination of history and tradition.17 These three elements do not necessarily give 
a definitive and fixed formal structure of place that could work across the disciplines.18 
However, they do provide a grounding and framework that best deals with the effect of 
technological change on lawyers’ ethics. 
 
Place is assumed but perhaps uncommonly articulated in many legal theories, especially 
those concerning community.19 In conditions of the rapid modern development and 
increasing use of information technology, place is also at risk of being obliterated by 
technology. The next section gives a brief overview of Heidegger’s ideas about 
phenomenology and place, which are then significantly expanded upon in chapters one, 
two and three.  
 
III THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A Heideggerian framework to address the issues lawyers face with increasing 
technology use underpins the thesis. Heidegger argued that modernist philosophical 
traditions that originated with Descartes were incomplete.20 In order to answer the 
question of what it is to be, he therefore developed the concept of Dasein. Da is literally 
translated as ‘there’ and Sein is ‘being’. The ‘there’ is central to the concept, as the 
																																																								
16 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS I INTRODUCTION. 
17 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS II HEIDEGGER. 
18 For a more comprehensive discussion on the changing nature of place, see Edward Casey, The Fate of 
Place: A Philosophical History (University of California Press, 1st ed, 1997) 286. 
19 BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR II ETHICS OF GEOGRAPHY AND 
PLACE. 
20 Rene Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (Valentine Miller and Reese Miller trans, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991). Descartes argued that the world and the mind were two separate concepts and one did 
not need to rely on the other. The world could actually be nothing more than an illusion.  
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being has to be there – a literal, ‘being-in-the-world’.21 So long as beings (Dasein) 
engage with the world, their thoughts and meanings are real.22  Once the being is 
complete and validated by their place, a range of personal traits and characteristics 
(including responsibility and authenticity) may develop into an ethical framework.23 
Without a place, a being (Dasein) cannot exist.  
 
The world in which Dasein exists is a phenomenon unto itself, but only exists with 
Dasein’s occupation. Involvement with the world (Bewandtnis) shapes the world and a 
characteristic of Dasein. The geographical location of the Dasein contributes to its 
place – a place in which it dwells. Dwelling in the world also brings a closeness and 
interaction with Others, which is the point at which Heidegger introduces community.24  
‘Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others’.25 If place 
directly contributes to building a community, place necessarily contributes to shared 
norms and ethics.  
 
Place is developed further in Heidegger’s later work in which he defines where place 
exists and how it grounds Dasein.26  This grounding occurs in the fourfold which 
Hiedegger describes as the idea of spirituality by reference to the earth, skies, divinities 
and mortal unity.27 In addition to location and community making up a place, the final 
element of tradition, spirit and history is introduced. This is originally based on Plato’s 
term Koinonia, which is the experience of the community, rather than the physical 
																																																								
21 Heidegger, above n 8, 11. 
22 Ibid 147 
23 Ibid 42. This term is referred to as ‘Eigentlichkeit’. 
24 Ibid 102.  
25 Ibid 115. 
26 Heidegger, above n 14, Poetry, Language, Thought, 157. 
27 Ibid 148. 
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community itself. There are three aspects of Koinonia, philosophy, shared meaning and 
spiritual meeting.28 In order to complete place, the history of the place contributes to 
the present. Heidegger addresses this in terms of temporality. Time has to be included 
in the construction of place, as place has a past, present and future – however Heidegger 
sees that these elements need not be sequential, nor linked. ‘Temporality temporalizes 
itself as a future which makes present in a process of having been’.29 With the removal 
of distance that comes from technology use, time is similarly obliterated. For example, 
it takes a certain amount of time between sending and receiving a letter, depending on 
where in the world the letter writer and recipient are. However, email is virtually 
instantaneous, so time is less of a consideration when sending and receiving them. 
 
Technology is another theme that appears in Heidegger’s philosophy. He sees 
technology as an entry point to creating a new world. Characteristics such as lack of 
communication, distraction and loss of authority can be magnified in the technological 
age.30 Heidegger was concerned that technology is capable of changing the essence of 
Dasein as well as the essence of the world. However, he also believed that technology 
was essential to being-in-the-world. As technology advances, it ‘threatens to slip from 
human control’.31 As such, it goes beyond boundaries and removes place. It connects 
all spaces and removes any form of dwelling which compromises essence.  
 
 
																																																								
28 Grange, above n 9. 
29 Heidegger, above n 8, 401. 
30 Albert Borgmann, 'Technology' in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds), A Companion to 
Heidegger (Blackwell, 2005) 420. 
31 Heidegger, above n 14, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 4. 
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IV AIM 
 
This thesis will primarily contribute to the existing literature by achieving two aims. 
 
It will assess the impact of technology on lawyers’ ethics. As technology use is vast 
and varied, many lawyers and law firms use and implement technologies to assist their 
work, without necessarily taking the time to consider the consequences.32 
 
It will then develop a coherent ethical perspective on technology and lawyers’ ethics 
based on theories of place. This thesis therefore fills a gap within community theories 
of lawyers’ ethics and bridges the gap between ethical theories and technology 
philosophy.33   
 
V METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis is philosophically informed legal research. Legal research can encompass 
doctrinal research, reform-oriented research and theoretical research.34 Although these 
three areas have been recognised as not capturing the extended elements of legal 
research, this thesis is primarily theoretical in nature. Quantitative and empirical 
																																																								
32 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, 'Ethical Risks From the Use of Technology' (2004-2005) 31 Rutgers 
Computer and Technology Law Journal 1. 
33 Ethical theories such as those found in Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 
1993); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Bloomsbury, 3rd ed, 2007); Catharine MacKinnon, 'Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence' (1983) 8(4) Signs 635; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, 'What's Gender got to do With it: The Politics and Morality of an Ethic of Care' (1996) 22(1) 
New York University Review of Law and Social Change and technological theories such as Alan R 
Drengson, 'Four Philosophies of Technology' in Craig Hanks (ed), Technology and Values (Blackwell 
Publishing, 1st ed, 2010) 26; Herbert Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology' (1941) 
9 Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences ; Merritt Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism In 
American Culture' in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The 
Dilemma of Technological Determinism (MIT Press, 1994) 2. 
34 The literature on legal research is notoriously sparse, but see Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don 
Harding, 'Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education 
Commission' (1987) 3(17) Australian Government Publishing Service , para 9. 
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research methods are not immediately relevant,35 however prior studies of that nature 
will be referred to when applicable to the research questions.  
 
That theory – grounded in Heideggerian thought – is the reference point for evaluating 
other doctrinal and reform-oriented research that is relevant to technology and lawyers’ 
ethics.36 The broad nature of theoretical research is advantageous to this project, which 
spans the areas of legal theory, ethical theory, continental philosophy and technology 
theory.  
 
The two-step nature of the doctrinal method, of finding the law and interpreting the 
text, will help achieve the aims of the study by ensuring current legal sources are 
incorporated and reflected upon.37 Case law, codes and legislation will be used to 
provide a context and to spur on greater theoretical research.38 This thesis draws on a 
number of jurisdictions, but it relies heavily on material from the United States. This is 
due to the fact that the United States is further advanced when it comes to reflecting on 
technology use by lawyers.39 
 
The methodology comprises three elements. First and most importantly, it involves the 
articulation of a coherent philosophy of technology and points at which that is relevant 
to the ethics of legal practice. Secondly, an account will be given of a number of discrete 
																																																								
35 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, 'Qualitative Legal Research' in Mike McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 16. 
36 Ibid 17. 
37 Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Lawbook Co, 3rd ed, 2010). 
38 Professional rules have also been included as a method of demonstrating their potential to deal with 
technology use by lawyers from a theoretical standpoint.  
39 For example, the American Bar Association’s model rules explicitly state that lawyers must provide 
competent representation to a client. In order to maintain requisite knowledge and skill, ‘a lawyer 
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated 
with relevant technology’. See American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (at 
2002) rule 1.1, comment 8.	
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legal and ethical issues that information technology has created for legal practice. As 
mentioned, there is already a professional literature and a small academic literature on 
these issues and the thesis will include a thorough analysis of that material. Thirdly, the 
philosophical perspective that is articulated will be used to evaluate the law and current 
ethical and technological practices amongst lawyers and law firms, and to give shape 
to any potential reforms of that practice. 
 
This method allows for recognition of ‘the extent and effect of underlying theory in 
order to better critique the validity of what exists, and provide a basis for something 
better’.40 
VI CHAPTER OUTLINES 
 
A Chapter One – Nearing is the Presencing of Nearness 
 
Chapter One introduces and gives an overview of Heidegger’s theories that lead to a 
construction of the theory of place. Here, the concept of being and being-there begins 
to emerge.41 The world in which being exists relates to concepts such as revealing, 
essence and care, which are all qualities that construct the being. This then leads to the 
central proposition of the thesis – a being must have place in order to develop and shape 
their ethical decision making. The potential for the abolition of distance begins, and is 
discussed by reference to Heidegger and community theories.42  
 
																																																								
40 Hutchinson, above n 37. 
41 Heidegger, above n 8; Heidegger, above n 13, The Basic Problems With Phenomenology. 
42 Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (Charles P. Loomis trans, David and Charles, 1st ed, 
2002). 
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Theories of community are approached next, to display the importance that history 
holds in building a community that influences the ethics of the people within.43 The 
loss of community will be considered to show how place is partly formed by 
community.44 The discussion on technology begins to emerge and philosophies are 
analysed to demonstrate the connection that technology shares with ethics. The 
separation of space and place and the effect that technology has had on the change is 
finally addressed within this chapter to form the foundation of the main discussion.  
 
B Chapter Two – Being in Place is Being in Something Superior 
 
Chapter Two provides an account of ethics, primarily the ethics of place, the ethics of 
technology and Heideggerian ethics. In order to reconcile lawyers’ ethics and 
technology use, the way that place is linked to ethics will be shown.  
 
The geographic location of someone or something can determine their ethics, so if 
location is removed by technology there is potential for ethics to disappear alongside 
it.45 The discussion moves to the ethics of technology and an account of how ethical 
frameworks exist in virtual locations and virtual communities when facilitated by the 
Internet. 46 
 
																																																								
43 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Wiley, 1992).  
44 Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (MIT Press, 2006). 
45 Ibid; Janz, above n 10. 
46  Ned Kock, 'The Psychobiological Mode: Towards a New Theory of Computer-Mediated 
Communication based on Darwinian Evolution' (2004) 15(3) Organization Science 327; Sara Ferlander, 
The Internet, Social Capital and Local Community (Doctoral Thesis, University of Stirling, 2003); 
Grange, above n 9. 
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This then examines the potential for legal ethics within a Heideggerian framework. 
Heidegger was not an ethicist, however his work leaves room for ethics to develop.47 
This is evident in the construction of the Dasein, who must have place in order to exhibit 
positive traits.  
 
C Chapter Three – The Priority of Place in Lawyers’ Ethics 
 
Chapter Three aims to discover the priority of place in lawyers’ ethics. An overview of 
liberalism48 and its ‘dominant view’ of lawyers’ ethics,49 virtue ethics50 and the ethics 
of care51 is given, and they are contrasted with sociological studies in lawyers’ ethics.52 
Each view is critiqued against the three elements that construct place – community, 
history and location.  
 
At one end of the ethical spectrum is liberalism that incorporates autonomy, encourages 
individualism and adherence to the client’s wishes. In these theories there is a clear 
disconnection between place and the lawyer, with little reference made to the 
community.53 In some respects, virtue ethics and ethics of care appear on the opposite 
side of the common lawyers’ ethical spectrum and share some overlapping features 
																																																								
47 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology' in David Farrell Krell (ed), Basic Writings 
(Harper Perennial, 2008) 307. 
48 Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics (Lexis Nexis, 4th ed, 2010).  
49 William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
50 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics (David Ross trans, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2009). David 
Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press, 2007); MacIntyre, above n 31 
After Virtue. 
51 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 'Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of Professional Responsibility and Dispute 
Resolution' (2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 979; Stephen Ellmann, 'The Ethic of Care as an 
Ethic for Lawyers' (1992) 81(7) Georgetown Law Journal 2665. 
52 Donald Landon, Country Lawyers (Praeger Publishers, 1st ed, 1990); John P. Heinz and Edward O. 
Laumann, Chicago Lawyers (Northwestern University Press, revised ed, 1994). 
53 Monroe Freedman, 'A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers' Ethics' (2012) 25 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 91. 
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such as community and tradition. However, in all, the element of place is either ignored 
or assumed, underplaying the significant role that it has in the expression of lawyers’ 
ethics.  
 
Sociological studies and theories also make greater reference to place than the 
dominant, liberal view. Unlike even virtue ethics and ethics of care, the location 
element of place is realised more explicitly than the other two factors of community 
and history.54  
 
D Chapter Four – Globalisation and Place 
 
Chapter Four operates in two parts and acts as a bridge between the theories discussed 
in the first three chapters and the practical issues dealt with in the latter chapters that 
make greater reference to case law and legislation. First, it deals with globalisation 
theory and how Heidegger predicted certain changes that the world would face - what 
is now described as globalisation. 55  Secondly, the chapter then deals with how 
globalisation is directly affecting the profession.  
 
Heidegger’s theories of globalisation arise from a valuing of tradition and the successful 
prediction of the abolition of distance. Technology has facilitated globalisation, by 
creating an endless space that removes boundaries. Building upon Enlightenment 
philosophies, 56  modernity can underpin globalisation theory by referencing a 
																																																								
54 This is particularly evident in Heinz and Laumann, above n 48. 
55 Heidegger, above n 13, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 
56 Stemming from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (P Guyer and A Wood trans, Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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disconnection between space, place and time,57 which is not necessarily evident in 
Enlightenment philosophy.  
 
There are three main areas of legal practice that are affected by globalisation and 
technological change: communication, confidentiality and litigation.58  This chapter 
briefly addresses each by examining the changing nature of the profession.59 These 
issues are each expanded in a dedicated chapter to discuss the technologies contributing 
to the issues and the impact it is having on ethics.  
 
E Chapter Five – Confidentiality and Unconcealment 
 
Chapter Five is the first to consider a specific ethical concern for practising lawyers. 
Confidentiality has always been a core concern of the profession.60 It is generally 
thought that the lawyer-client relationship cannot function successfully without the 
element of confidentiality. This chapter demonstrates how the three core elements of 
place may be relied upon to enhance adherence to professional standards relating to 
confidentiality. 
 
The chapter includes an account of the different ways confidentiality may be 
compromised through conflicts of interest.61 Cloud computing as a technology and 
																																																								
57 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1st ed, 1990); Anthony 
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (John Wiley & Sons, 
2013). 
58 Bradley H. Leiber, 'Applying Ethics Rules to Rapidly Changing Technology: The D.C. Bar's Approach 
to Metadata' (2008) 21 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 893. 
59 Harper, above n 12. 
60 Hill, above n 6; Radin, 'The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client' 
(1928) 16 California Law Review 487.  
61  Ian Dallen, 'The Rise of the Information Barrier: Managing Potential Legal Conflicts Within 
Commerical Firms' (2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 428; Sandro Goubran, 'Conflicts of Duty: The 
Perennial Lawyers' Tale - A Comparative Study of the Law in England and Australia' (2006) 30 
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outsourcing as a process facilitated by the cloud, are discussed to illustrate 
confidentiality issues in practice.62 The way that law firms and government entities 
create policy to address confidentiality and jurisdiction – a legal recognition of place -  
is briefly considered to frame the way outsourcing is used in the profession.  
 
Heidegger’s theories of Dasein, truth and unconcealment are then used to consider the 
ethical and practical issues of confidentiality in order to further the argument for place 
in lawyers’ ethics.  
 
F Chapter Six – Lawyer Communication 
 
Chapter Six presents a consistent account of communication technologies and medium 
theory, which helps to understand the issues lawyers face in regards to 
communication.63 These issues may be arranged into two areas, the first being the 
creation and maintenance of the lawyer-client relationship and the second being issues 
that relate to privileged communication.64  Advertising and social media are used as 
technological examples involving lawyer communication.65 
 
																																																								
Melbourne University Law Review 88; Janine Griffiths-Baker, Serving Two Masters: Conflicts of Interest 
in the Modern Law Firm (Hart Publishing, 2002). 
62 Brett Burney, 'Flying Safely In the Cloud' (2011) 37 Law Practice ; Jared A Harshbarger, 'Cloud 
Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building Trust with United States Companies' (2011) 16 
Journal of Technology Law and Policy 229. 
63 Donald Ellis, 'Medium Theory' in Stephen W Littlejohn and Karen A Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory (SAGE Publications, 2009) 645; Joshua Meyrowitz, 'Medium Theory' in David 
J Crowley and David Mitchell (eds), Communication Theory Today (Stanford University Press, 1994) 
50. 
64 Radin, above n 56. 
65 Coralie Kenny and Tahlia Gordon, 'Social Media Issues for Legal Practice' (2012) 50 Law Society 
Journal 66; Michael E Lackey and Joseph P Minta, 'Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of 
Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging' (2012) 28(1) Touro Law Review 149; Daniel Backer, 'Choice of 
Law in Online Legal Ethics: Changing a Vague Standard for Attorney Advertising on the Internet' (2002) 
70(6) Fordham Law Review 2409.  
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There is often a tension found between the technical aspect of technology and the 
societal view found in studies from the humanities.  There is debate as to whether 
society drives technological change, whether technology drives societal change, or 
whether there is a combination of both.66 Heidegger’s idea of place will be used to 
assist this discussion and highlight the ethical components and present a viewpoint that 
will contribute to the overall theme of place in lawyers’ ethics.  
 
 Issues that arise in practice are compared with the technologies that facilitate the 
communication such as email. This will be built on by examining the effect that social 
media use by the legal profession has on the personal and professional divide.  
Advertising naturally follows from that discussion, as lawyers and law firms currently 
utilise advertising mediums that are driven by technology.  
 
G Chapter Seven– Bridges to Their Own Answering: Use of Technology in the Courts 
 
Chapter Seven provides a contrast to the earlier chapters that focused solely on lawyers’ 
ethics. Technology in the courtroom is the central theme of this chapter, and judicial 
ethics are introduced as both a supplement and an unarticulated assumption to lawyers’ 
ethics.67  
 
First, the lawyer’s duty to the court is examined, alongside the lawyer’s duty of 
disclosure to the court, which is only made possible because of an impartial judge.68 
																																																								
66 For example, see discussions relating to technological determinism: Smith, above n 31. 
67 James Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2009). 
68 Goubran, above n 57. 
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Secondly, an account of judicial ethics is provided and the core concept of impartiality 
is addressed. Judicial ethics differ from lawyers’ ethics where duties are concerned. 69 
 
Courtrooms and litigation are evolving to encompass more technologies. 70  The 
rationale is that it saves time and costs associated with litigation. However, the 
technologies are also helping to obliterate place. The courtroom is a place in itself, 
which comprises a community, history and firm location. When technologies such as 
video linking are engaged, place is slowly compromised.71 This section also includes 
reference to courtroom design and the way that it impacts on the location aspect of 
place.  
 
The rise of electronic devices in the courtroom and the process of electronic discovery 
is at the centre of the technological discussion and is used to prove how place is 
disrupted in the courtroom.72  
 
 
																																																								
69 Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and George Williams, 'Judicial Independence from the Executive: A First-
Principles Review of The Australian Cases' (2014) 40(3) Monash University Law Review 593. For 
example, a lawyer must remain loyal to one client, whereas a judge must maintain independence during 
litigation.  
70  Electronic Trials (2 July 2014) District Court of Western Australia 
<http://www.districtcourt.wa.gov.au/E/electronictrials.aspx?uid=7989-5270-7024-3843>; eCourtroom 
Federal Court of Australia <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/online-services/ecourtroom>; Morris, above n 
5. 
71 Emma Rowden, Anne Wallance and Jane Goodman-Delahunty, 'Sentencing by Videolink: Up In the 
Air?' (2010) 34 Criminal Law Journal 363. 
72 Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Discovery of Documents in Federal Courts,  Report 
No 115 (2011); Michael F Kelleher, Matthew Bender Practice Guide: California E-Discovery and 
Evidence . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter gives a theoretical account of place that enables us to evaluate lawyers’ 
ethics (when engaging technology).  In doing so it integrates three concepts relating to 
space and place, community, and technology. The importance of these three areas will 
be established to identify conceptual structures that shape values and ethics.  
 
The issues to be considered in this chapter include establishing why space and place 
matter in ethics, how community can influence ethics, and determining how significant 
the role of technology is in affecting or shaping ethics.  
 
First, the works of  phenomenologist Martin Heidegger will be discussed in order to 
address the importance that space and place hold when engaging in philosophical 
inquiry.  By addressing prior assumptions made about what it is to exist and to be, and 
the influence of place and technology on existence, it will be argued that modern 
information technology is suppressing the influence that place had had on ethics. When 
place is removed, it can subsequently affect a person’s essence. Heidegger’s work is 
important and relevant to this argument, in order to show how being, essence and 
revealing powers are linked to technology use and ethics. 
 
Secondly, these foundations will be built upon to include the idea of community, which 
naturally follows from Heidegger’s concept of ‘place’. Community will be examined 
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to establish the world in which lawyers work, what a loss of community could result in 
and how communities can be of influence to ethics.  
 
Finally, subsequent philosophical work using Heidegger’s concepts in theories of 
technology will be addressed to demonstrate how place and community are present 
when engaging technology and how that may affect ethics. 
 
II HEIDEGGER 
 
The concept of existence can be difficult to address properly with ordinary language. 
To deeply explore the fundamental question of being, Heidegger used the German 
language with such force, that its meaning can be obfuscated.  Heidegger cannot use 
common phrases such as ‘being’ and ‘existence’ without clarification, as in order to 
question what it means to exist, all assumptions and common meaning relating to those 
words must be disregarded.  
 
Heidegger explored concepts of being, world and human existence, by reference to 
themes of space and place. He argued that we already find ourselves in the world and 
beings can only have thoughts and meaning, provided that they engage in the world.1 
This view counters modernist philosophical traditions originating with Descartes, 
believing the mind could operate independently of the world; a world that could simply 
be a stirring illusion.2  
 
																																																								
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Joan Stambaugh trans, State University of New York Press, revised 
ed ed, 2010) 147. [trans of: Sein und Zeit (first published 1953)]. 
2 Rene Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (Valentine Miller and Reese Miller trans, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991). 
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A Phenomenology and Asking the Question of Being 
 
Traditionally, philosophical questions were concerned with the discovery of whether or 
not a particular thing existed. Heidegger saw a fundamental flaw in this type of 
philosophy, and sought to question what exactly it meant to exist. ‘The fact that we live 
already in an understanding of being and that the meaning of being is at the same time 
shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental necessity of retrieving the question of the 
meaning of “being”’.3 By challenging the a priori assumption, Heidegger brought to 
light the ontological difference between being as an entity and being as existing.4 The 
difference between what is ontical and what is ontological is also important to 
Heidegger. An ontic interpretation of being relates only to the knowledge of facts about 
something, whereas ontological interpretation is about the philosophy of existence.5  
 
Heidegger considered himself a phenomenologist, which shaped his views on the 
question of being. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology he chose not to accept the 
earlier work Edmund Husserl had done in the field.6  Husserl had believed philosophy 
was a scientific discipline, founded on a phenomenological principle. 7  Heidegger 
thought otherwise. 
 
																																																								
3 Heidegger, above n 1, 3. 
4 Heidegger frequently made use of the term a priori to refer to knowledge that rested on a prior 
assumption. For example, existence in ancient philosophy was an a priori term.  
5 Andrew Feenberg, 'The Ontic and the Ontological in Heidegger's Philosophy of Technology: Response 
to Thomson' (2000) 43 Inquiry 445, 447. 
6 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Albert Hofstadter trans, Indiana University 
Press, revised ed ed, 1988) 28 [trans of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (first published 1927)]. 
7 Donn Welton (ed), The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology (Indiana 
University Press, 1999). 
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Once Heidegger decided upon the question of being, he chose to adopt a specific style 
of phenomenology as his method of inquiry. Instead of relying on the ordinary 
understanding of phenomenology, which is understanding how things are experienced, 
Heidegger took it further than mere consideration of an experience, but examined it to 
understand the a priori conditions that structure the experience.8 Phenomenology in 
this respect allows the presuppositions to be revealed, as it is hermeneutic, rather than 
transcendental in nature.9 The hermeneutic structure allows for a greater interpretation 
of being that can take in the history of existence as well as allowing for its revision.  
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger questioned the idea of worldliness in the world. Basing 
his definitions in phenomenology, Heidegger considered the world by way of 
phenomenon – ‘that which shows itself as being and the structure of being’.10 In order 
to answer the question of being whilst drawing on the fundamental ontological method 
of inquiry, Heidegger introduced the concept of Dasein.  
 
B Dasein 
 
Dasein is the central concept in Heidegger’s arguments. The literal German translation 
of the term is made up of two words. ‘Da’ meaning ‘there’ and ‘Sein’ meaning ‘being’. 
The ‘there’ is an integral part of ascertaining the meaning behind Dasein, as a being 
merely is, whereas a being-there makes reference to an existence with a worldview in 
mind. Dasein are not just being, but being there. Dasein is described as a ‘being-in-the-
																																																								
8 Heidegger, above n 1, 2. 
9 Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz (eds), Theodore Kisiel: Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and 
Interpretive Signposts (Continuum Books, 2002) ch 8. 
10 Heidegger, above n 1, 63. 
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world’.11 The Dasein is influenced by the world around them, which helps structure 
their habits and practices.   
 
In Heidegger’s philosophy, Dasein is a term used to describe the sort of entity that a 
human is and the way in which the human exists. This view is commonly referred to in 
the secondary literature. 12  In differentiating humans from animals and objects, 
Heidegger notes that only humans have an understanding of what it is to be, plus the 
ability to reflect upon that meaning. ‘Dasein is ontically distinguished by the fact that 
in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it’.13 Thus, an essential characteristic of the 
Dasein is the ability to understand what it is to exist (no matter how steeped within a 
priori conditions it may be), as opposed to merely being categorised as something that 
exists. The way in which Dasein interact with each other and the world will assist in 
discovering the meaning of Being. The aspect of engagement is described by Heidegger 
as the ‘existential analytic’.14   
 
By engaging with entities or equipment (as Heidegger calls items such as a hammer, or 
activities such as cooking), relationships are formed with the equipment because it is 
being used. The equipment has the potential to form a relationship, just as Dasein does. 
Thus the equipment has a kind of Being, described as readiness-to-hand.15 Dasein only 
experiences such equipment, rather than observing them as independent entities.  
 
																																																								
11 Ibid 11. 
12 For a discussion about the standard view see John Haugeland, 'Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger' 
(2005) 13(3) European Journal of Philosophy 421. 
13 Heidegger, above n 1, 11. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 69. 
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 ‘Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself understandingly toward 
that being’. 16  From this statement it can be inferred that the Dasein acts with 
responsibility towards the world around them. This indicates items and objects such as 
a lamp or computer merely possess physical properties incapable of harbouring 
responsibility. Heidegger had a word for this responsibility – ‘Eigentlichkeit’, also 
translated as ‘authenticity’.17  
 
In discussing existence, Heidegger exhibits characteristics that would later be 
developed in the French existentialist movement. This is reflected in his work as he 
expands on the world that Dasein exists in. 
 
C The World 
 
Once the encounter Dasein has with entities and equipment is ascertained, the notion 
of where these engagements are carried out must be addressed.  
 
The concept of the being-in-the-world is created in order to juxtapose the scientific 
assertions made about the universe with the phenomenological ideologies about the 
world. A scientist might go so far as to say the universe we exist in consists only of 
physical objects, thus values are meaningless.18  Heidegger rejects the supposition, 
believing the world is a phenomenon unto itself. Being-in-the-world is an essential 
																																																								
16 Ibid 53. Other translations of the term include ‘Dasein is a being which is related understandingly in 
its being toward that being’. 
17 Ibid 42. 
18 J.L. Mackie, Ethics Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books, 1st ed, 1991). 
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characteristic of Dasein as it belongs to and has a ‘relationship of being towards the 
world’.19 
 
As Dasein has such a deep connection with the world and behaves only in relation to 
the world, it can be said that the world space we exist in and the things we surround 
ourselves with are of great importance. There is an implied understanding (‘verstehen’) 
that comes with comporting towards the world. If we were not acting towards the world 
and enveloping the world, we would inhabit it and circulate in a state of dazed 
confusion.  This overarching world concept does not however mean smaller worlds 
cannot exist within the large world.20 There can be pockets of worlds – for example in 
the ‘world’ of the Australian legal profession, you will find many lawyers acting as 
lawyers, but not many lawyers acting as doctors. The lawyers acting as lawyers make 
up their own little pocket.  
 
Bewandtnis or ‘involvement’ is an important concept Heidegger relied on to further 
understand Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Dasein operates with a series of daily 
interactions, which interconnect into a large network. The network can be interpreted 
as having pre-ontological significance.21 Each link in the network results in shaping the 
context for equipment to exist and contributes to their definition, which in turn assists 
with exposing a characteristic of Dasein and being-in-the-world.  
 
 
 
																																																								
19 Heidegger, above n 1, 11. 
20 Ibid 12. 
21 Ibid 13. 
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D Nearness and Place 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger briefly considered the space in which Dasein dwells. 
Spatiality is an existential spatiality, characterised by ‘De-severing amounts to making 
the farness vanish – this is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it 
close’.22 Closeness appears to be directly related to availability. Physical distance is not 
something to be confused with existential space. Existential space Heidegger said was 
derived from temporality in order to be a characteristic of Dasein.23   
 
The idea of Being-with and Others turns the question of what it means to exist into a 
community oriented idea. Heidegger uses the term Others interchangeably with They, 
however they are not the conventional English understanding of the terms.24  
 
By Others we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the I stands out. 
They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself – those 
among whom one is too… By reason of this with-like, being-in-the-world, the world is always 
the one that I share with Others.25 
 
This indicates Others has a sense of community whereby shared norms result in an 
ontological phenomenon in their own right. And – an important point for this thesis -
this principle starts to embed the value of place in Heidegger’s philosophy. To exist is 
impossible without the world. The world in which Dasein finds itself being, is not just 
																																																								
22 Ibid 102. 
23 Ibid 70. 
24 Ibid 114.  
25 Ibid 115. 
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their own independent world, but rather a world that is shared. So to exist, means to 
exist with similar Others within the world. Therefore place is directly contributing to a 
concept of community and the sharing of norms, knowledge and ethics.  
 
E Technology 
 
Technology is another object that has influence on spatiality. Technology became a 
recurring theme in Heidegger’s work, especially in his later texts. Expanding his world 
ideas, a technological age created a new world. These are latent ideas that are built on 
and expanded from ideas in Being and Time, yet can be read almost independently of 
the prior work. Here, Heidegger became more spiritual in his writing, taking into 
consideration the universe and the greater notion of divinity. When reading Heidegger’s 
work chronologically, one can see the ‘gradual emergence of the problem of 
technology’.26 Although Being and Time failed to address technology completely as a 
means of revealing in the modern era, it worked as an anticipatory text, demonstrating 
how the characteristics that humans possess (such as communication losing touch with 
reality, a restlessness and distraction and a loss of authority) will eventually be 
magnified in a technological age.27 Technology had changed the world dramatically in 
so far as creating new expectations relating to the speed at which things are done and 
the assumption that nearness is no longer a necessity.  Referring back to Heidegger’s 
views on essence, technology was capable of changing the essence of the Dasein as 
well as changing the essence of the world. The world showed depth, centered on 
																																																								
26 Albert Borgmann, 'Technology' in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (eds), A Companion to 
Heidegger (Blackwell, 2005) 420. 
27 Ibid 422. 
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something tangible, but when faced with technological interference, these features are 
challenged. 
 
Heidegger’s worry stemmed from the distinction between objects as compared with 
resources. Resources were seen as flexible, whereas objects had fixed features. Things 
started to lose their essence, and with no constant, there could not be sets of values. 
Technology brought positives such as flexibility and ease, however it was at the cost of 
losing essence and our own character. Without essence it was difficult to develop a set 
of ethical values that could shape one’s character. Technology takes away the necessity 
of evolving certain skills relating to knowing how to act in society. It can be said that, 
if technology continues to develop, it could destroy certain sections of society.28  
 
Heidegger’s basic stance towards technology was that it created a world where things 
are removed and replaced with objects we had created, and as the creators we eventually 
become objects. Therefore we lose our essence, and our integrity is destroyed. As 
described by Feenberg, Heidegger states that:  
 
Technology constitutes a new type of cultural system that restructures the entire social world as 
an object of control. This system is characterised by an expansive dynamic which invades every 
pretechnological enclave and shapes the whole of social life. The instrumentalisation of man 
and society is thus a destiny from which there is no escape other than retreat. 29   
 
There are multiple critiques of the body of work found in The Question Concerning 
Technology. The main criticism is that all technology is not created alike. A nuclear 
																																																								
28 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology' in David Farrell Krell (ed), Basic Writings 
(Harper Perennial, 2008) 307, 309. 
29 Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (Routledge, 1999) 183. 
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warhead has different qualities to a newspaper press, but Heidegger would have 
classified them both as a technology. Heidegger favoured using the example of a 
hydroelectric plant built on the Rhine River.30 The natural environment is juxtaposed 
with the ‘monstrousness’ of the modern hydroelectric machinery to paint an image of 
conversion - a thing of natural beauty (the Rhine River) has been reduced to a machine 
and resource only useful as a supplier of hydropower.31 This example can be applied to 
the human situation of a casual chat turning into a networking opportunity. 32 
Technology is seen as an item to help establish the understanding of the world by 
revealing the world to itself. As such, it is seen that technology starts to define and 
shape our way of being, rather than existing as a passive characteristic. 
 
These views have led to scholarly discussion regarding the individual merits of each 
technology. The positive and negative aspects are evaluated in order to try to paint an 
accurate picture of where technology will lead us. The problem with this approach is 
that Heidegger still looked towards the way in which being reveals itself to the world – 
rather than simply choosing to view technology as a positive or negative force, it is 
used as a tool to understand the world.  
 
Technology moves into space and infringes on the Dasein’s capacity and right to sound 
development. Technology removes boundaries that were previously established and as 
we become more engrossed in the phenomena of technology, we drift further and 
further away from our own essence - and sacrifice the qualities that make us whole.  
																																																								
30 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (William Lovitt trans, 
Harper and Row, 1977)5, 29.. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics' in 
Charles B. Guignon (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge University Press, 345. 
	 28
 
Another important distinction to make when addressing Heidegger and his account of 
technology is that between what is ‘true’ and what is ‘correct’. When the instrumental 
conception of technology is approached, that as being a means to an end, Heidegger 
looks to the basic meaning, calling the statement correct. But truth is an entirely 
different concept that requires deeper analysis. The truth is revealed in essence, essence 
that comes from beings. 
 
Heidegger believed technology was essential to our way of being-in-the-world. 
‘Everywhere we remain, unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately 
affirm or deny it’. 33  Therefore the more technology advances, then the more it 
‘threatens to slip from human control’.34 These concerns are still as valid today as they 
were when The Question Concerning Technology was written.  
 
To begin to understand Heidegger’s view of technology as a philosophical concept, his 
definition must first be established. The commonly referred to definition of technology 
is tools and instruments that are invented and exploited.35 Technology is derived from 
the Greek term Techne, meaning skill and a mode of doing. Techne was opposed to 
Physis, meaning nature. Thus technology is a product of skill actualised to deal with 
something in nature. This statement is compatible with Heidegger’s way of thinking, 
but it could be believed to be limited to an ‘instrumental and anthropological’ definition 
of technology.36 This definition was dangerous however, as, similarly with Being, 
technology needed to be interrogated to discover the essence of itself. If essence were 
																																																								
33 Heidegger, above n 28, 1. 
34 Ibid 5. 
35 Ibid. See generally 7-15. 
36 Ibid 31. 
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not investigated, technology could remain at opposition with nature. For instance, to 
demonstrate the importance of the use of technology, Adorno and Horkheimer explored 
the theme of opposition and domination. ‘What human beings seek to learn from nature 
[physis] is how to use [techné] to dominate wholly both it and human beings.  Nothing 
else counts.’37 By recognising the opposition, technology may be defined in the best 
terms.  
 
F Revealing 
 
The interrogation method comes about as a concept of clearing – a way of being to 
reveal how things matter.38 Once the essence of technology is discovered, it acts as a 
mode of revealing Being and helps us to understand the world around us. 39 Technology 
is a fundamental mode of revealing.  
 
It is important to considering what technology eventually reveals about being to see the 
effect it has on our essence. In Contributions, Heidegger states technology reduces us 
to not-beings. He also calls this the abandonment of beings by Being.40 This reveals 
that as a not-being, technology removes any sense of awe in the presence of beings and 
in addition to that, we are indifferent to this fact. A numbing of feeling can be the result 
of technological substitution.41  
 
																																																								
37 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Edmund Jephcott trans, Stanford 
University Press, 2002) 2. 
38 Heidegger, above n 28, 44. 
39 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly 
trans, Indiana University Press, 1999) 88. 
40 Ibid 6. 
41 Ibid 8. 
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It seems as though we, as beings, are responsible for this mode of revealing. However 
Heidegger believes it is only to an extent: ‘essence of man is framed, claimed and 
challenged by a power which manifests itself in the essence of technology, a power 
which man himself does not control’.42 To understand this lack of control, Heidegger 
provided the terms Destining and Enframing. Destining is described as ‘what first starts 
man upon a way of revealing’.43 This is another a priori transcendental structure, which 
relies on ordainings. Enframing is a form of ordaining - ‘gathering together of the 
setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e, challenges him forth to reveal the actual, in the 
mode of ordering, as standing-reserve’.44 These terms will help develop the concept of 
Being’s essence unfolding and revealing. Enframing is seen as the essence of 
technology. Enframing does not hold technological possibility, but rather needs to be 
solely examined as the ontological process of revealing the truth.  
 
Another process of revealing is Poiesis, which is the process of fashioning materials in 
a way in which to bring forth the essence of the materials.45 ‘Bringing forth brings out 
of concealment into unconcealment’. 46  The truth of the object is once again an 
important theme in Heidegger’s concepts. By combining Techne with Poiesis, 
Heidegger created the idea of technology as a revealing power. As phenomena are now 
recognised in technology, enframing now ‘drives out every other possibility of 
revealing’ and conceals the fact that technology has a clearing in its essence.47  
 
																																																								
42 Der Spiegel, Interview with Martin Heidegger (Germany, 23 September 1966) – This interview is 
known as ‘Only God Can Save Us’’ The Spiegel Interview. 
43  Heidegger, above n 28, 46. 
44 Ibid 48. 
45 Ibid 10. 
46 Ibid 11. 
47 Ibid 27. 
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Heidegger emphasised that technology at this point should still not only be seen in a 
negative light, nor only positive. We do not have to ‘push on blindly with technology’ 
nor ‘curse it as the work of the devil’.48 In order to exist in harmony with technology, 
we must simply ensure technology is not the only way we encounter entities. By doing 
so we safeguard the fourfold. Remembering that the fourfold consists of the Earth, Sky, 
Divinity and Mortals, each dimension needs to be saved in the sense that their essence 
is revealed. The existential assembly of safeguarding can thus be described as ‘the only 
way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simply 
unity’.49 What can be concluded from this is that relationships with things and other 
beings are still highly important to essence, temporality and place.  
 
G Essence and Dwelling 
 
Fundamentally, temporality was identified as the transcendental condition necessary to 
understanding Being. In Being and Time, dwelling was used to describe the manner in 
which Dasein finds itself in the world. Heidegger developed the concept further in the 
essay Building, Dwelling, Thinking to define where one has a place.50 Place grounds 
Dasein with a set of familiar structures and practices. Place is also linked to Heidegger’s 
existential idea of spatiality.51 Dwelling becomes a central theme necessary to assist in 
the understanding of Being.52  
 
																																																								
48 Ibid 25. 
49 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (Albert Hofstadter trans, Harper & Row, 1st ed, 1971) 
21,157. 
50 Ibid. 
51 This idea of spatiality has been developed further by scholars such as Jeff Malpas e.g. Jeff Malpas, 
Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World (MIT Press, 2006). 
52 Heidegger, above n 1, 13. 
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Heidegger became more spiritual in his writing during Building, Dwelling, Thinking 
and made reference to the earth, the skies, divinities and mortals all living in unity.53 
Dwelling must be seen as ecstases – the phenomena that arise from the unity. The unity 
is referred to as the fourfold, whereby the world structure is no longer separate from 
nature, rather it is now a combination.54 The effect that technology and this revealing 
has is that humans are becoming primarily technological thinkers and technology is 
becoming a fundamental way of life. Thus we are losing our place in the fourfold. It is 
our engagement with technology which determines the positive or negative effects of 
it. This notion is relevant as dwelling (a place) assists with revealing truth and essence.   
 
In order to cope with technological developments, it is imperative that ‘dwellings’ be 
developed. Dwellings in Heidegger’s philosophy are not the same as the conventional 
English understanding, rather dwelling is a thing which preserves the ‘thingness’ of 
other things.55 It has already been established that with technology comes a loss of 
essence. Technology ‘strikes daily more divisively back at human being itself and 
degrades it to an orderable piece of resource’.56 Essence was addressed by Aristotle 
who noted ‘the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself’.57 Essence 
is similarly found in Sartre’s philosophy, our existence precedes our essence, yet for 
designed objects their essence precedes their existence.58 
 
Modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space 
proper to his essence… Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space 
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proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything 
essential within the destiny that now prevails.59 
 
Technology can connect us across space, therefore removing us from the confines of 
our dwelling, resulting in a loss of essence.  
 
Heidegger might be taken as polemical and engaging in hyperbole when he says that in 
a technological world ‘the danger stands that man is completely delivered over to 
technology and one day will be made into a controlled machine’. 60  However, 
technology does drive what occurs in the workplace, as well as providing a means by 
which to accomplish the work, and while its control may not be complete it is certainly 
significant.  
 
Being human is important to Heidegger and is important for the healthy development 
of values. If technology seeks to change us into controlled machine like objects, we 
lose our essence and our values. By using the concepts of fourfold and dwelling, it can 
be seen that the essence of being is revealed as dwelling in the fourfold, which means 
beings are as they dwell. The time in which they dwell is also of importance. 
 
 
 
 
H Care and Temporality 
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Heidegger challenged the concept of time, as he found the linear time model found in 
Aristotle’s work, Physics 61 incapable of recognising anything but the present. Time 
resonates with Heidegger’s account of distance because, with the removal of distance, 
the impact of time is lesser than when distance was a solid perception. 
 
In order to understand the ‘formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological 
structural whole’, 62  three dimensions of temporality emerge as being relevant to 
Dasein. The past, future and present are three dimensions that are commonly linked as 
being past, present and future, however Heidegger sought to disconnect and separate 
the dimensions in order to describe how Dasein care about things, others and the world.  
 
Disposedness is the past, whereby Dasein find themselves thrown into the world.63 This 
is directly linked to mood, as the a priori condition for mood. Mood is important 
because depending on what mood one finds oneself in, a related world opens up 
according to the mood. The mood arises owing to being-in-the-world.64 Projection is 
related to the future and is how Dasein copes with new situations. Dasein projects itself 
once understanding is gained.65 
 
Finally fallen-ness is found in the present. ‘Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away 
from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the world’.66 
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This mode of Being is the everyday mode, whereby a closing off of the world is 
involved. 
 
These three temporal aspects lead to Heidegger’s discussion of authentic and 
inauthentic selves. To be an authentic self, your self must be your own, whereas the 
inauthentic self has succumbed to the ‘they’ and are a fallen self.67 As fallen-ness is a 
characteristic Dasein experiences, it can be said if Dasein is an inauthentic self, it is 
solely their responsibility.68 The authentic self must also ensure they are not closed off 
from Others, rather that they are able to relate and interact without losing their self. 
Autonomy and a strong sense of self appear to be of value to the authentic self.  
 
The temporal divisions can be linked back to the authentic and inauthentic selves due 
to the fact it is Dasein’s ability to be open to time that results in their full authenticity 
being realised.  Time in this respect is similar to what it is in the Kantian tradition, 
whereby being embedded in time affects our experiences.69  However, temporality as a 
feature of Dasein ensures the past, present and future need not remain linked in 
succession, but rather grouped independently. ‘Temporality temporalizes itself as a 
future which makes present in a process of having been’.70  
 
Just as Dasein may be authentic, so too can temporality. Dasein must go through life 
focusing on the future (projection), which then creates authentic temporalising. 
Although projected towards the future, each temporal division plays a role in each 
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moment Dasein experiences. It is the temporality of Dasein that allows for the a priori 
condition for care, which is an essential element that makes up what Dasein actually is. 
Dasein then always combines the three tenses.  
 
I The Abolition of Distance 
 
Heidegger questioned the notion of nearness in Poetry, Language, Thought, a collection 
of essays.  
 
All distances in time and place are shrinking… Man puts the longest distances between him in 
the shortest time… Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness 
does not consist in shortness of distance.71 
 
The Heideggerian tradition is well adapted to understanding the significance of modern 
technology. Technology is abolishing time and distance, which eliminates nearness. 
When nearness is eliminated, Dasein lose their essence and their ability to relate to 
Others and objects. Once essence is removed from a being, they are incapable of 
forming personal traits or engaging in a community around them. Lawyers no longer 
have to be in the same room, city or country in order to work with clients or each other. 
Time is no longer a constraint to business. And, as will be developed later, technology 
poses a threat to the lawyer’s ability to make ethical decisions.72  
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Heidegger was concerned with the effects of the abolition of great distance, when 
everything is equally far and equally near. What is to happen ‘when everything gets 
lumped together into uniform distanceless-ness’?73 
 
The lack of distance brings about a multitude of problems. The most important 
consideration is that there is no longer a metaphorical wall, grouping people together 
so that all of their values can develop together in harmony.  ‘The failure of nearness to 
materialise in consequence of the abolition of all distances has brought the distanceless 
to dominance’.74 If the distanceless is brought to the forefront of reality, the effect of 
such is of great importance. What occurs between the battle of nearness and 
distanceless-ness must be considered in order to evaluate ethical development.   
 
The question to be asked and developed in later chapters is what constitutes 
distanceless-ness in the realm of legal practice? Technology contributes to the abolition 
of distance as it brings lawyers, other lawyers and clients together, no matter where in 
the world they may be. ‘In the default of nearness the thing remains annihilated as a 
thing in our sense. But when and in what way do things exist as things’?75  
 
Heidegger’s world and being-in-the-world are paralleled by studies into community 
and the ethics that can be developed within a community. Overall it is the human and 
practical involvement elements of Heidegger’s work that makes it of great relevance 
when linking technology with place. In order to create a successful community, the 
																																																								
73 Heidegger, above n 49, 164. 
74 Ibid 179. 
75 Ibid. 
	 38
people in the community share similar norms and values in order to connect with one 
another.  
 
III COMMUNITY 
 
The ethical theories that are discussed in this thesis assume concepts of place and 
community. This is similar to how being and existence were assumed before Heidegger 
sought to question it. At a basic level, anthropologist Edward T Hall discovered 20 
percent of the words in the Pocket Oxford Dictionary made reference to space or had 
spatial connotations.76 This implies a shared understanding of space, which is a basis 
for the development of ethics. Shared understanding is also reflected in the studies of 
communities.   
 
A general overview of community will first be discussed in order to hypothesise 
scenarios where it aids and hampers lawyers’ ethics. Finally, ethical development in 
communities, including Internet communities, will be analysed. 
 
A The History of Community 
 
Community has been a topic worthy of scholarly discussion through the ages. 
Historically, Plato made reference to the term Koinonia which can be translated as a 
sharing of kinds, also known as the experience of a community.77 There are three vital 
dimensions involved with understanding Koinonia – ‘philosophy, sharing meanings 
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and spiritual meeting. Each is an indispensible component of community as a human 
experience’.78 By sharing norms within a community, groups of people have been able 
to overcome adversity and advance the collective wants and needs of the group. When 
engaging and acting in a community, experiences are shared and bonds are created that 
ultimately strengthen the individuals, who then become better members of the 
community. Sharing meanings ensures a check and balance system to regulate the ideas 
stemming from philosophy. Finally, spiritual meeting comes from the individual’s own 
experience that they share with other individuals. These three dimensions combine to 
form the essence of a community. Technology is now adding a fourth dimension to the 
traditional community structure, which has the potential to break the bonds that 
reinforce and strengthen values within a community.79  
 
1 Community and Society  
 
Ferdinand Tönnies, in work that predated Heidegger, expressed concern about the 
effect that changing social structures had on society. He differentiated between 
Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) in order to explain the different 
states that exist before and after societal breakdown. Gemeinschaft is presented as the 
ideal, with Tönnies stating: 
 
The Gemeinschaft of blood, denoting unity of being, is developed and differentiated 
into Gemeinschaft of locality, which is based on a common habitat. A further 
differentiation leads to the Gemeinschaft of mind, which implies co-operation and co-
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ordinated action for a common goal... All three types of Gemeinschaft are closely 
interrelated in space as well as in time.80 
 
Gesellschaft was said to be increasing with urbanisation, which would ultimately result 
in the loss of community. Along with community, morality values would also be lost 
in the upheaval. Heidegger built upon this work, aligning place with community. 
 
Community is still a topic that generates much debate about its meaning. Three main 
positions surround the areas that define community: the area in which it is situated, 
common ties found within the group and social interactions that take place within the 
group.81 In discussing community, Heidegger referenced ‘local worlds’. These are 
created when the three main ideas combine and ‘such local worlds occur around some 
everyday thing whose origin usually lies in another understanding of being’.82  
 
Communication is a vital component of the development of community83  as well as 
being a prerequisite for community.84  Communication is also a significant factor in 
place and space and owing to technology, we are now able to communicate with more 
haste than ever before. Communication can occur by multiple means with 
communication being instantaneous between people from all different places. Yet they 
are connecting their places into one large space.  
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Physical location is still a key point in determining community. Locality within a 
geographical area forms boundaries in deciding what is and what is not part of the 
community.  As Webber stated on the subject:  
 
The idea of community has... been tied to the idea of place. Although other conditions 
are associated with the community – including a ‘sense of belonging’, a body of shared 
values, a system of social organization, and interdependency – spatial proximity 
continues to be considered a necessary condition.85 
 
B Loss of Community 
 
There is a range of opinions for and against the factors that cause a loss of community.  
On the positive side of the argument are scholars such as Cohen,86 Meyrowitz87 and 
Wellman,88 who believe community is being lost in populated areas due to factors such 
as population, societal change and lack of communal spaces in urban areas. 
Meyrowitz’s ideals are particularly relevant to this topic as his work focuses on the 
effect technology has had on community.89  
 
A more critical view is also present in the literature, either arguing that community is 
still alive and well in the urban landscape90 or that it exists and flourishes with societal 
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change.91 The common factor to these scholars’ work though, is the fact they hold 
community and local community in high esteem and regard its existence (or lack 
thereof) to be of particular importance when determining how place affects community 
or how technology affects community.92  
 
So once it has been established that community is being lost, the real question at hand 
is how this affects values, morals and ethical norms. Sociologist Robert Putnam has 
approached the question, asking about the practicability of people connecting from 
different communities sharing the same values and norms.93 It is hard to picture the 
world as one beige blanket of similarity, yet the Internet and online worlds are bringing 
people together to create new communities.  
 
Relationships are vital to a functioning community, which should be judged on the 
standards it upholds concerning the relationships people enjoy with one another.94 
Mutual interest contributes to the overall wellbeing of a community, which in turn 
makes for a stronger commitment to ‘good’ values. But technology does not always 
contribute to relationships. Similarly, it can assist in communication, but the quality of 
communication can suffer. Relationships existing in a community also appear to rely 
on an assumption of place. Where place is a combination of locale, location and sense 
of place, relationships can help contribute to the sense of place. Therefore it is 
impossible for it to exist without the other. And relationships contribute to the positive 
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development of values within a community. Thus community assumes place, which is 
central to ethical development.  
 
C The Internet as a Community 
 
The Internet is recognised as being a separate dimension that infiltrates our lives. As 
one judge put it, it is ‘ubiquitous, borderless, global and ambient in nature’.95 As a 
modern technology, it is competing with ethical codes and standards developed many 
decades beforehand. This separation could lead to recognition of the Internet as a 
community in its own right.  
 
There are many questions that still need to be asked of this ostensibly fast transition to 
the online world. Ethically, it seems as though there is no change. On the face of it, it 
is the same person, simply expanding their horizons by using technology. But it is 
proposed that the Internet is contributing to a distanceless-ness that is slowly removing 
people from their community. Once community is removed from a person’s social 
network, their capacity for ethical decision-making may be affected.  
 
There is an argument that the Internet creates a whole new place and pockets of the 
Internet exist as their own communities. The term cyberspace, first coined by science 
fiction novelist William Gibson 96  indicates the Internet is a space unto itself. 
Technology creates new worlds and spaces, this will assist in contextualising the effect 
it has on ethics. 
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The term ‘virtual community’ is generally linked to a group of individuals utilising the 
Internet and social media in their interactions. It can also be described as a ‘computer-
mediated social groups’.97 The unique characteristic of the virtual community is that it 
is not limited to geographical location, yet still retains some form of boundary. Non-
local community studies emerged in the 1960s onwards and described the impact that 
technology had on prior conceptions of community and justified why and how 
communities can exist online. 98  It is clear that virtual communities do not find 
limitation in space and time boundaries.99  
 
A virtual community has many benefits, mainly linked to ease and convenience. 
Information can be instantly passed on and virtual communities form around people 
who share things in common. There are however negatives, such as quality control and 
the problem of not truly knowing who is providing the information or who the members 
of the community are in real life. This is as a consequence of anonymity. When 
anonymous interactions take place within a virtual community, there is a total lack of 
moral accountability. Regulation also has an inability to touch on this virtual space. 
This can lead to ‘attitude polarisation and increased prejudices’ which can then be 
carried through to offline interactions.100 
 
IV THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON SPACE, PLACE AND COMMUNITY 
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To understand the role that technology has on lawyers’ ethics, philosophical principles 
underpinning technology must be considered. There is much work spanning the 
disciplines, creating links between technology, space and ethics.  
A The Philosophy and Ethics of Technology 
 
Where once technology was a standalone concept, it is now interlinked with other 
aspects of life such as science, politics and commercial endeavours. Technological 
determinism dictates that belief in technology becomes a dominant and governing force 
in society.101 Technology as such dictates societal change. This extreme view will not 
be taken in this thesis, though it is recognised that technology has taken on a greater 
role in society where it is now a central factor in decision making and has infiltrated 
our subconscious. Philosophers such as Ellul, 102  Marcuse, 103  and Ortega 104  have 
identified the effect technology-centric values might have on human-centric values. 
The technological values have the potential to threaten other human values. This theme 
will be developed to examine the conflict between technological values and lawyers’ 
ethics.  
 
Hans Jonas, a student of Heidegger, advocated a philosophy of technology that 
recognised that modern technology ‘touches on almost everything vital to man’s 
existence – material, mental and spiritual’.105 An important aspect of Jonas’ work is his 
delineation of modern technology as opposed to all of that which preceded it. In the 
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past, developments in technology remained steady and any advancement happened 
organically, rather than created via conscious process.106 Modern technology turns this 
process around and Jonas lists four traits as identifiers to separate modern technology 
from previous technology. Each step in in the technological field tends not to approach 
an equilibrium in fitting a means to an end process; each innovation spreads quickly; 
the relation of means to ends is circular not unilinear; and finally that progress is an 
inherent driving force of modern technology. These four traits help explain the fact that 
modern technology is an enterprise rather than a possession, and a process as opposed 
to a state.107 
 
Once the stages of modern technology have been assumed, ethics are the final topic 
modern technology is subjected to. According to Jonas, modern technology has still not 
faced the full gamut of ethical inspection. Jonas believes the knowledge of ethical 
dangers exists, but to actually deal with them and instill values in those who use 
technology is a matter of persuasion and indoctrination.108 ‘One part of the ethics of 
technology is precisely to guard the place in which any ethics can operate. For the rest, 
it must grapple with the cross-currents of value in the complexity of life.’109 Jonas’ 
statement indicates that technology has the capacity to obliterate place and, in order to 
preserve ethics, the place must be protected.110 Technology exists and infiltrates many 
separate places and can be said to be a space unto itself.  
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To answer this question, Joseph Pitt examined the autonomy of technology, arguing 
that if technology plays a central role in the everyday life, it can reflect our value system 
and reflect the economic structure of society.111 That is why it is vital to understand it, 
in order to maintain prior values and see how technology could alter them one way or 
another. A key premise in this line of work is that the ‘somewhat exaggerated’ claims 
made by scholars such as Jacques Ellul concerning technology are rejected.112  
 
They amount to treating technology as a kind of ‘thing’ and in doing so they reify it, 
attributing causal powers to it and endowing it with a mind and intentions of its own… 
It lies in removing the responsibility from human shoulders for the way in which we 
can make our way around the world. Now we can blame all the terrible things that ever 
happened on Technology!113  
 
By separating the ‘significant from the trivial’, Pitt provides a critique of tradition-
autonomous views. Technology is said to be autonomous when it is beyond the control 
of its creator. A second line of autonomy might be achieved when the technology and 
its use comes with consequences the inventor did not foresee. 114  Both of these 
arguments are weak owing to the fact that they can be applied to anything and 
everything. The solution to these problems usually comes about in a way of suggesting 
that tools and technology be eliminated. This is all but impossible. Technology is 
ingrained in the concept of humanity and it is the ‘perception, or lack of it, that people 
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have of the usefulness of a new product that determines the extent to which they are 
willing to make concessions in its direction’. 115  
 
If technology is incapable of being autonomous (except for the fact that it exists on its 
own) what does that mean for the values that come with technology? It can be said the 
power still lies with the person using the technology, but ultimately there is no 
questioning that technology still creates new scenarios and situations that require a 
different philosophical or ethical approach than would be necessary in different, offline, 
conditions. In order to address these ethical issues, technology can be viewed as 
assisting the individual with achieving their desired outcomes.  
 
B Space and Technology 
 
Heidegger has been of influence when dissecting the history of space and relating 
technology to place.116 Theorists such as Moore note the influence of Heidegger’s 
concept of place on ethical awareness in practice. Accordingly, once that place is 
undermined through the development of space, then a different set of ethics is almost 
inevitable. By combining cultural geography and sociology, new definitions have been 
created to provide new conclusions regarding the concept of place. Cultural geography 
has also been relevant when formulating new ideas in regards to place.117 A central 
concept relevant to the study of technology and space is that place can no longer be 
limited to geographical or architectural limits. Boundaries, and what constitutes them, 
need to be defined and one approach is to define the phenomenon of place by addressing 
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location, locale and sense of place.118 The terms are not static and imply interaction 
with one another in so far as ‘it is the paths and projects of everyday life, to use the 
language of time-geography, that provides the practical glue for the place in these three 
senses’.119 Compared with location as ‘objective structures’, it has been concluded that 
place is a set of intersubjective phenomena, reliant on paths and projects of everyday 
life.120  
 
The effect that space has on technology is significant as both concepts rely on 
competing interests when attempting to define them. In order to establish the effect of 
space on technology, an approach is to assign spatial definitions to both concepts. Place 
is understandable as a spatial concept, however technology usually requires more 
thought. This idea has been developed by hypothesising that the operation of 
technology relies on a combination of resources, both human and nonhuman, that exist 
in different places.121 Thus relationships are now defined by both social and spatial 
qualities. 
 
As technology is intrinsically linked with place and space, it is stated ‘Through spatial 
interpretation we are more likely to understand how technological networks operate to 
dominate the places inhabited by humans and nonhumans’.122 This notion has been 
elaborated further to ‘reinforce the dynamic relationship between technology and 
place’.123 Places are thus produced by technology acting in nature and that society 
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produces its own type of space.124 It is suggested that a statement like ‘places are 
produced by technology’ is not just black and white, but rather that technological 
practices do and will affect place. This is in line with the idea resistant to technological 
determinism that technology and society are not a cause and effect system, but rather 
an intertwining experience.125 Technology can be seen as fluid, having the potential to 
shape and be shaped by society. Place relies on an element of spatiality, as it represents 
a smaller and more unified area in a vast expansive landscape. Technology, though, as 
defined spatially can create a competing force against place, thus contributing to the 
demise of place.  
 
Practices as opposed to objects, become a central concept to the development of place 
and technology. Yet the qualities of technology and place are not interchangeable. ‘The 
location, locale and sense of place… are largely congruent with the human knowledge, 
human practices and sets of physical objects that describe the competing technologies 
that operate’. 126  Moore’s final hypothesis on the situation is that ‘Places and 
technologies are different things, but the processes of their social construction are 
dialogically related’.127 To be dialogically related means a fluid and transient account 
that is constantly subject to development. It is proposed the linkage of technology and 
place could lead to domination of one over the other, and that place, with elements of 
knowledge incorporated into its structure, could be obliterated as technology has the 
potential to change practices and knowledge so drastically as to remove place 
altogether.  
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The proposal of the obliteration of place within technology mirrors Heidegger’s views 
on place. Heidegger’s ideas work as a means of understanding technology.  A number 
of ways have been proposed in order to address the combined ideas of space and place 
with information technology. 128  Three perspectives (substitution, co-evolution and 
recombination), demonstrate that it is dangerous to try to place technology in a neat box 
just for the sake of applying a model to it to understand it.  
 
It is best not to adopt a simplistic concept of space and place when linking space, place 
and technology. 129  When technology is involved it is important to reject simple 
geographical definitions and define a place based on relational terms as well. ‘Only by 
maintaining linked, relational conceptions of both new information and 
communications technologies and space and place will we ever approach a full 
understanding of the inter-relationships between them’.130 Furthermore, ‘linkages are 
so intimate and recombinatory that defining space and place separately from 
technological networks soon becomes as impossible as defining technological networks 
separately from space and place’.131  
 
This establishes a direct corollary between technology and place, which builds upon 
Heidegger’s idea that place can be used as a means of understanding technology. It is 
necessary to explore this relationship in order to rely on the effect of place on the end 
user of such technologies. Technology within a community also needs to be explored. 
 
																																																								
128 Stephen Graham, 'The end of Geography or the Explosion of Place?' (1998) 22(2) Progress in Human 
Geography 165. 
129 Ibid 181.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
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C Community and Technology 
 
Similarly to space and place, the effect that technology has on a community has also 
been subject to scholarly analysis. There has been work in the area of community 
studies that builds upon the community works of Plato.132  
 
Joseph Grange argued about the importance of community when evaluating ethics and 
technology.133 Connections are a constant theme throughout his work. There is a need 
of recognition amongst individuals, which can be impinged upon by the collision of 
cultural forms. This bears similarities with Hegel’s thoughts on social consciousness. 
There is no doubt that technology acts as another cultural form. In a logical sense, 
interactions on the Internet are replete with the unknown. Even though one may send 
an email to a known address, there is no guarantee the person who sends a response 
back is indeed the original and intended recipient. When interacting on Internet forums 
and in social media, the unknown is even greater. People can impersonate others (as is 
often the case with celebrities) and there is little to no accountability or there are no 
ramifications for bad actions. There is a profound and perhaps unmerited assumption 
of trust required to use the Internet effectively. In a more abstract sense, the collision 
of many cultural forms creates another form of unknown as one cannot guarantee that 
another’s ideas will mirror one’s own. Technology provides a gateway for the cultures 
to collide. 
 
																																																								
132 See text accompanying above nn 77-79.  
133 Grange, above n 78, 385.  
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The ‘something in between’ is discussed to assist in understanding the definition of 
technology. ‘The something in between that is the very essence of community is a 
fusion of the love of wisdom and the sharing of meaning’.134 Community then collides 
with values, therefore it needs to be discovered how one may influence the other.  
 
Grange also develops the idea of community engagement. Individuals participate in 
society in order to be fulfilled and enriched. ‘What cultural participation is really all 
about is learning the symbolic code whereby the wealth of human experience can be 
transferred among the people of a city’.135 The symbolic code is another phrase for 
shared norms and values. Grange goes so far as to say that if you remove the ‘vectors 
of meaning’ you kill the soul of the people and eliminate what it is to be human.136 If 
humans do not participate in the culture of the community, they lose what is a real and 
effective presence of value in their lives. This leads to a removal of what it is to be 
human. Similarly to Heidegger and his discussion of essence and what it meant to be a 
being and as part of beings, a loss of community reduces the human to nothing and with 
nothing they cannot produce positivity and communicate it.137  By losing community 
and subsequently a culture, values cannot be confirmed which results in a sense of 
helplessness. Technology is resulting in humans withdrawing from the community 
around them and engaging in different sorts of communication that do not require actual 
contact. This importance of community is directly linked with place and place is linked 
with technology. If technology has the potential to obliterate place, then it is natural to 
assume community would go with it. Finally, values would disappear along with 
																																																								
134 Ibid 390. 
135 Ibid 392. 
136 Ibid.  
137 If essence is key to Heidegger’s Dasein, essence in community could be directly related. 
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community. Community assumes place, be it a personal, professional, domestic or 
commercial community. All assume place.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
Common themes found in place, community and technology theories have been 
explored across this chapter in order to provide a theoretical framework by which to 
evaluate the effect that technology has on lawyers’ ethics.  
 
The importance of place and its power to reveal what it is to be human was discussed. 
Space and place have been examined, place and community are linked, but technology 
has the potential to obliterate place. Place is also something that is assumed in many 
different fields. Studies into community almost always assume place as opposed to the 
greater space. As such, many theories regarding both technology and ethics have been 
developed by relying on this assumption.  
 
Dealing with theories of technology, it has been said that technology use can affect a 
person and their ethics and present them with new ethical dilemmas. Technology is also 
affecting the greater community as well as place. In fact technology is all but 
obliterating place, removing any sense of ‘nearness’ we once had.138 Technology is able 
to remove any geographic constraints as well as remove the ability to relate to those 
who are near. Without a geographic grounding in location, people cannot form their 
communities that also benefit from the history of the location. As the positive 
																																																								
138 See text accompanying above nn 69-73. 
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development of ethics relies on shared norms, the loss of place and community because 
of the effect of technology is placing strain on general community ethics.  
 
As lawyers exist in multiple places, in multiple communities and are now operating in 
a distanceless world, their ethics will be and are being affected by the increase in 
technology use and thus the decrease of place based interactions. Lawyers must now 
use a myriad of technologies in the workplace, which each raise a number of legal and 
ethical questions. These technologies will be evaluated against the theories of place in 
order to determine whether or not they affect lawyers’ ethics – positively or negatively.  
 
The next chapter will start to construct ethics within a geographical location and 
examine the potential for ethical technology use. Heidegger’s relationship with ethics 
is approached in order to further the discussion relating to lawyer technology use. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to relate the concepts of place previously discussed in chapter two 
directly to ethics. In doing so it integrates ethical concepts relating to place and 
geography, community and technology. The significance of these areas will be 
established to show how, when place is linked to lawyers, a new set of ethical 
considerations can become relevant.  
 
The issues to be considered in this chapter include discussing how place creates a 
different set of ethics, what effect Internet use and the creation of online communities 
has on place and ethics, and how community is linked to place. 
 
First, an ethics associated with place (including geographical place) is discussed to 
demonstrate an alternative way of approaching ethics. This is a point of comparison 
with traditional notions of lawyers’ ethics. It will be shown that a place creates its own 
set of ethics. Lawyers and technologies will be linked to place. Secondly, ethics specific 
to technologies and the Internet will be approached. Online locations will be linked to 
physical offline locations to show how lawyers cannot escape the influence of place in 
their profession. Thirdly, Heidegger’s views on technology will be related to lawyers 
and their ethics, followed by an account of technology used by the profession.  Ethics 
relating to communication theory will be used to illustrate another perspective to be 
taken into consideration when evaluating lawyers’ ethics. Finally, community and 
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communication will be addressed to establish the connection between current legal 
ethical perspectives of place. 
 
II ETHICS OF GEOGRAPHY AND PLACE 
 
A Ethics of Place (Thinking Like a Mountain) 
 
Ethics as a term is grounded in the Greek ethos: the ways of place and a characteristic 
of people in a community. There is a tension between this historical view of 
particularisation and a modernist perspective of systems of action.1 ‘The ethics of place 
is not so much an oxymoron, as a recovery, a placing in tension of elements that have 
always been present, and a way to re-think the all too easy move from universal to 
particular’.2 Place should not just be thought of simply as a physical location. Instead, 
by relying on Heidegger’s idea of human essence existing within place, place becomes 
essential to our being and we become ‘platial beings’.3  To properly evaluate an ethic 
of place, platial history needs to be recognised as being integral to the question asked 
of ethics. If place itself is the site of ethical reasoning as opposed to the object of ethical 
reasoning, the discussion of the ethics of place becomes the discussion of the place of 
ethics – ‘the ways in which ethics is necessarily emplaced, always related to place, 
always imagined in place rather than in some methodologically deterministic, utopian 
or abstract place’.4 Temporality is also historically recognised as being an element 
necessary for ethos to develop. Aldo Leopold’s sand county almanac discusses a land 
																																																								
1 Bruce Janz, 'Thinking Like A Mountain: Ethics and Place as Travelling Concepts' in Martin Drenthen, 
Jozef Keulartz and James Proctor (eds), New Visions of Nature: Complexity and Authenticity (Springer, 
2009) 181, 182. 
2 Ibid 182. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid 183. 
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ethic which links place to time, slightly valuing temporality over place. 5  But by 
showing a link with time, place manages to resist categorisation into an eternal field. 
Place interacts with time by compressing, extending, distending and summarising 
time.6 In Leopold’s philosophy, ethics become platial by disregarding the isolation of 
specific features of ethical systems and focusing on the construction of place relating 
to a phenomenology of place.7 ‘Ethics of place is not about specificity… but rather the 
ongoing task of working out an ethic in the encounter between forms of ethos’.8 Ethics 
exist within place and, by rejecting Cartesian dualism as Heidegger did, it can be said 
that place holds a sense of being and thus a sense of knowing. This knowledge holds 
‘responsive and disciplined’ characteristics and produces positive and negative 
feedback and holds memory.9 Abstract principles do not exist in this theory of place, 
thus ethics can only be formed in response to the rational processes of nature that 
provide the foundation for human action.10  
 
Technology is another item that provides an aspect of interdisciplinarity to lawyers’ 
ethics. Interdisciplinarity occurs when disciplines make the space for new questions to 
be asked for themselves, in the context of the interrogation of the other.11 Travelling 
plays a key role in asking new questions as concepts travel across their relative 
disciplinary boundaries, taking their past with it, yet still needing to create new 
knowledge and to find a way of existing within the new place. Travelling forces one to 
question knowledge that comes from the place, and from the mixture of relationships 
																																																								
5 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Ballantine Books, 1986). 
6 Ibid 184.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid 185. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid 186. 
11 Ibid. 
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and connections that create place.12 ‘A recognition that knowledge always owes its debt 
to the place from which it comes, and, therefore, any ethical action must also proceed 
from there, inasmuch as ethics is based at least in part on knowledge’.13 
 
Place-making imagination assists with understanding how ethical actions occur. Place-
making imagination recognises that the concept of place is often oversimplified, which 
means that any knowledge derived from its meaning is superficial when driven by 
insufficient questioning based on the oversimplified concept. 14  It also recognises 
tradition as an aspect of peripheral vision when inquiry into objects occurs. So long as 
tradition, which undermines individuality, is not seen as a backdrop for ethical 
development, it can act to respect knowledge that can serve to challenge ideas and 
create a moment of interdisciplinarity and ethics. 15  By resisting the model of 
temporalised ethics, ethics of place can act to create a system where knowledge is 
inherent and options are created in the ‘face of competing or alternate systems of 
knowledge’.16  The ethics of place are directly linked to interconnections of the place. 
As humans we do not merely use a place or happen upon a place, but we create 
knowledge in conjunction with the knowledge of the place.17 
 
																																																								
12 Ibid 188. 
13 Ibid 190. 
14 Ibid 191.  
15 Ibid 192. 
16 Ibid 193. 
17 Ibid. See also THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS I INTRODUCTION. 
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Lawyers are very much connected to place due to the fact that they operate within a 
location 18  and community 19  with historical traditions. 20  Hence, if lawyers are to 
develop a self reflective ethical awareness – a being-there – they need to recognise the 
effect that place has on their ethical development. Technology is nonetheless assisting 
in removing traditional notions of place and in itself creates new places. Technology 
coupled with legal practice creates new interdisciplinarity in which to generate new 
knowledge. Ethics centred on a community should not be seen as the starting point as 
the community had to be founded on a place. If lawyers consider the knowledge that a 
place holds and allow the place to present them with ethical options, deeper ethical 
development may occur. If technology changes a place, then another aspect of ethical 
development also changes for the lawyer.  
 
B Ethics of Geography 
 
When discussing ethics in a geographical context, geography can be defined as largely 
‘a knowledge-building enterprise consisting of two major components: its ontological 
project and its epistemological process’.21 This achieves an understanding of aspects 
of being by using ontological metaphors of space and place, coupled with knowledge 
of those metaphors. 22  It is important to consider the geography perspective in 
discussing lawyers’ ethics in place because geography ‘investigates the place of rules 
																																																								
18  See for example Donald Landon, Country Lawyers (Praeger Publishers, 1st ed, 1990). THE 
PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS V SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES. 
19 John P. Heinz and Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers (Northwestern University Press, revised ed, 
1994). GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS IV CHANGING NATURE OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION. 
20 See generally, BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR and GLOBALISATION, 
TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS. 
21 James D. Proctor, 'Overlapping Terrains' in James D. Proctor and David M. Smith (eds), Geography 
and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain (Routledge, 1999) 1, 6. 
22 Ibid. 
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and meaning in the processes that are changing the earth, the worlds that people create 
and the spaces they inhabit. Incorporating ethics into geography, we not only account 
for objective phenomena, but also explicate and critique the worldviews underlying our 
own and other’s beliefs and practices’23. 
 
Studies into geography over recent years have dispensed with traditional notions of 
space and region, and are now incorporating ideas relating to the death of distance – 
distanceless-ness - and the importance of place.24 Simplifying the difference between 
space and place as merely a matter of scale is too simplistic, exhibiting signs of 
Heidegger’s place: a priori impressions as the conclusion dictated by scale is 
presupposed25.  
 
By combining Heidegger’s views on place with geographical interpretations, the 
definition of place will be taken to mean places in which people carry out their lives 
and existence. Humans construct places, and activities are shared, to provide a location 
for fundamentally normative routines to take place.26 Both the place and the activities 
are normative. A place is not limited to one location, but due to the complexity of 
activities ‘through which we construct and maintain place’ multiple places occur.27 It 
is when the different activities belonging to multiple places collide that we see ethical 
and geographical dilemmas. ‘Inquiry into the nature of places can shed light on the 
ways in which the everyday activities by which we make and maintain places involve 
																																																								
23 Paul Roebuck, 'Meaning and Geography' in James D. Proctor and David M. Smith (eds), Geography 
and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain (Routledge, 1999) 19. 
24 See for example Anne Buttimer, 'Home, Reach and a Sense of Place' in Anne Buttimer and David 
Seaman (eds), The Human Experience of Space and Place (Croom Helm, 1980) 166, 168-171. 
25 Michael R. Curry, '"Hereness" and the Normativity of Place' in James D. Proctor and David M. Smith 
(eds), Geography and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain (Routledge, 1999) 96. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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appeal to ethical and normative concepts usually seen as the provenance of 
philosophers’.28 Place will assist in defining a new ethical position based on the fact 
that place is evident in philosophies relating to technology, and is relatively 
unarticulated and underplayed in philosophies relating to lawyers’ ethics. 29 
Technology, and the Internet specifically, lend themselves well to discussing place 
because they both create and destroy place and represent the possibility of place without 
a location defined by physical boundaries.  
 
III ETHICS OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
A Internet Ethics 
 
The moral value of the Internet as a technology is a central concern to the question of 
whether it is a negative or positive development.  
 
In characterising the negative aspects, the ‘logic of hegemony’ is used to express power 
relations associated with technology. 30  The logic presumes certain frameworks of 
positivism, rationalisation and commodification, and allows for the invasion of 
privacy.31 Therefore technology is not a neutral activity, but an ideology.32  As the 
capability for breaches of privacy and confidentiality exists on the Internet, its potential 
to influence ethics must be examined.  
 
																																																								
28 Ibid. 
29 BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR IV HEIDEGGER AND LAWYERS. 
30  Jeremy Crampton, 'The Ethics of the Internet' in James D. Proctor and David M. Smith (eds), 
Geography and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain (Routledge, 1999) 72, 73. 
31 Ibid. 
32Robert Aronowitz, Science as Power, Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988). 
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The argument for the positive existence of the Internet sees the enabling and 
emancipatory nature of the Internet as democratic discourses.33 This construct can be 
summarised as the ‘logic of empowerment’ and this coupled with the progressive notion 
of virtual communities completes the case for the Internet as a positive product.  
Democratisation promotes rationality and consensus amongst participants, which can 
be a result of Internet connectivity.34 This may lead to local groups being empowered.  
 
These two views can be balanced by a final non-essentialist claim that the Internet relies 
on multiple philosophies without an intrinsic nature. 35 This multiplicity lends itself 
well to furthering the discussion into the diverse area of Internet locations and virtual 
communities.  
 
B Virtual Locations 
 
The ‘virtuality of geography’ is a term that relates to ‘geographic interactions [that] 
increasingly require or include a virtual component’.36 Lawyers over the past 20 years 
have proven themselves to be supporters of technology, incorporating it into their daily 
workflows.37 The negative aspect of these practices is that technology gives rise to 
competing logics and thus competing ethics where one view will always be privileged 
over the other. This will be based on our interactions with technology, rather than the 
																																																								
33 Crampton, above n 30 ,73. 
34 Christopher Kedzie, Communication and Democracy (Rand, 1997). 
35 Crampton, above n 30, 73. 
36 Ibid 72. 
37 For example see Andrew Colley, 'The Federal Court Builds Case for Using iPads', The Australian 14 
August 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/australian-it/it-business/the-federal-court-builds-case-
for-using-ipads/story-e6frganx-1226449564885>; Barry Brickner, 'Computer Usage by Michigan 
Lawyers' (2004) 83 Michigan Bar Journal 40 and Bradley H. Leiber, 'Applying Ethics Rules to Rapidly 
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technology itself. 38  In deducing the implications of new spatial practices, Internet 
access and the formation of new places are noted as being of concern.39 Today it would 
be an extreme disadvantage for a lawyer not to access the Internet in work, and that 
would in turn disadvantage the client by means of efficiency and access to knowledge. 
Globalisation also plays a role in the ethics of geography posing questions such as 
whether or not it extends a network of relations simply beyond the local, or if it leads 
to a ‘time-space compression due to a hypermobility of capital and finance’.40 This then 
leads to a range of ethical questions concerning lawyers. Without the structure of place 
and with legal work being shifted to different spaces (as is the case with outsourcing), 
how can certain professional ethical requirements be adhered to? As technology and 
the Internet break down boundaries, the introduction of competing logics, as paralleled 
with Internet use in general, becomes competing ethics.  
 
While place might be a comforting port in the boundaries of space, virtual space has no 
such limitations. It is an endless creation free from the traditional constraints of space. 
As such, constraints commonly found in the offline world - location, social standing 
and economic background - are released in the virtual world. A way to understand and 
explain the context of new spatial landscapes is to employ spatial metaphors. By 
assigning words to make the complex online world tangible, these singular spaces are 
better understood, but at the same time, they can obscure the greater picture.41 
 
																																																								
38Crampton, above n 30, 74. 
39 Ibid. 
40Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communication Revolition will Change our Lives 
(Harvard Business School Press, 1997). 
41 Steven Moore, 'The Local History of Space' in Craig Hanks (ed), Technology and Values (Blackwell 
Publishing, 1st ed, 2010) 373, 377. 
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Some describe the Internet as a ‘middle landscape’ that ‘allows individuals to exercise 
their impulses for both separation and connectedness’. 42  This is the trend that is 
currently observed when analysing the elements of location, community and history 
that make up place. A dichotomy exists, whereby people are reconnecting as physical 
communities cease to exist; yet it is also acting to discourage physical participation. 
The only constant it seems is that those who were naturally withdrawn become further 
withdrawn, and those who participate continue to do so offline, as well as online.  
 
Lawyers belong to a profession that cannot exist without a community of some sort 
around them. They belong to their own professional community, the community of their 
client, the community of their law firm, and the community outside their work.43 
Communities will be discussed further in chapter three, and will incorporate an analysis 
of current perspectives on communities from ethics scholars and sociologists.44 Virtual 
spaces will allow a lawyer to continue their community-centric endeavours and perhaps 
expand their existing communities; yet will probably not withdraw them from their 
physical locations either. 
 
Alternatively, the increase in virtual space, as opposed to the virtual community, is 
contributing to online lawyering and outsourcing of basic legal work. Law firms are 
currently able to outsource basic legal processes through online portals to staff working 
in countries distant from their firms’ home base.45 There are some ethical conundrums 
																																																								
42 Dave Healy, 'The Internet as Middle Landscape on the Electronic Frontier' in David Porter (ed), 
Internet Culture (Routledge, 1996) 55, 66. 
43 See for example Heinz and Laumann, above n 19 for discussions of professional communities.  
44 GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS IV CHANGING NATURE OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION. 
45 Jennifer Skarda-McCann, 'Overseas Outsourcing of Private Information and Individual Remedies for 
Breach of Privacy' (2005-2006) 32 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 325. 
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that come with such activities, which are outlined further in chapters five and six.46 If 
lawyers no longer complete basic administrative work, part of the lawyer’s place is 
changed. Similarly, working across various online and offline spaces could remove the 
geographic location element of place. 
 
However, virtual space, as it has been defined in this section, can constitute the location 
element of place. All that remains to create a whole place are the historical and 
community aspects of place. Problems may arise when another’s place, or virtual 
location, starts to compete with the lawyer’s place. For example, the lawyer may be 
grounded in their location and traditional legal community (both local-professional and 
office based), yet when basic work is outsourced to a firm overseas, the laws and ethics 
of a different place are introduced to the ‘home’ based lawyer.47  
 
Removing an aspect of the lawyer’s work may also remove an element of what it is to 
be a lawyer. Paralleled with Heidegger’s work, it is similar to technology removing an 
element of what it is to be, and what it is to be Dasein.48 As place grounds Dasein in 
familiar practices and structures, it helps to construct their essence. Dasein requires a 
dwelling in order to cope with technological development as technology can cause 
Dasein to lose their essence.49 Dwelling creates a place within the three temporal 
horizons. As technology can remove the idea of what is in the past or present or future, 
places and beings are instantly connected. In comparison, Dasein must always 
																																																								
46  CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT V OUTSOURCING and LAWYER 
COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING IV . 
47 Jayanth K Krishnan, 'Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal Profession' (Faculty Publications No 311, 
Indiana University, 2007). 
48 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (William Lovitt trans, 
Harper and Row, 1977). 
49 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS II HEIDEGGER. 
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recognise the three tenses in order to create authenticity. In order to gain ethical benefit 
from place, the lawyer must continue working place and not only be, but be there.    
 
Virtual space is not a concept with a concrete definition. It is not just the online space 
like a webpage, but also the community that inhabits it. Often virtual communities exist 
within virtual space, which is contrasted with geographical or physical space. Without 
the assistance of computers or cyber technology, the computer-generated environment 
could not exist.50 Virtual can be contrasted with the terms ‘real’ or actual’, but it can 
also mean a sense of being in a distant situation. Virtual reality can be defined as ‘a 
three dimensional interactive computer generated environment that incorporates a first 
person perspective’.51 Active engagement is what sets apart a virtual environment from 
passively enjoying a virtual reality such as television. Ethical questions and aspects 
may be applied to online communities as well as virtual realities. A prominent question 
in this regard relates to misrepresentation in a virtual environment. This can occur when 
one or multiple users actively fail to correspond accurately in the course of 
engagement. 52  This can happen especially when people use social media and 
misrepresent their own personal character. There are also multiple cases involving 
lawyers using social media in order to research witnesses,53 or to garner information 
from parties.54  
																																																								
50 Herman Tavani, Ethics and Technology: Ethical Issues in an Age of Information and Communication 
Technology (John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed, 2007) 334. 
51 Philip Brey, 'The Ethic of Representation and Action in Virtual Reality' (1999) 1(1) Ethics and 
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52 See for example the case of Bonhomme v St James, 970 N.E 2d 1 (Ill Sup Ct, 2012) whereby the 
plaintiff sued for damages resulting from fraudulent misrepresentation in an Internet based relationship. 
53 New York City Bar Association Formal Opinion 2012-2 states that lawyers are in contravention of 
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54 In the case of Kregg v Maldonado, 951 S 2.d 301 (NY, 2012) a discovery request was filed to collect 
the contents of the plaintiff’s social media profile and in the case of Offenback v L.M. Bowman Inc, WL 
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C Virtual Communities 
 
Although communities commonly rely on geographic location as the common feature, 
a virtual community can exist independently of locational ties. Whilst members of the 
virtual community may not share an environment, that does not mean the participants 
of the group cannot experience the same benefits that a community provides, such as 
support and information sharing between members. Although the idea of a virtual 
community existed before the proliferation of the Internet, online convenience has only 
served to strengthen and develop the notion of virtual community and it can no longer 
be denied that the Internet creates communities.55 Virtual communities may also simply 
be a result of online convenience, or they may survive solely due to the Internet. 
Rheingold, in discussing cyberspace and virtual communities, states that ‘life will be 
happier for the online individual because the people with whom one interacts more 
strongly will be selected more by commonality of interests and goals than by accidents 
of proximity’.56 
 
Community existing outside of a physical location can be beneficial to both private and 
professional groups. It is possible for a lawyer to act within a virtual community of 
lawyers through a LinkedIn group, or within an interdepartmental intranet at work.  
Social media also creates virtual communities as people can operate through their 
profile to connect to and communicate with other people. Lawyers could follow other 
lawyers who tweet about law related events on Twitter, or ‘like’ pages with legal 
themed content on Facebook. 
																																																								
55 See for example Melvin Webber, 'Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity' in J. Lowdon 
Wingo (ed), Cities and Space (John Hopkins Press, 1963) 23. 
56  Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Harper 
Collins, 1993) 24. 
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Participants in virtual communities are not necessarily withdrawn from a physical 
community, as sometimes their activities can translate back into the geographic place. 
A major benefit of the virtual community is that it offers participants opportunities that 
might not be available in their geographic location. Virtual communities are frequently 
based in the free exchange of information, which can enlighten users as well as 
providing an outlet for people who might feel displaced in their own geographic 
community. The all-inclusive nature of some virtual communities can promote positive 
traits and allow for belonging and support for users. They are also ‘robust enough to 
ground moral behavior defined internally to the communities’.57  
 
Alternatively, virtual communities are rarely policed, which can mean that the 
information freely exchanged might not be correct, nor might people be who they say 
they are. Sometimes this can be purposely misleading, suggesting someone with 
questionable ethics initiates the activity, or sometimes it is purely a result of ignorance. 
However, these flaws can be due to a failure of the community to develop properly.58  
 
Narrow communities also exist on the Internet. Participation in a narrow virtual 
community can result in polarising attitudes and prejudices that contribute to both an 
individual and social cost.59 A narrow virtual community is one that has restricted 
membership and fails to engage in broad debate.60 The ability to reach a wide audience 
can be condensed to an audience who all share the same views, unlike offline 
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interactions whereby it is far more difficult to restrict favoured opinions. Diversity is 
something participants do not need to bother themselves with. Online, ‘polarisation is 
occurring among those that are active participants and is restricted to those issues that 
are taken as identifiers of membership to particular communities’ and the Internet is 
serving only to encourage participation in the polarised community.61 The lack of face-
to-face contact can also increase polarisation as well as ‘facilitate deindividuation and 
increases the salience of situational cues’. 62  This indicates that online activity 
downgrades individuality with participants reducing their thinking to that of a herd 
mentality. Any small cue, possibly made by an outsider, such as ending a sentence with 
an emoticon in a response, may be overthought and could be interpreted as a passive 
aggressive slight at the person the response is directed at.  An example of a polarised 
community can occur on Twitter with far left and far right political participants. It is 
easy only to follow people who share the same political views as you, without ever 
seeing the opposing opinion. Members in the narrow virtual community over-
emphasise situational cues to garner meaning and further solidify and over-exaggerate 
the similarity within the group. The ‘fragile nature of online communications’ means 
that a hyperactive and hyper-trusting communication style is utilised, which pressures 
new community members into conforming to the same style and standard.63  
 
It is possible that lawyers engaging in personal online activity might encounter a narrow 
virtual community that is linked to their interests outside of work. In the course of their 
work, the fact that their interactions are grounded in reality prevents the likelihood of 
																																																								
61 Ibid 44. 
62 Tom Postmes, Russell Spears and Martin Lea, 'Breaching or Building Social Boundaries?' (1998) 25(6) 
Communication Research 689. 
63 For further discussion on communication styles see for example, Joyce Yukawa, 'Factors Influencing 
Online Communication Style in LIS Problem-Based Learning' (2007) 48(1) Journal of Education for 
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polarisation occurring. In a professional social media group, such as one found in 
LinkedIn, it is absolutely beneficial for a lawyer to maintain their own identity, as the 
whole point of a professional group is to network and possibly acquire new business 
contacts and clients. The virtual community that is formed when lawyers interact when 
working for a virtual law firm is far more closed and would have a unique style of 
communication that would need to be adhered to. Although there is some accountability 
on the part of the lawyer, the client can be completely anonymous throughout the 
process of finding a lawyer.64 The grounding of the virtual firm within the offline world 
would ensure that the negative aspects of a virtual community do not overpower the 
positives and benefits - such as convenience and accessibility associated with virtual 
firms.  
 
It is highly unlikely that a lawyer who has experience across representing multimillion-
dollar corporations as well as representing clients with minor traffic offences could 
become polarised. However, lawyers who are participating in online firms, or are 
working consistently on purely transactional work involving filling in and proof reading 
forms, may become closed and inaccessible to the outside world.  
 
A wide degree of autonomy is associated with online activity. The construction of an 
online identity is usually reflective of our offline identity. However, the autonomy to 
do as one wishes can result in an unhealthy identity where people become defined by 
the community values and as such, the members of the group change and conform to 
suit the group. Outsiders have no hope of disproving the validity of the notions put forth 
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in the virtual community, nor any hope of questioning the values held. There is always 
potential online for the autonomy of the individual to be corrupted, however if the 
online identity is linked and grounded in the offline world, there is greater potential for 
healthy groups to form that are based in truthfulness and authenticity. Regardless of 
positive or negative autonomy, it is important that the community regulates itself and 
create its own systems of ensuring openness and transparency.65  
 
Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally significant (online) 
phenomena and physical location. The rise of the global computer network is 
destroying the link between geographical location and: (1) the power of local 
governments to assert control over online behavior; (2) the effects of online behavior 
on individuals or things; (3) the legitimacy of a local sovereign’s efforts to regulate 
global phenomena; and (4) the ability of physical location to give notice of which sets 
of rules apply.66 
 
Owing to changes in the practice of law such as increased competition and decreased 
prestige, self-regulation within law has also changed.67 For some legal professions that 
are being considered in this research, self-regulation has not only changed, it has been 
lost.68 There remain professions, mainly in the United States, that maintain high levels 
of self-regulation.69 To test the effect of self-regulation, it is necessary to assess whether 
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or not the profession adequately internalises its costs and benefits.70 If the cost of 
regulatory sanctions declines, so too does the effect of self-regulation. ‘Self-regulation 
often leads to little repercussion for incivility, as the bar recognises the needs of lawyers 
and law firms to compete for business’.71 Technology has only increased competition 
amongst lawyers, which indicates that self-regulation within online legal communities, 
might be just as rife with professional ethical issues, as is self-regulation in offline 
communities.   
 
Apart from online communities, mere access to the Internet increases a lawyer’s 
autonomy because it enables them to view much information in a short space of time 
which could lead to more informed decisions for themselves as well as their client. 
There is also a creation aspect of the Internet, whereby users are free to produce blogs, 
micro-blogs, web pages and engage a variety of social media platforms to showcase 
their creative works. It is well documented that collaboration to maximise the spread of 
information is a benefit of technology and the Internet.72 However, as it can alter the 
way we approach life and discussions, there is the possibility that the Internet could 
stunt self-reflection, which is required for the exercise of rational autonomy. 
 
Aside from autonomy, another concept relevant to the online community is trust. There 
are four obstacles to trust online:73 Community, Internet context, disembodiment and 
security. Trust is a value that arises when discussing communities, both online and 
																																																								
70 Jonathan Macey and Maureen O'Hara, 'From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving 
World' (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 563. 
71 Macey, above n 67, 1099 and generally Stephen Gillers, 'Profession, If You Can Keep It: How 
Information Technology and Fading Borders are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should 
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offline. ‘Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and 
cooperative behaviour based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members 
of that community’. The shared moral value can be found within each community found 
online, but the greater and more general online community is found across many 
different countries and cultures. 
 
Trust is an integral part to the lawyer-client relationship and is at the core of the 
fiduciary duty bestowed upon the lawyer.74 Social media use may blur the line whereby 
the lawyer-client relationship is formed. In Australia, the relationship is entered once a 
client instructs the lawyer, however, the retainer between solicitor and client may be 
implied from conduct.75 By comparison, in the United States, the relationship forms 
when a client relies on advice provided by a lawyer.76 Although the lawyer might not 
believe they are advising the client, the client could easily believe they have received 
legal advice, as there is no requirement of a binding agreement to enter relations. If this 
communication occurs in a legal office, during business hours, it is safe to assume that 
both parties are aware of their commitment. If a lawyer writes a blog about a legal issue, 
or responds to a person via a tweet stating some legal fact, ambiguity ensues. A lawyer 
may write a disclaimer and ‘limit the scope of the representation’, so long as it is 
reasonable in the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.77 However, a 
person searching the Internet for legal advice might not wish to dispense with the 
possibility of representation through advice. There is also a practicality issue in relation 
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to the disclaimer.78 A blogger may make a disclaimer visible on their webpage footer, 
but on Twitter the task is not as easy - it is unlikely that an appropriate disclaimer could 
be drafted in ‘140 characters or less’.79  
 
IV HEIDEGGER AND LAWYERS 
 
A Heidegger and Ethics 
 
Heidegger’s views of technology are a springboard for setting the boundaries of what 
particular world one wishes to examine in relation to lawyers and their use of 
technology. Heidegger’s broad definitions provide a framework in which to judge 
whether or not technology is conducive to the positive development of lawyers’ ethics. 
It is not the intention to state that technology will ruin us and reduce us to a state that 
would be familiar in Orwell’s 1984.80 Rather, the more we rely on technology as a 
ground for our decisions, the more these decisions become the idea at the forefront of 
our mind. As such we lose elements of ourselves that could exist for the positive 
establishment of ethics and values.  
 
Heidegger never explicitly wrote of ethics. However, he justified this stance in his essay 
Letter on Humanism. He pondered whether or not ontology, the study of being or 
existence, need be supplemented by ethics.81 Although it is the concepts of space and 
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place that confine this exploration of lawyers’ ethics in regards to technology, it would 
be imprudent not to address the Heideggerian thought on technology that also has 
important implications for the ethics of space and place. Heidegger discusses ‘things’ 
and their effect on nearness and distance. Although his prime example was that of the 
Rhine River, and the way that technology creates power out of the river,82 Heidegger 
could not have imagined the proliferation of computers and the Internet in modern day 
life. Once the Rhine is transformed from a natural water way into a hydroelectric dam, 
the concept and meaning of the river changes.83 The river becomes a resource, a source 
of electricity. Whereas before the change, the river was seen as a source of inspiration 
for poet Friedrich Höderlin.84 Another way in which to understand the concept of 
resources and distance is to look at the jug. Heidegger’s concept of the jug could explain 
how the Internet might or might not affect distance.85 Heidegger states that nearness 
‘cannot be encountered directly’. This indicates that tangible ‘things’ help to define 
what is near. A jug of water on a kitchen table is near when you are in the kitchen. The 
idea of a kitchen comprises tangible benches, sinks and cupboards. Equally, the jug 
affects our perceptions of fullness since ‘we become aware of the vessel’s holding 
nature when we fill the jug’.86 Similarly, on an office desk, a stapler indicates you are 
in the office and the staples represent the nature of the stapler. The Internet has the 
potential to affect our perceptions of nearness too. However, when we use the Internet, 
we become aware of the fact that nearness may be far away. It has been noted that place 
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and the grounding of place becomes ‘overwritten’ when communities go online.87 This 
can affect the revealing nature required to adequately exist and be.  
 
Unlike the jug, the Internet is not necessarily a tangible object, but the two qualities that 
make up the jug are the function of the jug and the physical existence of the jug. The 
Internet functions by being both a system of networks by which to transfer information 
as well as functioning the way the user intends for it to function. The network still exists 
if no one uses it, yet its function can change depending on who is using it. The physical 
existence of the Internet exists in the cables, as images existing in a computer screen or 
on a mobile phone Internet browser are unique to those things alone – not to the Internet. 
Similarly, the cables the Internet utilised can sometimes be shared with phone lines. 
For the purposes of this line of enquiry, we will assume these two criteria are fulfilled. 
Thus if the Internet is a ‘thing’, the dangers associated with it, such as those found in 
the Rhine example (ultimately turning humans into mere resources) are applicable to 
lawyers and anyone who uses the Internet.  
 
Further analyses of technology can come from previous analyses of being and modes 
of revealing. Dasein is Dasein because they can question her own existence as well as 
the existence of others.88 Questioning ourselves is what Heidegger calls Existenz.89 By 
questioning our being, the fundamental mode of being is revealed. Immediately, what 
can be derived from this statement is that things that cause us to stop questioning and 
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lull us into a false sense of security can remove an element of what it is to be. That 
subsequently is the difference between the authentic and inauthentic life.90  
 
Direct availability of the Internet makes reference to ‘ready-to-hand’ objects in 
Dasein’s world.91 These are things that function properly and are equipped as such. 
Dasein has an expectation that they will work or achieve their function.  When they 
cease to function or break, it is present-at-hand and no longer works seamlessly in 
Dasein’s experience. It must then be reflected upon, and the purpose of the Thing is 
questioned.  
 
Authenticity naturally follows when discussing modes of revealing. Dasein must be 
authentic, so how does the Internet affect authenticity? Heidegger did not write about 
trust, but evaluated the notion of truth, or as he referred to a type of truth, Aletheia.92 
Aletheia represents truth by being something that is not concealed or hidden, which in 
turn contributes to the construction of trust. On the Internet, it is easier for things to be 
hidden and concealed. It is natural to conclude that the Internet with its potential for 
inauthenticity could affect the user’s authenticity and ability to trust, or be trusted. 
 
When compared with his analysis in Being and Time, Heidegger’s later writings about 
technology differed vastly. Technology started as equipment, but evolved to being an 
understanding of being. Heidegger highlighted the limits and dangers of a technological 
way of thinking and being. Technology can be seen as equipment, which is still ready-
to-hand and which can help us understand our existence. It still does not define who we 
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are, as ultimately we decide why we want to use technology. However, it is possible 
that technology working in every area of our lives may start to overpower the non-
technological influences. There is also the concern that daily routines and activities 
cannot be completed without technology of some form. This suits Heidegger’s line of 
argument because, although he could not possibly have predicted the Internet 60 years 
ago, his questioning of the essence of technology, rather than the technology itself, can 
still shine a light on the potential problems. If the Dasein allows themselves to be 
overcome with the essence of technology, they can be reduced to a resource, since 
technology can transform our engagement.  
 
Similarities can be drawn between Heidegger’s observation that the very nature of 
being and existence was assumed and overlooked and with the idea that lawyers’ ethics 
are too often discussed while relying on the unstated assumption of place.  
 
Previous notions of time are abolished in relation to work. For example, in the 1980s, 
a lawyer might take a day or two to research something significant in books. The books 
might not even be near their office, so travel time might have been factored into the 
commitment made for the research. The same lawyer in the 2010’s might spend only 
an hour or two looking up the information they require in legal databases or simply on 
the Internet, accessed from their office.  It is proposed that, as even this single example 
will show, the uniform distanceless-ness will affect the development of values required 
to be a good lawyer. 
 
The rise of technology has therefore created a limited perspective of the significance of 
place, thus introducing competing ideals and conflicting ethics that need to be 
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reconciled. The modern situation with lawyers is no different. Technology is being 
implemented into lawyers daily work flows because of positives such as perceived 
efficiency and cost reduction.  It is Heidegger’s overarching negatives that make the 
effect of information technology on lawyers’ ethics a provocative issue. 
 
B Lawyers’ Technology Use 
 
Lawyers are increasingly using technology to achieve their desired outcomes at work. 
The Internet has contributed to the rise in cloud computing and outsourcing, which 
results in a lawyer sharing client information with third parties. The use of social media 
has also exploded into lawyers’ personal and professional lives, but lawyers are not the 
only members of the profession at risk of consequences rising from their social media 
use. A judge in the United States was subject to proceedings brought against him for 
‘friending’93 a lawyer on Facebook who had a case before the judge.94 Similarly, a 
judge was disqualified for emailing a witness.95 This has not dissuaded all judges in the 
United States from using social media, however, as some keep blogs96 as an expression 
of their right to write about the law and administration of justice.97 By comparison, in 
the United Kingdom a senior judge issued guidance to judges stating that judges who 
blog must not identify themselves as belonging to the judiciary and that failure to adhere 
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to such recommendations could result in disciplinary action.98 This is a stern directive 
in comparison to the liberal approach taken in the United States.  Australian judges are 
yet to embrace blogging, but there is a possibility that retired judges may be recruited 
to run blogs on Supreme Court websites.99 
 
Social media not only has personal appeal, but also can be used in litigation as well to 
demonstrate evidence of employment or communication in the scope of work. E-
discovery similarly unveils a wealth of information stored in company files and emails 
by tracing the metadata to quickly and accurately find key words that might relate to 
the case at hand.100 Locations, timing, actions and bias can all be ascertained from 
viewing an individual’s social media portfolio.101 In the United States, it is implied that 
lawyers should investigate social media sites as a matter of professional competence.102 
When a lawyer advised his client to clean up and delete his Facebook account, his 
deceptive and obstructionist conduct resulted in a $542,000 penalty.103 All of these 
technologies that lawyers use need to be grounded in a place in order to explain their 
benefits and consequences.  
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Each specific technology will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 104  But first, 
geography, community and virtual landscapes must be discussed to discover the context 
in which technologies are being utilised.  
 
Virtual place and communities are especially relevant to online law firms, operating 
solely inside the confines of the Internet.105 There has been a rise of entirely online law 
firms in the last ten years. A virtual law firm is still subject to the same professional 
rules and regulations as regular bricks and mortar firms, yet they operate in a highly 
technological manner delivering legal solutions to clients exclusively online.106 The 
lawyers themselves may operate from a communal office, or in some cases their own 
home. The services offered are often referred to as eLawyering. The American Bar 
Association has established a task force, aimed at regulating and researching 
eLawyering.107 It can be said the virtual firms create their own small community, yet 
they are in fact isolated with traditional workflow concepts abandoned in favour of new, 
modern processes.  
 
Lawyers merely using Internet powered solutions like cloud computing for file storage 
are caught between two worlds.108 They are not online enough to be part of a genuine 
Internet community, yet they are still using online services. There is no doubt this new 
technology gives rise to new ethical problems. The lawyers all using the same 
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technology such as cloud computing could also now belong to a whole new community 
of lawyers who use the cloud.   
 
Therefore, when defining space and place with technology it is best to assume that the 
two cannot operate independently. This provides a stronger argument that when space, 
place and technology are linked to lawyers; they will be of great importance in 
determining the effect on the development of their ethics.109  
 
The Internet is also challenging the traditional structure of the legal profession. By 
allowing lawyers access to information on the move and from home that would 
previously be left at the office, lawyers are capable of doing more work and may be 
more prone to complex issues surrounding information privacy. 110  That in itself 
increases the pressure of work. Without the Internet it would also be impossible for 
lawyers to work from home and virtual law firms would fail to exist.111 With an entirely 
virtual law firm, however, a lot of the traditional aspects of a lawyer’s work are 
changed. This could impact on the client and their level of trust towards the lawyer they 
may have never met. Is the client’s experience of the legal system satisfactory with a 
virtual lawyer? Although lawyers frequently take direction by phone or fax, email is far 
more easily accessed outside work hours. The Internet, although assisting with 
communication, is also operating to affect the quality of communication. This will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter six. 
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C Communication 
 
Due to an increase in communication methods, lawyers face the possibility that the 
technology will turn them into little more than a resource, working all hours to make 
maximum profit.112  
 
Lawyers belong to a profession that thrives on communication. Letters and emails are 
constantly sent, phone calls are made and face-to-face meetings and court appearances 
are regular occurrences. By constantly communicating with one another, clients and 
outside forces, the legal community is one of strength and authority.  The Internet and 
modern technology has no doubt assisted communication, but there is debate around 
the quality of communication and there is an overarching idea of whether or not the 
communication engaged is indeed ethical. 
 
A concept that follows from the space and place theories is the effect it has on 
communication. Interactions can be ‘situated’ in a specific place, for a specific 
duration.113 Previous communication only occurred across space, usually within a local 
context. However in the seventeenth century, a community known as the ‘Republic of 
Letters’ was formed by early enlightenment intellectuals and philosophers. Postal 
communication allowed the academic community to thrive across boundaries.114  In 
sociology, the nature of indirect communication is questioned in order to raise 
discussion over the positives and negatives. So far there is no concrete answer.  When 
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building upon Heidegger’s work on place, it can be concluded that modernity 
(technology) has resulted in locales becoming shaped by influences that are distant from 
them.115  
 
Interactions may be analysed further, breaking them down to face to face, mediated, 
and mediated quasi interactions.116 Each of these interactions occurs in law firms each 
day with technology playing a significant role in mediated interaction especially. 
Mediated interaction can lead to ambiguity as one only relies on oneself to interpret 
communication received in letters and emails.  
 
Modern media has broken barriers that previously established traditional concepts of 
place. By providing universal access, barriers are removed.117 The electronic landscape 
is now privileged over physical location. A key idea that is raised from this area of work 
is that different media and media use allow us to incorporate different perspectives as 
never before.118 These different perspectives can give rise to situations where separate 
sets of ethics conflict with one another. 
 
Both positive and negative attributes can be linked to online communication. On one 
side of the argument, Giddens recognises the two competing ideals. Technology is too 
limited to prevent trickery, yet there is also online ‘trust’ systems in place, acting as 
self-regulators.119 On the other side, Meyrowitz attempts to reconcile the difference 
between being connected to multiple locations at once, leading to a possible group 
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identity. Yet technically, we are engaging technology from our location, a physical 
place, rather than becoming unstuck in a ‘uniform distancelessness’ as stated by 
Heidegger.120  
 
The second theory to apply to communication amongst lawyers is that of the media 
naturalness theory, a rebuttal to the richness theory.121 Unlike the richness theory, the 
naturalness theory accounts for context. 
 
Although many other industries and occupations are free to choose communication 
methods relying solely on productivity or profits as incentives to changes, the legal 
profession must also ensure their professional and ethical standards are maintained. 
Kock has formulated this theory to reconcile the benefits that electronic communication 
provides, with the problems caused by non face-to-face communication. 122   The 
naturalness of each medium is explained as the degree of similarity it has with face-to-
face communication. Where a medium has significantly fewer or greater 
communicative stimuli per unit of time, it poses cognitive obstacles to 
communication.123  
 
Information technology has the capacity to transform relationships across fields of 
practice within organisations. 124  Information Technology can however have both 
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competing and contradictory consequences in the workplace. It can be used to 
strengthen market exchanges ‘arm’s-length’ relationships, yet can also develop shared 
‘boundary objects’ across organisations. 125  Although it can reduce face-to-face 
communication which can break community ties, it also can bring people together 
within an organisation by enabling informal connections. By examining lawyers in the 
context of fields-of-practice, it can be seen that they experience a uniting of individuals 
within their field as well as experiencing conflict and boundary crossing in the field. 
Lawyers belong to both their field-of-practice and their organisation field. ‘Moreover, 
they may also attain different degrees of influence over practices in their joint 
organisational field while exercising different degrees of control over organisational 
resources’.126  
 
Technology can be used to create communities in organisations by facilitating 
communication between individual workers. Boundary-spanning practices also enable 
community thinking by encouraging new relationships to form. Communication 
theories are relevant to Heidegger’s ideas because they build upon and make reference 
to thoughts about place. If there were no communication, the impact of the loss of place 
would not be felt as strongly, since the community, and to a lesser extent the history, 
aspects of place would be incapable of being constructed in the first instance.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
																																																								
125 Ibid 14. 
126 Ibid 16. 
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A summary of ethics that evolve from concepts of place, geography, technology and 
community has been provided to demonstrate how lawyers are affected by place and 
how they need to be aware of all the new challenges that technology use raises.  
 
The importance of place and geographical concerns should not be underestimated. By 
considering whether or not place has inherent knowledge in the spirit of Heidegger’s 
thoughts from Being and Time, it was established that place can hold their own set of 
ethical standards independently of the people who inhibit the place at any given time. 
 
Technology and the Internet create increased ethical dilemmas for lawyers. They may 
arise from their use and to indicate how virtual place and virtual communities can 
develop. Internet use is challenging the structure of the legal profession by providing 
new places for lawyers to work in.  
 
Technology has transformative value in organisations as well as having the power to 
change communication methods and structures. The direct availability of the Internet 
can hinder Dasein’s ability to continually question themselves in order to reveal their 
fundamental mode of being and authenticity.  Increased technology use has the 
potential to affect the place of the lawyer and their ability to develop the values 
necessary to complete their professional and ethical requirements. 
 
The following chapter will focus on theories of lawyers’ ethics. A wide selection of 
theories will be examined ranging from liberalism and its dominant view of lawyers’ 
ethics to the ethics of care and sociological studies. By identifying whether or not 
place is featured predominantly in these theories, this thesis will be able to establish 
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whether lawyers have sufficient frameworks in which to ground their ethics when 
they engage in technology use. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Having previously introduced place in the context of Heideggerian philosophy, this 
chapter continues to examine the exposition of place as a feature in moral philosophy 
and studies into the social structure of the legal profession.  
 
In this chapter, how the elements of place are addressed in a range of theories of 
lawyers’ ethics will be established. Subsequently, place will be drawn upon to articulate 
how ethics can be understood in a Heideggerain framework. The works of moral 
philosophers and legal ethicists will be explored by reference to the elements of place. 
Place will be understood in relation to Hediegger’s concepts of being-in-the-world, 
temporality and dwelling, and being-there, to enable us to understand the significance 
that place holds in relation to technological change.  
 
As a point of contrast, sociological theories will also be included and compared with 
the ethical theories. Social inquiries into the nature of the legal profession have 
determined how great an impact location and client play on the nature of the lawyers’ 
work and their ethical development. These variables mirror qualities that structure 
place.  
 
Place has not yet been presented explicitly at any length across various theories of 
lawyers’ ethics. Autonomy and zealous advocacy appear at the liberal end of the 
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lawyers’ ethical spectrum in the English speaking literature, encouraging individualism 
and adherence to the client’s explicit wishes. Place fails to feature strongly, if at all, in 
the liberal theories, with a clear disconnection between the community and the 
autonomous, zealous advocate. Strong liberal views take issue with role differentiation 
as seen in legal ethics philosophy.1 This is in contrast to the liberalism expressed in 
terms of contextual judgment. Contextual judgment allows for the question to be asked 
of whether a lawyer should correct an adversary’s mistake to the detriment of their 
client, if the alternative is that the lawyer breaches fiduciary duty by not zealously 
representing their interests.2 Autonomy (and liberal ethics) conflicts with traditional 
concepts of community and virtue. Heidegger’s idea of place assists in reconciling this 
conflict - as it allows for an autonomous person to keep her own self within the 
community, realised as an authentic Dasein. 
 
Place is prioritised in most virtue ethic theories, indicating that virtue ethics may be 
better equipped to address issues of technology. By examining virtue ethics and the 
ethics of care, it is clear there is a significant overlap with the community element of 
place that is unarticulated in the texts. The overlapping features are the same features 
that contribute to the construction of place, such as community and tradition. Place as 
a relational and community factor is enriched by an ethics of care. But by failing to see 
location as a factor in ethical development, these theories are not as complete as they 
could be. Place is often assumed and is not used to its full potential in the elaboration 
of these theories. 
 
																																																								
1,Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics (Lexis Nexis, 4th ed, 2010) 94. 
2 Ibid. 
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In the sociological theories, place appears to be significant in practice and directly 
linked to location. Yet similarly to ethics of care theories, the sociological theories have 
an incomplete understanding of place. The concept of hemispheres is impaired owing 
to a lack of the acknowledgement of location specific analysis. This is rectified in later 
works, which pick up geographic as well as relational elements of place. Studies 
conclude that country lawyers, whilst retaining a connection with place, have greater 
autonomy.  
 
Heidegger’s texts were never explicit in stating ethical norms, however there are many 
arguments and ideas that relate to common themes found within texts regarding 
lawyers’ ethics. In the ‘Letter on Humanism’ Heidegger actively rejected any idea of 
ethics, preferring to return to ethics not linked to the metaphysical attributes of Dasein 
and substituting ethics for Being.3 
 
There are several sources that identify some ethical reasoning in Heidegger’s texts, 
especially in the context of the political4 in the potential of guilt within the being,5 and 
within truth.6  It is also possible that the ‘authenticity’ of Dasein and the idea of 
authenticity as a value are linked.7  
 
																																																								
3  David Farrell Krell (ed), Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 
Revised ed, 2008) 213. 
4 Michael Lewis, Heidegger and the Place of Ethics (Continuum International Publishing Group, 1st ed, 
2005). 
5 Donovan Miyasaki, 'A Groud For Ethics in Heidegger's Being and Time' (2007) 38(3) (October) 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 261. 
6 Frederick A. Olafson, Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
7 Ethics found within Heidegger is not the sole concern of this chapter. Rather, Heidegger’s concepts of 
being-there, being in the world and dwelling and time are used as indicators of place by which to evaluate 
lawyers’ ethics.  
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II LIBERALISM AND THE DOMINANT VIEW 
 
Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. Dasein has a network, in a state of Bewandtnis, or 
involvement. Dasein must involve themselves in their world as well as being-with 
Others. The world is one that Dasein shares with Others, which alludes to a community 
required for Dasein to fully realise their self.8 This shared world, or place, relies on a 
community ideal.  
 
Heidegger discusses authentic and inauthentic selves, to build Dasein further. An 
inauthentic Dasein is one that loses their self and becomes their own sole responsibility. 
Whereas an authentic Dasein, whilst keeping autonomy and a strong sense of self, must 
ensure they do not isolate themselves from Others. This section will explain the concept 
of autonomy in liberal theory, how it is at odds with place and how Heidegger can 
bridge place with liberal theory. 
 
A Complete Autonomy – At Odds With The Community Element of Place 
 
Autonomy is a theme found in liberal ethics, meaning the capacity one holds to make 
her own informed decision. Autonomy is directly linked to moral accountability and 
practical reason – values found in liberal thinking and, of these, prominently found in 
the Kantian tradition.9  
 
																																																								
8 Olafson, above n 6,115. 
9 Immanuel Kant, 'Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals' in Allen W Wood (ed), Basic 
Writings of Kant (The Modern Library 2001) A534. 
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Liberal theorists themselves contest the nature of autonomy: ‘the capacity to govern 
oneself, the actual condition of self-government, a personal ideal, and a set of rights 
expressive of one’s sovereignty over oneself’.10 There is both moral autonomy and 
personal autonomy, together to be defined separately from freedom. Kantian moral 
autonomy suggests the ability to construct a moral identity, whereas personal autonomy 
is not limited to the development of morals.11 References to autonomy can occur in a 
global and local sphere – much like the notion of place. The greater autonomy of the 
person represents a greater space, whereas autonomy that relates only to a specific value 
can be exercised generously within a limited physical space.  
 
The Kantian concept of practical reason, which is the ability to choose one’s actions 
through reason, comes with an overriding sense of freedom and the ability to choose to 
impose a law upon ourselves. The Categorical Imperative needs the quality of 
autonomy to engage one into acting towards the maxims we would be happy to have as 
universal law.12 It also requires us to respect another by way of their autonomy.13  The 
importance of the individual is highlighted when a choice must be made as to which is 
the greater moral good. By placing an individual at the centre of the decision making 
process, their place falls to the background. 
 
By contrast to Kant, John Stuart Mill saw autonomy as an ‘element of well-being’ 
which leads to a consequentialist view of autonomy.14   A good outcome defines 
consequentialism, with happiness being held as the highest possible value.  Autonomy 
																																																								
10 Ibid. 
11 Joel Feinberg, 'Autonomy' in John Christman (ed), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy 
(Oxford University Press, 1989) 27; above n 6. 
12 Kant, above n 9, 4:455. 
13 Ibid 4:439. 
14 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Dover Publications, 2002) 2. 
	 95
can contribute to happiness, and therefore contribute to the ultimate outcome. The 
outcome based moral journey is even more removed from place than the individualists. 
There is no evidence that place is required as a value of happiness or well-being, nor 
for autonomy, which leaves little room for a place based decision to be made.  
 
As autonomy is conceptualised in distinction to groups or community, it is often 
directly at odds with community conceptions of morals and virtue. In constructing the 
moral being, autonomy allows morality to exist in the person independently of 
reference to other people or other institutions. Place is clearly ignored when analysing 
purely autonomous, moral individuals – a key issue found in the works of Kant, and of 
the Kantian disciple John Rawls. An example may be found in Rawls’ original position 
and ‘veil of ignorance’. This concept requires one to determine their moral standpoint 
based on not knowing their place or fortune in society.15 By removing an individual’s 
knowledge of their position in the world, they can evaluate a decision without being 
clouded by personal privilege. Although the sentiment is strong, the element of place 
is entirely ignored when exercising rational choice behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. Place 
therefore does not factor in any identifiable way into the moral choice in Rawlsian 
theory. 
 
Theories of autonomy often fail to see metaphysical experience and interactions with 
things that identify an individual such as their culture and beliefs. To be truly 
autonomous is to marginalise self-identity to foster autonomy. This indicates that ‘true 
liberal conceptions fail to take seriously the permanent and unalterable aspects of the 
																																																								
15 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, Revised ed, 1999) 118. 
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self and its social position’. 16  True autonomy in this context could result in a 
compromised and inauthentic Dasein. Dasein cannot exist unless they reference Others 
in their world.  
 
There has been a connection between private and public elements of autonomy, so as 
to further the idea of positive justice when the principles of autonomy are practised and 
supported by the affected citizens.17 The role of law is such that it relieves the public 
of concern and provides boundaries so that the public may go forth in their autonomy 
and thrive. Public and private autonomy exist harmoniously to become ‘fully realised’ 
as each is ‘co-original’.18 The private citizens’ autonomy contributes to the public 
autonomy, which creates place – the law is produced for a group or community, in a 
specific location that is most likely built upon a history. While the idea of autonomy 
works positively by allowing members of the group an increased capacity for self-
reflection, the idea of the ‘affected citizens’ amounts to a place in themselves. Although 
supposedly conflicting, autonomy works in Jürgen Habermas’ theory by gently relying 
on the community elements of place. Autonomy only occurs because location and 
community help the individual become autonomous. Liberal legal ethics does not 
currently recognise this assimilation.   
 
Associated with the liberal theories of lawyers’ ethics is the idea of the lawyer as a 
zealous advocate. In order to act morally (rather than embracing an amoral perspective) 
the lawyer must be aware of how their moral priorities define their ‘moral profile’.19 
Although there is a moral responsibility to represent a client in need, they must 
																																																								
16 Iris Young, Justice and Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 2011) 46. 
17 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (William Rehg trans, The MIT Press, 1998). 
18 Ibid 107. 
19 Freedman, above n 1, 11. 
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represent them zealously with no reference to the lawyer’s own moral code.20Individual 
autonomy is paramount, which suggests morality arises in the practice of law from 
allowing the client to ‘carry out their lawful decisions’.21  
 
As Freedman recently indicates, countless lawyers have ‘found the practice of law to 
be an exhilarating, gratifying, and essentially moral profession of serving the dignity 
and autonomy of our fellow citizens… [this] would not be possible if lawyers were to 
view their relationship with their clients with a patronizing attitude of moral arrogance’. 
22 This differs slightly from earlier works by actively dismissing any moral code a 
lawyer may impart to their client as ‘patronizing… moral arrogance’.23  
 
As an example of complete autonomy, in defining the duties of an advocate, Henry 
Brougham (later Lord Chancellor) took an extreme position when representing Queen 
Caroline of England.  King George IV sought to divorce his wife, Queen Caroline, 
which would result in Parliament considering a bill that would deprive the Queen of 
her title.24 Owing to the ‘right of recrimination’ as a defence to divorce, Brougham 
needed to demonstrate that the King had engaged in extra-marital affairs.25 By invoking 
this right, the King’s reign would end. Brougham faced a dilemma – he had to choose 
between his suggested duty as a ‘good citizen’ (who would never think of incriminating 
the King) and his duty as counsel.26 His response on the matter was as follows:27 
																																																								
20 Ibid 6.  
21 Ibid 57. 
22 Monroe Freedman, 'A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers' Ethics' (2012) 25 Georgetown 
Journal of Legal Ethics 91, 105. 
23 Ibid 102. 
24 Catherine J Lactot, 'The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions' (1991) 64 Southern California Law Review 951, 960. 
25 Monroe H. Freedman, 'Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal' (2004) 34 Hofstra Law Review 1319, 1320. 
26 Gerald F. Uelmen, 'Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens' (1996) 30 Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review 119, 120. 
27 Freedman, above n 25, 1319. See the whole article for historic variations to the statement, 1321-24.  
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[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and 
that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of the patriot from 
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it should be his 
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.28 
 
Ultimately, the charges were dropped due to the gravity of Brougham’s threat.29 Upon 
reflection, Brougham later remarked that the statement was a ‘menace’,30 however, it 
is that exact nature of the statement that made it so powerful.31   
 
It is evident that place is not taken into consideration in the zealous advocate 
perspective. Where place theory would look towards the lawyer, the court and the 
client’s place, ultimate autonomy results in the lawyer ignoring their own place in order 
to maintain an absolute duty to the client. No reference is made to the location of lawyer 
or client, nor are there references in his work towards a community spirit or history at 
a location. Heidegger’s understanding of autonomy is poorly represented in the zealous 
advocate – the lawyer practises at the expense of the community. 
 
																																																								
28  Critics acknowledge that the point was made while ‘he was speaking under very exciting and 
extraordinary circumstances; defending the character of a woman against the inveterate enmity of a great 
King, he would naturally arrogate to himself the broadest privileges possible’. - Richard Harris, Hints on 
Advoacy: Intended for Practitioners in Civil and Criminal Courts (William H Stevenson, 1881) 154. 
29 Freedman, above n 25, 1320. 
30  Henry Lord Brougham, The Life and Times of Henry Lord Brougham, Written By Himself (W 
Blackwood, 1871) 309. 
31 Freedman, above n 25, 1321. 
	 99
Particularly, it is clear that place cannot be factored into Brougham’s idea of the 
advocate. The singular nature of the client, separate from all others, coupled with the 
blatant disregard of ‘other persons’ leaves no room for community or contextual 
influences. The history of a place cannot be summoned to prove a guiding hand, nor 
can the location provide a context.32 ‘Alienation is a problem in the transition from 
organically integrated society to a looser individualistic one’ indicates that 
individualism may not be entirely positive for ethical development.33  Similarly to 
Heidegger, this statement recognises society as a community, but not as a location.34  
 
B Contextual Judgment and Moral Activism 
 
Some legal ethicists engage the question of autonomy through critiques of the liberal 
views that expresses autonomy as place-less.35 References to community can be seen 
in works that support the exercise of contextual judgment, but the institutions that the 
lawyers are working in are ignored in favour of the lawyers’ personal ethical code. The 
‘place’ of the institution is similarly overlooked. A lawyer can adapt to questionable 
situations by using contextual judgment, which seeks to examine the law, but then 
engage with the context of its application to determine whether an action is fair.36 
Under this theory, libertarian, positivist or consequentialist views of lawyers’ ethics are 
rejected. By taking personal responsibility for the end result of justice, lawyers must 
																																																								
32  David Pannick, Advocates (Oxford University Press, 1993) 105. Critics have also noted more 
generally, that this statement fails to recognise the important responsibility a lawyer owes to the court, 
as well as his client. 
33 William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1998) 111. 
34 See generally, Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Martino Fine Books, 2012). 
35 Simon is a proponent of the contextual view and references Ronald Dworkin’s work throughout his 
own. Simon, above n 33, 39, 82, 91, 95, 126. 
36 Ibid 10. 
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sometimes disregard the client’s interest in the short-term.37 Although this places more 
responsibility on the lawyer, the end result of justice is seen as more important than the 
client’s fundamental interests. The place of the client is equally overlooked.  
 
Whilst recognising ‘ethical disappointment’ and ‘moral anxiety’ found within lawyers, 
the focus tends to be on the ‘structural tension in the lawyers’ role’.38 In contrast with 
the dominant view, the contextual judgment view focuses on the law being applied 
purely in accordance with its purpose, and litigation commences only to achieve a 
resolution.39 This is in contrast to the dominant view that a lawyer must act in the best 
interests of their client no matter what moral dilemmas may arise.  The contextual view 
that – ‘the lawyer should take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances 
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice’ provides a slightly greater 
recognition of place than the dominant view. 40 By focusing on the idea that lawyers 
want to do well and that they should take into consideration their social role, the 
contextual view serves to find the answer that will allow lawyers to keep or rediscover 
the connection between their basic work and the pursuit of justice. This connection 
could be strengthened if a greater acknowledgement were made of place because justice 
could quite often be founded on ideals central to a specific location.  
 
 When a lawyer is acting in a libertarian fashion, they may believe they have moral 
permission to exploit all loopholes available to them for the benefit of the client. No 
public interest needs to be taken into consideration, and in identifying what the law is, 
lawyers need not solve problems with the law. When lawyers are constantly faced with 
																																																								
37 Ibid 73. 
38 Ibid 30, 2. 
39 Ibid 8. 
40 Ibid 9.  
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contextual decisions to make regarding the validity and hierarchy of laws, they cannot 
adhere purely to a simple structure of positive rules. Arguing against the 
consequentialist standpoint, which states that injustices along the way are justified so 
long as they still work towards justice, contextual judgment demonstrates how 
important it is to ensure decisions are made within a context.  What a theory based in 
contextual judgment fails adequately to recognise, however, is the element of location 
or community within that context. Context is created by factors such as environment 
and community, and by failing to recognise the importance of place, this theory only 
partially realises the potential for a sound ethical framework lawyers can use when 
engaging in technology use.  
 
A Rawlsian defence of the standard conception continues, albeit in a slightly modified 
version.41 The importance of linking the role of the lawyer to the role of the law results 
in the institution affecting ethics.42  This reflects context and makes an attempt at 
loosely defining a place from which the lawyer can gain ethical grounding. The 
community is referred to as holding a ‘broader morality’ that the lawyer must reconcile 
with their own role obligations.43  Tradition is evident through the indication that 
institutional histories shape the lawyer’s role. 44  However, the institution actually 
contributes to an autonomous view of the lawyer, based on the obligation to serve the 
client without question and accept the fiduciary relationship that follows.45 As such, a 
clear distinction must be made between the obligations that come with the lawyer’s role 
and the greater morality of the community. There is little room for place in this view, 
																																																								
41 Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer's Role 
(Ashgate Publishing 2009). 
42 Ibid 45-46. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid 117. 
45 Ibid 122-3. 
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outside of appreciating the history and tradition of the institution that contributes to the 
formulation of lawyers’ ethics.  
 
Similarly sharing the ideal that the dominant view needs to be displaced, results in the 
moral activist view - a shared responsibility between the client and the lawyer.46 The 
lawyer should not be a hired gun and, instead, would ensure the means they use to 
achieve their end are moral as well as legal.47  By initiating a shared concept of 
responsibility, moral activism instantly references shared norms found within a 
community, and indicates that by sharing responsibility there is an acceptance of 
similarity, and possibly a community between lawyer and client.  
 
Under the moral activism umbrella, the lawyer must act as a moral agent, exempt from 
the supposed professional ‘safeguards’ in place under the dominant view.48 The ethics 
available to the lawyer are general ethics, rather than professionally defined ethics. 
Instead of relying on legal positivism, moral activism is capable of interpreting 
consequentialist theories as well as deontological theories.49  The process must be 
correct in order for the action to be right.50  Moral accountability is never shifted, 
simply because the person is acting in their role as a lawyer.51 By not limiting the place 
of the person as the place of ‘a lawyer’, moral activism appears to allow a more 
generalised view of place. 
 
																																																								
46 David Luban, Lawyers and Justice (Princeton University Press, 1998) 166. 
47 Ibid. ‘And the argument of our first eight chapters has not been kind to the hired gun. It has, to be 
blunt, shown that the role of legal hired gun is morally untenable’.  
48 Ibid xxii.  
49 Christine Parker, 'A Critical Morality For Lawyers: Four Approaches to Lawyers' Ethics' (2004) 30(1) 
Monash University Law Review 49, 54. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Luban, above n 46, 173-4. 
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Public interest and the advancement of justice are keys to the moral activist. These at 
times can mean reforming the law as well as counseling the client.52 A moral activist 
would discuss every avenue of impact with the client, such as how right or wrong their 
course of action may be, as well as the impact it may have on other parties. This can 
result in a client not receiving the zealous advocacy they may desire and consequently 
a parting of ways between lawyer and client.53  It explicitly advocates the view of 
constrained advocacy with distinct moral limits. The community is under an obligation 
to offer equal justice. The community bears great responsibility, as do the lawyers 
operating within the morally equal community. ‘There is no better way to commit 
ourselves to equal justice under law for all, and thus to a concept of community richer 
and more generous than the society of winners and losers, than to make access to the 
law tangible by realising it as a matter of right’. 54 Community by way of Others and 
acting for all resonates with Heideggarian thinking that Dasein requires a place and 
relationship with Others in order to exist.55 Through moral activism, it can be seen that 
place is starting to take shape.  
 
This idea of a rich community based in equal justice can only exist if place is a key 
factor in the moral activist’s conception. The spirit of the place and confines of the 
boundary ensconce the notion of justice. The justice of the community cannot be placed 
on the shoulders of one lawyer.56 
 
																																																								
52 Ibid 63. 
53 Ibid 174. 
54 Ibid 289. 
55 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS II HEIDEGGER. 
56 Luban, above n 46, xix. 
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Blending the emphases in these theories on contextual judgment and community 
standards, David Luban notes that: ‘Beneath their diversity, the lawyers inhabit a single, 
profession-wide interpretive community, with the same overall understanding of what 
makes law law’.57 This fact allows us to speak coherently of a single legal profession’. 
58  
 
The ‘morally unworthy litigant’, as morally suspicious clients may be called, may be 
dissuaded by the moral activist to pursue their ‘morally shady’ projects by being told 
of their loss of respect within the community.59 Again, place continues to hold great 
value in the community. The client’s community might well be the same as the lawyers’ 
community. But where the lawyer may fear public shaming, the morally unworthy 
litigant probably does not care. It could also be argued that, as place can contribute to 
better morals, in disrespecting community, the morally unworthy litigant also 
disrespects place. 
 
C History within the Community 
 
Another community present in the legal profession is an interpretive community, which 
can be used to define the bounds of reasonableness and plausibility of legal 
arguments.60 To be fully explained, an interpretive community should instead be an 
interpretive place. The interpretive place is dependent upon the history as well as the 
location and the community within. Reasonableness in one state may differ from 
																																																								
57 David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 3. The reference 
to ‘interpretive community’ here resonates with the emphasis on Ronald Dworkin’s work found in 
William Simon’s theory of contextual judgment: see above n 35.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 47. 
60 Ibid 3.  
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another, and even more so with countries. Instead of focusing solely on the community, 
reference to the place could enhance interpretations, leading to more plausible 
outcomes because recognition of place subsequently strengthens the community. Place 
is clearly assumed when discussing political motivations as the politics take place in 
districts and locations. History is constantly passed down and referred to, yet rarely 
explicitly acknowledged.  
 
Moral activism approaches history and time more fervently than zealous advocacy.61 
There is great discussion of change over time within the moral activist realm, always 
for justice and the betterment of justice – this could including changing the way clients 
think as well as changing how the institutions think.62 Zealous advocacy may occur, 
however, when the lawyer and client’s aims are synergised. In this instance, if the client 
and lawyers’ morals are not entirely wholesome, there is every chance laws and 
conventional morals can be disregarded. History and time are not immediately relevant 
in this scenario.  
 
There is also a strong element of political reform in the ethics of the moral activist 
lawyer and they may commonly find themselves contributing to the public interest 
aspect of lawyering.63 The political aspect provides a proactive outlet for the lawyer, 
as, by taking on cases that align with their beliefs on a political topic, the lawyer can 
pave the wave for social change. This aspect depends heavily on the lawyer, as the 
																																																								
61 Ibid. In order to influence the client, or reform the law, change must occur over time. See also Luban, 
above n 46, 173. 
62 Luban, above n 46, 160. ‘moral activism: a vision of law practice in which the lawyer swho disagrees 
with the morality or justice of a client’s ends does not simply terminate the relationship, but tries to 
influence the client for the better’. 
63 Luban, above n 57, 323. 
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lawyer is the only one directing the morality that informs the cause. It is the lawyer’s 
place and history that have shaped their views.  
 
D Liberalism Within A Location 
 
Heidegger’s Dasein is not just a being, but rather a being-there – it has a worldview in 
mind. The world around the Dasein helps to structure their character and the Dasein 
acts only towards the world.64  To uncover the true meaning of Being, Heidegger’s 
existential analytic is used to examine how Dasein interacts with their world around 
them. Engaging in the world and objects in the world contribute to experience.65 The 
world not only exists to Dasein, but is a phenomenon in itself.66 This deep connection 
implies that the world is of extraordinary importance and acts as a grounding agent.  
 
Physical location plays a crucial role in defining Dasein and place. In order to paint a 
complete picture of place and its importance to lawyers’ ethics, location must be 
explored. Heidegger addressed autonomy briefly in discussions regarding the authentic 
and inauthentic Dasein. Autonomy is a concept well explored in lawyers’ ethics, but 
often at the expense of the factors that make up place – community, history and location.  
 
Location starts to creep into theories that recognise the moral community. The lawyer 
is under no moral obligation to follow or agree with the law. ‘There is no moral 
obligation to obey the law in general, but that an obligation exists to obey those laws 
																																																								
64 Ibid 11.  
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that satisfy a “generality requirement”’. 67  The generality requirement is one that 
transcends individual gain in order to do the best for the community. If one does not 
follow this rule, one expresses disrespect for the ‘community and solidarity’.68 If a 
person breaks the law, they are privileging themselves above the moral community. 
Members of the community are moral equals, and in common law countries there is 
community control over the legal system in the form of juries. Community in this 
respect is identifying place, but surreptitiously recognising the physical location of the 
place – members for juries are filtered first and foremost by location.69 To be acting 
within the community means you must all be in the same locale, rather than an esoteric 
notion of place. Community is strong in this aspect, yet location and history are not 
explicitly considered. 
 
Liberal approaches to legal ethics found in the dominant view often work to push aside 
the boundaries of place. Little, if any, moral significance is given to the significance of 
place in these views and they do not have the resources to resist the inherent effect 
technology is having on the undermining of place. Technology is also removing 
boundaries and, consequentially, is pushing back and has potential to remove places 
entirely. In the technological age, boundaries need to remain in place, in order to ensure 
ethics are kept within certain parameters. ‘One part of the ethics of technology is 
precisely to guard the space in which any ethics can operate’.70 Technology use is most 
in line with the dominant view, which ultimately does not necessarily require the lawyer 
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to act in the best interests of justice when comparing it with other approaches. Place 
subsequently needs to be featured to engage lawyers’ ethical development. If 
boundaries are pushed back by the dominant view as well as by the technological 
practicalities, the importance of place slowly diminishes.  
 
Heidegger considered boundaries to be a component of ‘distanceless-ness’. If 
everything is as equally near, as it is far, what will the effect be? Boundaries contribute 
to the construction of place, by grouping people together in a location to develop a 
shared experience. For place to be realised in its entirety, boundaries need to be 
enforced. 
 
In a contextual view, lawyers will acknowledge the boundaries and make decisions that 
may or may not exploit every last loophole. It gives them the option to disregard 
‘morally shady’71 avenues of action, even if they might assist the client. They may 
instead choose another route to achieve the client’s aims. The lawyer need not simply 
ignore partisanship, but acknowledge their actions and what the end result could be – 
such as exploiting a loophole. The contextual view is fundamentally advocating for 
justice, not client individualism. For the contextual view to replace the dominant view, 
regulation and discipline within the legal profession would need to be readdressed. 
Location would play a more important role in how far the regulation would extend and 
whether or not discipline would be specific to differing locations.  
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Elements of place are noticeably absent in the dominant view since it relies on strict 
autonomy. For place to thrive, the elements of location, community and history need to 
be present and acknowledged.  
 
III VIRTUE ETHICS 
 
In contrast with the modernists, contemporary pre-modernists believe that community 
traditions and virtues help to construct an ethical lawyer. It is possible to bridge the gap 
between their theories with non-law specific neo-Aristotelian ethics. Place is indirectly 
recognised in all by way of community.  
 
Virtue ethics theories often start with reference to Aristotle, but also by comparison 
with Kant. At the core of Anthony Kronman’s influential virtue ethics is the ‘crisis in 
the American legal profession’ that ‘stands in danger of losing its soul’.72 Kronman’s 
is the ideal of the lawyer-statesman, in their delivery of prudence or practical wisdom, 
that will save the legal profession.73  
 
Aristotelian virtue is drawn upon to solve lawyers’ ethical dilemmas, in particular 
practical wisdom.74  Political discussion and Aristotle’s Polis also feature,75  as the 
incorporation of politics into the discussion serves to represent both community and 
joint decision making – ideas that resonate with being-in-the-world.76 Already, such 
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strong recognition of place is starting to construct virtue ethics as a tool for 
understanding technology use. 
 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics is privileged over the philosophies of enlightenment and post-
enlightenment philosophers such as Marx, Kant and Hume. By abandoning the idea of 
teleology, their ‘highly specific historical backgrounds’ lead them to fail in their 
ideas.77 It was a regurgitation of vocabulary with little to no context that informed in 
the rejection of Aristotle’s teleology from a physics standpoint that compromised the 
ideal. Subjective rules based on an individuals’ morality serves to remove morality 
completely. Hyper-individualism only weakens place. Thus, it can be seen that if 
morality is removed from individualism, it is present in place. This is directly at odds 
with libertarian autonomy, and is aligned with the community ideals of place. 
 
A The Virtue Ethics Community 
 
The community aspect of ethics expands when the idea of the law teacher community 
acting as separate to the student community as separate to the court community reflects 
the idea of different places existing within a similar sphere. Place is valued and appears 
by reference to community. What is lacking is the recognition of location or history in 
this context. 
 
In The Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle concludes that politics follows ethics.78 What 
is central to Book I of The Politics is the political community, a theme explored in legal 
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virtue ethics as political fraternity.79 Polis is the highest form community can take and 
it is the public life that is significantly greater virtuously than the private life.80 To 
achieve an individual’s telos, one must exist within the political community, which 
contributes to the individual’s virtuous development in terms of education and laws.81 
The political community is not one that is bound by laws or power, but rather is defined 
by partnerships in pursuit of the common good.82  When the political community 
flourishes, so does an individual’s virtue.83 Within the political community are shared 
understandings, which contribute to the overall wellbeing.  
 
The Aristotelian significance of community is also prominent in Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
earlier virtue ethics. In his After Virtue period, MacIntyre proposed that community 
influences and shapes ethics. Moral identity founded on a community does not, 
however, mean that the moral agent must also accept the limitations of that community 
– ‘there would never be anywhere to begin, but for the moral particularities’.84 The 
significance of the element of community assists the development of place.  
 
B Time, Temporality and Tradition 
 
History and temporality motivates discussion of the spirit of a place and the history and 
traditions that shape place and the people within it. Heidegger addressed tradition in 
Being and Time to demonstrate and ‘dekonstrukt’ how tradition can ‘block our access 
to those primordial ‘sources’ from which categories and concepts handed down to us 
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have been in part quite genuinely drawn’.85 Thus tradition is viewed as a contributing 
factor to place. There is also a greater concept of temporality throughout Being and 
Time whereby there is an interconnectedness of past, present and future. ‘Temporality 
temporalizes as a future which makes present in the process of having been’.86 
 
Heidegger’s temporality is the transcendental condition required to understand being. 
Dasein finds themselves in the world at their place, by way of dwelling.87 The place 
Dasein dwells in comes with familiar history, practices and structures. Dwellings must 
be developed to ensure essence is not lost and to assist in revealing elements of being 
such as truth. Dwellings may also function to preserve characteristics of a place or 
thing.88  
 
Essence is revealed when the being is dwelling in a temporal landscape. Heidegger 
rejected the standard structure of time being linear as past, present and future and 
instead disconnected the standard dimensions. Paralleling the discussions of 
community and Others, temporality leads to a discussion of authentic and inauthentic 
selves. Dasein may have their authenticity realised when they become open to time – 
similarly to Kantian tradition whereby time affects our experiences.89 Time provides a 
history, as well as a future to project activities towards.  
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MacIntyre’s ethics of virtue strongly feature community as well as history and 
traditions.90 Not only is history utilised to demonstrate the development of ethics, 
Aristotelian virtue acts as a framework of his account of moral philosophy. To achieve 
the shift towards MacIntyre’s viewpoint, it is stated that present, analytical and 
phenomenological philosophies will be ‘powerless to detect the disorders of moral 
thought’.91 Hegel’s idea of philosophical history instead is used to understand the 
current hypothetical world.92 By recognising Nietzsche’s rejection of moral rationality, 
Aristotelian teleology is relied upon to dictate what constitutes a moral person and how 
one ought to act. 93  Nietzsche is strongly critiqued, yet Nietzsche’s critique of 
Enlightenment morality is also acknowledged as valid.94  
 
Virtue ethics seek to recognise important structural differences between Enlightenment 
and Aristotelian philosophy. According to MacIntyre, Enlightenment ideas rejected 
Aristotle’s telos, yet still did not provide a metaphysical substitute. Enlightenment 
theory reversed Aristotle’s rules based on virtue, and instead based virtues on subjective 
principles. Finally, it is the Enlightenment’s attribution of morality to the individual 
that competes with Aristotle’s notion of virtue belonging to society.95  Following on 
from this, Nietzsche, similarly to Aristotle, rejected the individualistic ideal, yet merely 
replaced it with his own ideas of individualism. After Virtue concludes with strong 
opposition to the individualist political philosophies of Rawls and Robert Nozick.96 
The theme of history throughout After Virtue ensures we look at our history to discover 
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our future as moral entities. As a consequence, place emerges as a factor in MacIntyre’s 
works on virtue, through the concepts of community, history and tradition, yet it is not 
explicitly acknowledged. 
 
Through the concept of tradition, a person’s ‘moral starting point’ comes from a 
‘family, city, tribe and nation’.97  By appreciating these factors, place is indirectly 
recognised and it can actually be a moral starting point.  
 
According to MacIntyre: 
 
The best type of human life, that in which the tradition of the virtues is most adequately 
embodies, is lived by those engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community 
directed towards the shared achievement of those common goods without which the 
ultimate human good cannot be achieved.98  
 
This solidifies the nexus between community and tradition resulting in an ultimate 
good.99 This also sees tradition and rival traditions as concepts. ‘It is only from the 
standpoint of their own tradition that the difficulties of that rival tradition can be 
adequately understood and overcome’.100 Progress within tradition, and the ability of a 
tradition to resolve issues, can move the argument towards a solution. Rival traditions 
are resolved by understanding the thoughts of the tradition and then to identify the 
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unresolved problems. 101  Tradition is a key element of Heidegger’s place and 
complements history.  
 
An institution can act as a bearer of tradition. The spirit of a place is formed by the 
history. Tradition is defined as ‘an argument extended through time in which certain 
fundamental agreements are defined and redefined’.102  Accounts of traditions are 
provided along with discussion of practical rationality to deal with incompatible forms 
of justice. By looking at how traditions interact with one another, it is shown how 
practical rationality can aid in the continuation of the traditions. Tradition is not just a 
concrete idea, but an ever-changing and evolving process. In place, it is the fluid 
element found against the fixed location and progressing community. Participation in 
tradition is a recurring theme in virtue ethics,103  and extends from a broad moral 
concept to a specific mode of moral analysis. Virtues sustain traditions as the tradition 
provides ‘practices and individual lives with their necessary historical content’.104 By 
linking virtuous living with tradition, in MacIntyre’s analysis virtues are linked with an 
element of place. Place is thereby an important contributing factor to a virtuous life 
and, if place is rejected or removed from the equation, it is possible for the individual 
to become less virtuous.  
 
Following tradition, history is present in MacIntyre’s neutral analysis and the 
Heideggerian idea of ‘revealing’ exists surreptitiously in his concept of 
‘understanding’. ‘Practices always have histories and that at any given moment what a 
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practice is depends on a mode of understanding’.105  Practice is defined as an activity, 
requiring skills and standards of excellence, from which goods are realised.106 As the 
practice is not fundamentally moral, it is similar to Heideggerian revealing. 
 
Revealing in Heidegger’s texts is a concept that helps Dasein understand the world 
around them.107 An example of a revealing mode is that of technology. Once the 
essence of the mode is understood, it aids to reveal. ‘Understanding’ could reflect as 
understanding the essence of the practices and their histories contribute to their 
essence.108  
 
Comparatively by reference to time, technology is addressed briefly, and place 
inadvertently, in the context of law as a profession. ‘The practice of law is today in 
danger of losing its temporal range and shrinking down to a series of disconnected 
points’.109  This indicates that place, as recognised by the element of time and distance, 
is shrinking. ‘Technology has also, in a different way, foreshortened the temporal 
horizon of lawyers… The result is a fragmentation of experience, and the narrowing of 
one’s temporal frame of reference, an inward state of mind that is outwardly reflected 
in the growing tendency of lawyers to move from one firm to the next with dizzying 
speed’.110 If lawyers are less connected to their past, an element of place is being lost. 
The consequence could be that the professional craft of law may be reduced to the status 
of being an ordinary job. Whilst the idea of time is tacitly acknowledging a 
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Heideggerian ideal, it also states that it can have a negative effect on the lawyer. 
Recognition of the significance of place could strengthen virtue ethics arguments from 
a temporal standpoint.  
 
 
C Location 
 
A lack of boundaries and a mixture of locations could result in competing ethics. 
Similarly to Heidegger, Kronman addresses multiple places coming together. ‘Different 
conceptions of community aims can set disputants apart’.111 Place similarly recognises 
this problem by addressing location as well as culture. 
 
There is an element of law firm culture discussed in texts that identifies the identity of 
the lawyer and the benefits of a small firm over the economically focused big firm.112 
Location is taken into consideration when defining such firms. There is also the contrast 
between law graduates of today drifting towards larger firms, where the client is given 
the role of leader, putting lawyers and their moral counsel on the backburner.113 This 
is drawn in comparison with lawyers of yesterday, engaging the client, with value 
placed on honesty, candour and detachment. 114  These are all cornerstones of the 
lawyer-statesman, who assumes place.  
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Overall it is clear that virtue ethics value the idea of place, but again, without explicitly 
stating it. References to the three things of location, community and spirit of a place 
(history) are evident to contribute an understanding of place. Neo-Aristotelian 
philosophy presupposes knowledge of place. In order to view community as a moral 
community, with people being accountable to their local community, place must be 
observed. An ethic of care shares similarities, but has limitations that are not found in 
virtue ethics. These will be discussed below. 
IV ETHICS OF CARE 
 
In contrast with virtue ethics, an ethics of care utilises normative ethics to construct a 
moral basis to explain human conduct. In discussing moral development, ‘conventional 
judgment is based on the shared norms and values that sustain relationships, groups, 
communities and societies’.115 Conventional judgment is a value some scholars have 
hypothesised about in relation to lawyers.116 Conventional judgment allows a lawyer 
to make correct decisions involving the work they take on, the way in which they advise 
a client and the way in which they ultimately fight the case for their client. The main 
difference between an ethics of care and moral activism is that an ethics of care focuses 
on the personal relationships whereas moral activism is concerned with the overall just 
ordering of society.  
 
In Gilligan’s study, the ‘duality of girls’ and boys’ moral development was explored – 
the boy exploring logic of justice and the girl an ethic of care.117 It was understood by 
looking at the way girls emphasise care and compassion – especially in comparison 
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with the boys who valued duty and obligation. The ethic of care approach requires 
personal connection and justification of how a problem is solved, rather than simply 
choosing an answer. Context, reasoning and relationships play the largest role.118 The 
connection between people, rather than explicit rights and duties, is the focus.119 This 
connection is a key theme of feminist thinking.  
 
 
A Community in the Ethic of Care 
 
It is evident, given the analysis in Gilligan on the girl’s ethic of care, that feminist theory 
would be the source of further development of this school of ethics.120 Carrie Menkel-
Meadow applied a feminist ethics of care to legal ethics. She noted that existing ethical 
studies were based on male subjects, which, due to the increase in female participation 
in the legal profession, justified further inquiry into the field.121 By identifying gender 
differences and acknowledging the bodies of scholarly work in sociology and 
psychology, the female lawyer’s point of view and values were examined. It was 
possible for a female place within a community, hence an ethic of care may be 
consistent with place.  
 
The role of community is prominent in other accounts of an ethics of care. Thomas 
Shaffer, for instance, held that is is wrong to discuss rights, freedoms, acts and choices 
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instead of taking about the people involved.122 Shaffer’s ethic of care is Christian and 
differently grounded to Gilligan’s and Menkel-Meadow’s assumption of essential 
female qualities. Shaffer therefore even refers to a gentleman lawyer, whose ethic is a 
communal ethic, an ethic for a lawyer in his community.	 123  However, Shaffer 
recognised that other communal ethics exist and that different community ethics can 
interact with one another.124 In discussing moral order, there are two kinds of moral 
order brought to the profession. The first, matters of the heart, shows communitarian 
and cultural moral worth in the gentleman lawyer. The second requires ‘reflection, 
decision and defence’.125 
   
Accordingly, for Shaffer any professional ethic is cultural and community plays a large 
role in ethical development - ‘No one becomes virtuous alone. We learn in the 
community what virtue is and how to practice it: We learn as we are part of the 
community’.126 Shaffer’s explicit statement of community value greatly endorses the 
community aspect of place. If one recognises place, one could be more conscious of the 
virtues of place. This consciousness encourages ethical  awareness. Heidegger’s Dasein 
– being there – is more likely to consciously act towards and consider Others when they 
are in their community – which is itself a contribution to place.   
 
To illustrate this in greater detail, place appears in Shaffer’s account of an ethics of care 
when discussing the Italian notion of rispetto which contributes to the moral formation 
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of a culture.127 The concept of place (paesani) and the people in it makes up part of 
rispetto. The important thing about rispetto is that it allows for one to be in a family, 
without their loss of self. The community does not define them entirely.128 The concept 
of rispetto reflects a communitarian anthropology and evolves from family, to 
community, and then to a sense of place. Independence, courage, pride and respect can 
be seen within the context group. Rispetto is being-there. 
 
For lawyers, communities may be created when technology allows them to work for 
global companies, retain clients in different states and even countries - and as such be 
influenced by these relationships that, nonetheless, minimise the significance of 
geography. Lawyers in small communities may not be influenced by as many sources 
– there might be a small group of other lawyers and their clientele will be from the same 
surrounding area. Yet lawyers operating in a city, at a large, even global firm, are 
expected to incorporate a range of values and ideals into their regular way of practice 
– due to the size of the firm and the wide range of clients spanning the globe does not 
necessarily dilute the effect of these values, albeit that they will inevitably differ from 
those in the small community in which geography looms large.  
 
B Tradition 
 
By comparison, the gentleman ethic can prevail through the development of tradition, 
craftsmanship and, paradoxically, the subversion of patriarchy.129  In mirroring an 
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element of place, tradition is cultivated by acknowledging the gentleman’s heritage, 
which is also the heritage of the community.  
 
An ethic of care, having some commonalities with an ethic of virue, also alludes to the 
relational and geographic community aspect of place.130 By actively harnessing the 
tradition bestowed to the community, greater moral development and awareness can 
occur under an ethic of care. Existing in the community, the gentleman-lawyer has 
greater potential to represent a tradition without being entirely defined by it. The 
gentleman-lawyer is being-there. They are within their community, conscious of its 
history.   
 
However, in the predominant feminist approaches to an ethics of care, it can be said 
that ethics of care does not wholly acknowledge place in its full form, and that place is 
only weakly alluded to as a history. The legal system encompasses both male and 
female perspectives, but ‘even though our present legal structures may reflect elements 
of both sets of values, there is a tendency for the male-dominated or male-created forms 
and values to control’.131 Whether or not there are distinctive male and female values 
and despite the contribution of Shaffer’s work, it is the gender-defined values that are 
still at the centre of the ethics of care discussion.   
 
Menkel-Meadow considers that, in the context of the adversarial model, there is a win 
or lose mentality which supports competitive behaviour to gain the most in 
settlement.132 This indicates that there is limited room in the current adversary system 
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for an ethics of care. Mediation is, as a consequence, better suited to the aspirations of 
dispute resolution within an ethics of care. When practising in accordance with an ethics 
of care, rather than zealous advocacy to the adversarial situation, all parties’ needs are 
taken into consideration and creative or non-adversarial solutions are considered. 
Compared with the typical elements of a male-based system, such as ‘hierarchy, 
advocacy, competition and binary results’ the feminine relational approach mirrors the 
relational quality of place.133 Although hypothetically, the needs of others coupled with 
a desire to change the rules of the game imply a benefit to the community, no reference 
is necessarily made in most theories’ account of location, and there is only a vague 
correlation between context and history of a place. 
 
 
C Boundaries 
 
Furthermore, in legal practice, if operating with an ethic of care, women have greater 
autonomy over how they treat colleagues and interact in their workplace.134  This 
creation of a feminist form of organisation is ‘a methodology that creates knowledge 
from shared, collective experience’.135 By comparison with the hierarchy, typical of 
larger law firms, this organisational method could create a community by removing 
most of the barriers between personal and professional lives and maintaining values 
such as altruism and fairness.136 Some difficulties facing an ethic of care relate to where 
to draw the line in relation to how much care to give, how many people you are 
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responsible to and how much context one can take in before general principles are 
lost.137 The seemingly endless sphere of care appears to reflect space, rather than place. 
The relationship Dasein shares with Others is always contained and helps to form the 
place. Whereas the relationships that are present in ethics of care are open and do not 
necessarily assist in constructing place.  
 
These concerns could be allied if place was considered in its full form. Care would be 
absolute to all members of the community, defined by a history and location that 
provides the appropriate context. Place would assist to set the boundaries of care, as 
Heidegger said: ‘A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks 
recognized, the boundary is that from which some begin its presencing’.138  
 
V SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES 
 
In sociological studies, a connection has been established between a lawyers’ 
specialisation and their background and religious origins.139 This also contributes to 
how clients pick their lawyers. It is likely the client selects a lawyer whom they feel 
comfortable with and probably share characteristics.140 The greatest influences on the 
structure of the profession all come from outside the profession – these are ‘client 
demand, ethnoreligious origin and politics’.141 These elements can be traced to taking 
place within a community. After examining a variety of lawyers working across 
different disciplines, John Heinz and Edward Laumann concluded that there were two 
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distinct hemispheres in the legal profession, which were structured by context.142 The 
two hemispheres divided lawyers into those who worked for small businesses and 
individuals and those who represented large organisations. The context they give is 
shaped by community, history and location.  
 
A Community 
 
Greater autonomy occurs for the lawyer when they are working for an individual who 
is less likely to be aware of their needs, as opposed to a lawyer working in the corporate 
hemisphere.143 Sociologists have challenged the idea that the lawyer is the dominant 
party in the lawyer-client relationship stating ‘these writers have usually had in mind 
the part of the profession that we have referred to as the “personal plight” practice, the 
representation of individuals with legal difficulties that are… personal rather than 
economic in nature’.144 By contrast, corporate lawyers have greater affinity with their 
clients and what is good for the corporate client is usually good for the lawyer.145 As 
such, the corporate client will define their needs, whereas the individual lawyers might 
be more professional in the sense that their client base promotes collegiality, rather than 
patronage.146  
 
While community is missing as an ethical dimension in Heinz and Laumann’s studies 
into city lawyers, work based on the rural lawyer gave explicit recognition of the 
importance of the community. ‘A community’s expectations for professional behavior 
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appear to condition the conduct of the local rural lawyer as advocate’.147 A benefit rural 
lawyers have is that they are willing to engage on a personal and community level which 
in turn strengthens their practice and community.148 If the presence of community is 
removed by technology, then the lawyer who relies on information technology for client 
communication, outsourcing or discovery, may commit a fragmentation of their ethical 
resources. 
 
In rural practice, the lawyer’s role extends far beyond that of legal counsel. Lawyers 
are shown to be far more involved in civic and community activities compared with 
those in metropolitan areas.149 Not only is there an ecology of practice, but there is an 
ecology of political and organisational participation. A rural lawyer is more likely to be 
active in his community and refer to the community for recognition and achievement, 
thus expanding his professional role.150  The entrepreneurial nature of his practice 
pushes the rural lawyer into the community, as do his clients. He is committed to the 
values of rural life and is visible and accountable to the community. 151  This 
accountability contributes to the authentic lawyers’ being-there. 
 
The egalitarian nature of the rural community also helps in promoting professional 
collegiality. Everyone belongs to the ‘community of ordinary folk’ and by and large, 
most of the lawyers are geographically close and well acquainted with one another.152 
																																																								
147Jon T Johnsen, 'Rural Justice: Country Lawyers and Legal Services in the United States and Britain' 
(1992) 17(3) Law and Social Inquiry 415, 420.  
148 Ibid 419.  
149 Landon, above n 111, 14. 
150 Ibid 96. 
151 Ibid 151. 
152 Ibid 50. 
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A ‘community of practice’ needs to be added to the ‘hemispheres of practice’ to 
represent an additional source of fragmentation in the greater legal profession.153  
 
B Tradition and History 
 
Sociologists have also made use of tradition and history as a contributing factor to 
positive lawyers’ ethics. In the country ‘legal pluralism – the appearance of variations 
within the legal system even where a common set of rules provides for consistency – 
has been widely documented’.154 This contributes to the profession being externally 
determined where its structure comes from both socialisation and context. The law is 
seen as rooted in human institutions and the local economy,155 which again contributes 
to the structure of the profession.  
 
In addition to the moral philosophers, sociologists also recognise elements of place and 
community in their studies. There are a number of sociologists who have examined the 
nature of legal practice, and what factors work to influence the structure of the 
profession. Heinz and Laumann’s Chicago Lawyers therefore provides insight into the 
social structure of the bar in Chicago.156 The two hemispheres that they identified show 
that fundamental differences in the nature of the client resulted in the social 
differentiation of the profession – although Heinz and Laumann emphasise that their 
study is a generalisation and that exceptions can occur to the rule.157 Quite obviously, 
the study stemmed from a particular location - Chicago - the place of the lawyers.  
																																																								
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid 16. 
155 Ibid 6. 
156 Heinz and Laumann, above n 112, 135. 
157 Ibid 128. 
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Lawyers were specialised by their client type and more specifically, the wealth of their 
client. This resulted in a large and important difference between corporate and 
individual clients, which contributed to the two separate hemispheres within a 
location.158 Although lawyers with corporate clients held greater influence over the 
structure of work, lawyers with individual clients ‘are likely to have greater freedom of 
action, greater control over how they practice law, if their clients are individuals’.159 
 
With regard to morality, lawyers, like other non-lawyers, may act as ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ 160  and as such create conflict with those who do not share their 
values.161 The client not only influences their specialisation, but also influences their 
outside activism in organisations or in political fields.162  This demonstrates that the 
place of the client, is contributing to the development of the lawyers’ place. It is also 
possible for lawyers to ‘adopt their clients views’ as their own.163 
 
C Location 
 
It is the distinction between Heinz and Laumann’s two hemispheres that represents an 
element of place as well as the client influence acting as a separate place. Hemispheres 
are relational and could perhaps be found in any major city in the world. This might 
discount geographic influence. Yet Heinz and Laumann’s study itself is completely 
specific to the place of Chicago. In the strictest sense, it could also be argued these 
																																																								
158 Ibid 129. 
159 Ibid 130. 
160 Howard S Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press, 1973) 147-163. 
161 Heinz and Laumann, above n 112, 135, 133. 
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results are solely reflective of the geographic locale of Chicago. Thus, place is 
established by location.  
 
In contrast, Donald Landon started by making comparisons between a study into rural 
lawyers and Heinz and Laumann’s study into Chicago lawyers. Country lawyers are 
community driven as opposed to client driven – neither sub-group of the profession is 
lawyer driven.164  It is the community that is of greater influence compared with 
ethnoreligious and political diversity and prestige comes from income potential of the 
lawyer, rather than the client’s social standing.165 The community is built within the 
geographic location. 
 
By relying on an ecological frame of reference, location and city size can be used as a 
variable in determining the structure of the bar.166 It is the significant differences found 
in urban and non urban practice that are rooted in the institution of the containing 
community. In rural practice, lawyers are defined by their containing community where 
their practice occurs, rather than by doctrinal specialisations of law. 167  Landon’s 
emphasis on location resonates with Heidegger’s place. 
  
Higher levels of autonomy and accountability are found in the country lawyer, 
reflecting Heinz and Laumann’s findings that the lawyer in the personal hemisphere 
has greater autonomy than a lawyer in the corporate hemisphere.168 Autonomy in this 
respect is a positive force; recall that Heidegger regarded autonomy as contributing to 
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an authentic being-there. The client driven structure is mitigated in rural practice due 
to the scale of the community and the mix of clients being heterogeneous.169 The rural 
lawyer is able to maintain their own ideological autonomy separate from the client.170 
Another factor that contributes to the autonomy of the rural lawyer is the 
entrepreneurial nature of his practice, which also encourages initiative and personal 
achievement.171 The important conclusion is that the legal profession is, above all, 
differentiated by its containing community.172  
 
The legal profession is an externally determined social system that is structured by 
environment, rather than professional codes or professional knowledge.173 Landon’s 
work therefore builds upon Heinz and Laumann’s by adding the idea of the containing 
community. The containing community is a prior consideration which affects the 
morals of the lawyer. Community is the prior source of structuring to client influence. 
As the profession is adaptive to its relationship with the environment, the ecological 
approach is best, as all the forces organising the lawyers’ work, relationship to clients, 
colleagues and community, are external.174 Location, community and history are all 
creating place within the sociological studies.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
By analysing the elements of place against different approaches to lawyers’ ethics, it 
appears that virtue ethics is at this point, more likely to recognise the importance of 
																																																								
169 Ibid 70-79. 
170 Ibid 116. 
171 Ibid 79. 
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place in ethical development and awareness. Place, and Heidegger’s Dasein, bridge the 
gap between ethics, law and technology. 
 
Sociologists have been more explicit in the way that they have treated place – relational 
and geographic – as important for lawyers’ ethics. It is disturbing how the dominant 
liberal view of lawyers’ ethics barely concede that significant conclusion, and that 
virtue and care ethics, while giving greater weighting to the significance of place, are 
yet to explore the effect of information technology on the role of place in ethical 
development and awareness.  
 
In the next chapter, the effect that globalisation has on the profession will be addressed 
and will consider the lawyer’s capacity to make ethical decisions when dealing with 
new technology.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter deals with globalisation, understood as a theory, and how it is having a 
practical effect on the legal profession.  
 
In the first part, the theory of globalisation will be examined by reference to Heidegger 
and his theories that predicted the technological changes the world would face. This 
will be followed with the works of scholars who have subsequently built upon elements 
of Heidegger’s work to develop globalisation theory. 
 
The second part of this chapter will deal with how globalisation is directly affecting 
lawyers in the course of their work. To begin with, an overview of the changes to the 
profession will be identified. 
 
There are four main areas where legal practice is being most affected by technology 
and the challenge to place: confidentiality, communication, litigation and regulation. 
These four areas can also be broken down to represent (in the same order) clients, 
lawyers, courts and law makers. Confidentiality primarily affects the client. A client is 
most at risk if their information is compromised or exposed to the larger world. 
Communication is at the heart of what a lawyer does. A lawyer must communicate their 
ideas by writing, constructing and discussing. The courts are undergoing a 
technological transformation. Changes are occurring rapidly, for example, appearances 
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that in the recent past could be made by telephone may now be made with video 
technology and judges may hand down judgments to a remote location from the comfort 
of their city chambers.  Finally, regulation is the thread that binds all of these topics 
together. It is important to examine what the issues are, how they might be best 
regulated and how regulation can respond to constant changes in practice. 
 
Professional ethics are threaded through the chapter. Conduct rules in many countries 
may be sufficient, yet are certainly lacking specific direction as to how to deal with 
technology. In contrast, the American Bar Association regularly releases practice 
directions to assist its lawyers in facing the changing landscape. These differing 
approaches will be discussed in the context of globalisation.  
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PART ONE – GLOBALISATION THEORY  
II HEIDEGGER 
 
Most of Heidegger’s contributions to globalisation theory come from The Age of the 
World Picture, published in 1938.1 To reflect on the modern age, one must view the 
Weltbild and reflect upon it.  
 
Hence world picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world 
but the world conceived and grasped as a picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken 
in such a way that it first is in being, and only is in being to the extent that it is set up 
by man, who represents and sets forth… The Being of whatever is, is sought and found 
in the representedness of the latter. 2 
 
Heidegger valued tradition and believed that practices from the past can help to guide 
future development.3 By holding on to the best elements from the past, the future is 
developed with tools that allow for full exploration of an open and positive future. 
Heidegger’s ‘Hermeneutical Phenomenology’ relied upon understanding in relation to 
history, where being is revealing and beings are the revelation. It assumes that 
something comes before being and that the world is already a fulfilling and enriching 
in itself.  
 
 
 
																																																								
1 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (William Lovitt trans, 
Harper and Row, 1977) 115. 
2 Ibid 130. 
3 Ibid 175. ‘Everything “historiographical”, everything represented and established after the manner of 
historiography, is  historical [geschichtlich], i.e., grounded upon the destining resident in happening’. 
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A Heidegger and Globalisation 
 
As technology is the main accelerator of globalisation, Heidegger’s views on the nature 
of the impact of technology serve as a starting point for establishing the potential that 
place has to reconcile the ethical implications of globalisation.4  Heidegger’s ability to 
‘predict’ globalisation, and his work across technology, provide a foundation for the 
ethical assessment of globalisation. Existence, or rather Heidegger’s ek-sistence, 
recognises the ontological difference between beings and Being. ‘Heidegger thinks 
humanity is a necessary and creative co-player in the world’.5 ‘More, a human being 
truly becomes human, if he exists in a way that lets beings be according to what they 
are, instead of forcing them to satisfy our passing whims’.6 Heidegger was constantly 
questioning the essence of technology. By not demonising technology, he could focus 
on understanding the true essence of technology, to better understand the effect on 
Being and Dasein.  
 
Heidegger, through his concepts of being-in-the-world and Dasein, is one of the few 
philosophers of the mid-twentieth century who clearly anticipated the modern idea of 
globalisation. In 1950, Heidegger prophesised ‘All distances in time and space are 
shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by places, places which formerly took weeks 
and months of travel’7. The abolition of distance, which was explored in chapter one 
by reference to technology, will be further explored in this chapter in the context of 
																																																								
4 GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS II HEIDEGGER. 
5 Christine Ramos, Globalization and Technology (Manila: Rex Bookstore Inc, 2003), 76.  
6 Ibid 77. 
7 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (Albert Hofstadter trans, Harper & Row, 1st ed, 1971) 
‘The Thing’ 163. 
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globalisation. Not only did Heidegger successfully predict the abolition of distance, he 
picked up the key themes found in globalisation theory today, such as human nature 
existing instantly across borders and simultaneously with technology. In an 
environment where everything is ‘equally far and equally near’ and ‘uniform 
distancelessness’ is the result, things begin to lose their unique characteristics. The 
human experience is watered down from the rich, to the one-dimensional.8  
 
Heidegger’s lecture, The Age of the World Picture, reviews the modern age of 1938, 
revealing five phenomena that contributed to the world picture: science, machine 
technology, art as aesthetics, human activity as culture and the loss of gods.9 Although 
the term ‘globalisation’ is unarticulated, he states that ‘the fundamental event of the 
modern age is the conquest of the world as a picture’. 10  Yet Heidegger did not 
necessarily view the world picture as a clash of cultures: ‘Because this position secures, 
organizes and articulates itself as a world view, the modern relationship to that which 
is, is one that becomes, in a decisive unfolding, a confrontation of world views’.11 All 
different cultures still undergo a loss of Being, an experience which they share with all 
other cultures.12 Dasein has ‘an essential tendency to closeness’, indicating that it is 
important to Dasein to conquer remoteness.13 If globalisation is the result of this quest, 
the result has been twofold. Although technology is bringing everything closer together, 
it is isolating as well.  
 
																																																								
8 Ibid 166. 
9 Heidegger, above n 1, 116. 
10Ibid 134. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid 142. 
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Joan Stambaugh trans, State University of New York Press, 
revised ed ed, 2010). 
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B Heidegger and Technology 
If technology serves to compromise Being and reduce everything to mere process and 
machinery, then globalisation is a catalyst for phenomenological disaster. Place is used 
to ground meaning. The removal of place indicates that capacity to ground meaning is 
being undermined. Machenschaft, a precursor to Technik, is a mode of revealing that 
humans are objects, reduced to the same status as the technology they use. Quality can 
be sacrificed for quantity. And humans are a mere resource.14  
 
It is recognised that there are many different perspectives on Heidegger and his account 
of technology. Technology in a Heideggerian sense can have two meanings. The first 
is technology as a thing and the second is technology as a way of being.15 Some call 
him an essentialist, believing that Heidegger sees technology reducing everything to a 
function.16 This fails adequately to address the fact that technology is not completely 
beyond human control. Others think that Heidegger is too abstract to deal with modern 
technology.17  ‘Heidegger dared to state that human fulfillment is not likely to be 
attained through an ever-expanding technology or in a managerial society, and that 
democratic individualism has resulted in loss of cultural specificity and in 
delegitimizing long-established community’.18 
 
Heideggerian thought serves as a useful reference for dealing with technology in 
relation to lawyers, owing to its reconceptualisation of the importance of place. 
																																																								
14 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESS II HEIDEGGER. 
15 In this thesis, technology is being used in both ways and will evolve through the argument. 
16 Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (Routledge, 1999). 
17  For example see Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity (Indiana 
University Press, 1990). 
18 Ramos, above n 5, 78. 
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Lawyers practise in place. However, as we have seen, this view is often unarticulated.19 
An increasing reliance on information technology, coupled with the changing nature of 
the profession indicates that place needs to come to the forefront of the discussion. 
Heidegger’s combination of technology with place provides the starting point.  
 
C Identity 
 
The sense of place is strongly linked to identity and culture, which contribute to the 
community and history of a place. Heidegger did not agree with uniformity, or 
workforces that were made up of identical participants. Unique being and unique spirit 
make up the being as opposed to a predetermined template of a person. 
 
Identity is traditionally defined by a formula whereby A=A. Since Parmenides, who 
stated ‘thought and being are the same’, identity has been subject to philosophical 
inquiry.20 Heidegger ‘concludes that the principle of identity presupposes the meaning 
of identity itself’.21 Heidegger believed that this formula concealed the deepest essence. 
If A is A, there is only one element which is the same thing. This represents tautology, 
a ‘truth that is merely pure and logical, and so empty, in form’.22 Heidegger believed 
there were differences between identity and equality. The two things are not the same. 
‘All differences disappear in the equal, and appear in the identical’. 23  Therefore, 
Heideggerian identity where A=A becomes A is A. Is becomes ‘belonging together’: a 
																																																								
19 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS II LIBERALISM AND THE DOMINANT 
VIEW. 
20 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (Joan Stambaugh trans, Harper & Row Publishers, 1969) 
7. 
21 Ibid 11. 
22 Soren Gosvig Olesen, Transcendental History (David D. Prossen trans, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 
148.  
23 Heidegger, above n 7, 167. 
	 139
relation.24  Identity is thus ‘belonging-together’. Identity is therefore paramount to 
beings Being.  
 
As we turn to the way this constructs the lawyers’ identity, we note that there are four 
key features that make legal practice a profession. ‘The practice of law is a public 
calling and a generalist’s craft that engages the whole personality of the practitioner 
and which links him to a tradition that joins the generations in a partnership of 
historical proportions’.25 This appeals to both the community and history aspects of 
place as well as identity.  Without place, the identity of the lawyers along with the 
conception of the legal profession as a whole would be compromised.  
 
All conceptions of legal ethics ground themselves in the identity of the lawyer. The 
burden of responsibility for completing legal work always lies with the lawyer, and that 
indicates the place and identity of the lawyers’ role. In order to regulate the profession, 
there have been efforts to create a global code of ethics.26 Although this would seem a 
constructive step in providing guidance for lawyers, the problem of localised culture 
and identity on which a lawyer’s ethical code has traditionally been grounded functions 
as a restraint on this judgement. 
 
When viewed in the context of globalization, and more particularly in the sub-context 
of the globalization of law and ethics, we must be conscious of the paradigm within 
which this debate occurs – that of law – and acknowledge that failure to recognize the 
																																																								
24 Heidegger, above n 13, 12. 
25 Anthony Kronman, 'The Law as a Profession' in Deborah L. Rhode (ed), Ethics in Practice: Lawyers' 
Roles, Responsibilities and Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2000) 29, 34. 
26 Steven Mark, 'Harmonization or Homogenization? The Globalization of Law and Legal Ethics - An 
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link between law, culture, and identity is the embrace the paradigms that must be 
strenuously resisted by those who feel their culture or identity under attack.27  
 
 
 
III GLOBALISATION THEORIES 
 
Five concepts make up contemporary globalisation social theory. Deterritorialisation 
occurs when social activity is displaced and can be achieved independently of 
geographical location.28 Lawyers are no longer limited to their geographic location and 
clients, especially business clients, can easily take their business across borders. 
 
Social interconnectedness relies on the assumption that much human activity still 
occurs within a traditional geographic location and occurs simultaneously.29 However, 
human activity in other locations may still impact on another location owing to the 
interconnectedness of society. A lawyer may take on a case in one jurisdiction that 
affects a whole other jurisdiction.  
 
The two characteristics above focus on the location of globalisation. By incorporating 
the speed of social activity, 30  globalisation can be explained in terms of how the 
																																																								
27 Ibid 1186. 
28 Arjun Appadurai, 'DIsjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy' in Imre Szeman and 
Timothy Kaposy (eds), Cultural Theory: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishing, 2011) 282, 289. 
29 Jeffrey M. Stanton, 'InfoSec in Synthetic Worlds: Historical Perspectives from MOOs, MUDs and 
MMOGs' in Jeffrey G. Morrison, Kenneth W. Kisiel and C.A.P Smith (eds),  (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2012) 383, 387. 
30 Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity (Columbia University Press, 2013) 
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locations connect. Speed creates influence since slow connections across borders would 
not have as great an impact.  
 
Globalisation is both a long term and multi-pronged process. 31  Technology has 
accelerated all facets of globalisation, however that does not indicate that the 
deterritorialisation of location is a current happenstance. Globalisation has been 
occurring for decades and will continue to do so.  
Globalisation is a culmination of technology removing boundaries.  
 
Electronic media have undermined the traditional relationship between physical setting 
and social situation. Electronic media have created many new situations and destroyed 
old ones. One of the reasons many Americans may no longer seem to “know their 
place” is that they no longer have a place.32 
 
 If lawyers’ place is removed, ethical structure and defined roles also risk disappearing.  
 
By bringing many different types of people to the same “place” electronic media have 
fostered a blurring of many formerly distinct social roles. Electronic media affect us, 
then, not primarily through their content, but by changing the “situational geography” 
of social life.33  
 
With low-level legal jobs being outsourced to foreign markets, it is certainly arguable 
that the boundaries of legal practice are becoming blurred.34 
																																																								
31 See for example David Held et al, Global Transformations (Stanford University Press, 1999). 
32 Joshua Meyrowitz, No Sense of Place (Oxford University Press, 1986) 7. 
33 Ibid 6. 
34 The emphasis on this section will be on globalisation, rather than regulation.  
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A Modernity 
 
The concept of modernity can underpin much of globalisation theory today. Modernity 
is marked by industrialisation, capitalism and life in a modern city.35 Heidegger thought 
‘The essence of modernity can be seen in humanity’s freeing itself from the bonds of 
the Middle Ages… Certainly the modern age as a consequence of the liberation of 
humanity, introduced individualism’.36 The four essential phenomena of Heidegger’s 
modern age were science, machine technology, art as an expression of human life and 
human activity conceived and manifested as culture.37 
 
There are two theorists whose work is especially relevant to this interpretation of 
Heidegger – Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. Both believe modernity is an 
evolving concept, which can occur in phases. Each theorist refers to this (respectively) 
as ‘liquid modernity’38 or ‘high modernity’39. Modernity as described by Giddens is a 
way of describing the modern world, associated with three factors:  
 
‘(1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the idea of the world as open to 
transformation, by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic institutions, 
especially industrial production and a market economy; (3) a certain range of political 
institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy.’40  
																																																								
35 Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays (Phaidon  Press, 2nd ed, 1995). 
36 Heidegger, above n 1, 127. 
37 Ibid 116. 
38 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity Press, 2000). 
39 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (John Wiley 
& Sons, 2013) 4. 
40 Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of 
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Whilst Giddens is a proponent and advocate for modernity, Bauman takes a more 
critical stance and believes that modernity creates a feeling of isolation and alientation 
from society – a recurring theme with Heidegger’s Dasein. ‘For all practical purposes, 
power has become truly exterritorial, no longer bound, or even slowed down, by the 
resistance of space… it does not matter any more where… the difference between 
‘close by’ and ‘far away’ or for that matter between the wilderness and the civilized, 
orderly space has been all but cancelled’.41 From Bauman’s statement we can see a 
continuation of Heidegger’s ‘abolition of place’ sentiment. An interesting parallel may 
be drawn between power no longer having boundaries either. This might suggest a need 
for stronger ethical and legal constraints on those who hold power and this might also 
include lawyers.  
 
Giddens’ neutral stance aligns with Hediegger’s view that we must not demonise 
technology, nor herald it. His view of modernity is less fluid than Bauman’s, choosing 
to contrast pre-modern traditional culture and post-traditional modern culture.42 Owing 
to tradition, actions were automatically determined by the local custom, whereas in the 
modern culture, tradition is more easily disregarded and precedent is rejected. As such, 
Giddens states that individual action requires greater analysis than it did in the past.43 
Technology is streamlining processes and granting us more information at our 
fingertips than ever before, but this means that there is less to assume, and more to think 
about, when it comes to actions and ethics. To illustrate this point, one of Giddens’ 
																																																								
41 Bauman, above n 36, 11. 
42 Giddens, above n 37, 80. 
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realms of social institution will be examined further: identity. Self-identity is not only 
shaped by the institution of modernity, but also helps to shape it.44 
 
Modernity is equally as concerned with technology as Heidegger was. Technology in 
Gidden’s work is a disconnection from time and space – an obvious throwback to Sein 
und Zeit. Due to the influx of technology, time is no longer linked to movement and is 
all but becoming obsolete. Boundaries have lost their grounding.  
 
There are three features that distinguish modern social institutions from a traditional 
order. First, the ‘pace of change’ represents an extreme state of rapid change brought 
on by technology.45 Secondly, the ‘scope of change’ brings all different countries, states 
and cities together in one seamless action.46 Thirdly, the ‘nature of modern institutions’ 
has been altered to incorporate traditional cities and embrace technology.47 
 
The change in social institutions directly affects the community aspect of place. The 
individualist nature of technology might bring individuals together, but the compromise 
is that tradition, history and spirit are practically lost. The identity of the lawyer is 
compromised in many respects. The changing nature of their work, the changing nature 
of their workplace and the changing nature of their clients all have an effect on their 
ethics.  
 
The lawyer who does not work for the global firm is not immune from this image crisis. 
There is a definite trend in the literature to skew any analysis towards the global lawyer 
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45 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1st ed, 1990) 6. 
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or the lawyer working commercially in large firms across the globe. But globalisation 
is still affecting the sole practitioner or the lawyer in a small firm engaging in the local 
community. No lawyer should be left behind. In chapter two it was seen that there is 
evidence that suggests the rural solicitor retains greater autonomy than the ‘Chicago 
Lawyer’.48 Perhaps the balance is shifting in the ‘rural solicitor’s’ favour – the global 
lawyer is now the professional more likely to experience identity crisis and is best 
positioned both to take advantage of technology and to be victim to it.  
 
The true understanding of Being occurs when a Dasein is fully authentic and reveals 
itself to itself. Dasein knows exactly what she is, who she is and how she interacts with 
the community around her. The elements of place help Dasein to reveal themselves to 
others. Dasein has a strong identity. If the lawyers’ identity relies on place and their 
ethics are linked to their identity, it cannot be ethical to allow such technological 
proliferation without appropriate consideration, analysis and guidance. 
 
PART TWO – GLOBALISATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
IV CHANGING NATURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
It is well documented that the changing pace of technology is affecting the legal 
profession.49 Top tier law firms are feeling the greatest impact, but smaller boutique 
firms and sole practitioners are not immune from the changes either.  
 
																																																								
48 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS V SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES. 
49 Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, 'Trends and Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The 
Impact of Globalization and Technology' (2012) 80(6) Fordham Law Review 2661, 2661. 
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Globalisation is contributing to the changing structure of the law firm. The Alternative 
Business Structure (ABS) allows a law firm to confer ownership to a non-lawyer or 
corporate ownership.50 Law firms are existing in multiple jurisdictions, which results 
in global management. 51  On an individual level, technological advancement is 
facilitating such expansions in law firms. Lawyers are now always on call and are 
constantly accessible. Technologies such as smart phones and services such as email 
allow a lawyer to be reached anywhere at any time. Just as globalisation has meant that 
many manufacturing jobs have been sent to developing countries, so too have legal 
jobs.52 Cloud computing allows for information to be accessed from anywhere at all 
times, a development which has directly accelerated the growth of legal outsourcing. 
‘The issues facing the profession seem to be increasingly multifaceted, 
multidisciplinary, and complex’, which is why preexisting approaches to legal ethics 
must incorporate an approach to technological use.53  Work and processes that were 
once exclusively held in the domain of lawyers are now widely available to people who 
have access to technology and the Internet. 54  Specialised training is no longer a 
prerequisite to handling a will or a divorce. Courts actively encourage the ‘do it 
yourself’ approach in some circumstances.55  
 
																																																								
50Alternative Business Structures are British in origin, however the term is a useful descriptor for law 
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Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 276. 
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Legal outsourcing not only includes routine paralegal tasks such as word processing 
and transcription, but now includes substantive roles such as electronic discovery and 
patent applications.56 Outsourcing companies in India ‘readily point out that Indian 
lawyers can perform the exact same tasks as US lawyers, and are willing to work for a 
fraction of the price.57 The practical and monetary issues are not the only ones raised 
by the increase in foreign outsourcing. Workers operating in countries foreign to the 
originating documents are not bound by the same professional legislation that lawyers 
in the home jurisdiction are.58 They are similarly not necessarily held to the same 
ethical and professional standards. The lack of place involved in deciding to send work 
overseas raises these ethical issues. Work is not being performed in the same country, 
in the same location, so the same ethical standards do not apply. The work is being 
performed by people in a different community, with different shared norms and 
histories.  Sources have identified five major ethical and professional conduct issues 
raised by outsourcing: ‘unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers; conflicts of 
interest; client confidentiality; client disclosure and consent; and, billing issues’.59 
 
A recurring theme to comment on the legal profession over the last decade is that it is 
in crisis.60  Some outwardly admit that the law is a crisis-prone profession, citing 
communism, immigration and litigation as various threats faced by the profession over 
the years, with the latest being globalisation and technology.61 Recently, the American 
																																																								
56 Harmon, above n 50, 44. 
57 Ibid 46. 
58 There are other practical measures available to counteract the differing ethical rules. For example, 
service level agreements and ethical responsibility being placed with the law firm using the outsourcer 
can mitigate these risks. This is explained further: CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT 
V OUTSOURCING  
59 Ibid 47. 
60 For example see Steven J Harper, The Lawyer Bubble: A Profession in Crisis (Basic Books, 2013). 
61 James E Moliterno, The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and Response to Change 
(Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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Bar Association set up committees such as the Ethics 20/20 committee reflecting the 
changing nature of legal practice, primarily brought on by increased technology use.62 
 
Global law firms are now replacing the large Australian law firm, with three out of the 
five biggest Australian law firms having global connections and affiliations. 
Developments in Australian law firms over the last five years and have dramatically 
changed towards a global perspective. In 2012 Mallesons Stephen Jacques merged with 
Chinese firm King & Wood, 63  and Blake Dawson Waldron merged with United 
Kingdom firm Ashurst.64 Later in the year Allens Arthur Robinson entered into an 
alliance agreement with United Kingdom firm Linklaters.65 This differs from the earlier 
mergers insofar as each firm retains independence but is enabled to engage in joint 
ventures in Asia. The relationship is a hybrid arrangement that grants a non-exclusive 
relationship so each firm can still maintain independence.66 Freehills was the final 
Australian firm actually to merge in 2012, with United Kingdom firm Herbert Smith.67  
 
These super firms engage in much cross-border work to create truly globalalised legal 
practice. Mid tier firms such as Gadens and Corrs Chambers Westgarth are slowly 
moving into the position of the old top tiers, by taking on large contracts that require 
no global input. However, in the past, these are also the firms that are experiencing 
																																																								
62 For Example, the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission and Ethics 20/20 Commission. 
63 Briana Everett, Mallesons Counts Down to March Merger (24 February 2012) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/mallesons-counts-down-to-march-merger>. 
64 The New Lawyer, Ashurst and Blake Dawson to Merge (26 September 2011) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/the-new-lawyer/law-firms/ashurst-and-blake-dawson-to-merge>. 
65  Briana Everett, Merger on the Menu (23 April 2012) Lawyers Weekly 
<http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/allens-to-join-with-linklaters>. 
66  Allens: Media Release: Allens and Linklaters Form Integrated Alliance (23 April 2012) Allens 
Linklaters <http://www.allens.com.au/med/pressreleases/pr23apr12.htm>. 
67 Alex Boxsell, Freehills Joins Race to Conquer the World (28 June 2012) Australian Financial Review 
<http://www.afr.com/p/national/legal_affairs/freehills_joins_race_to_conquer_32E65ACRSE9IyCqDY
pZjPL>. 
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large staff cutbacks.68 Minter Ellison is another large firm that remains competitive on 
a national level, with no indication that a global merger will occur any time soon. 
 
An alternative to the global law structure is to create a ‘global network’. As an example, 
Corrs Chambers Westgarth work with leading law firms worldwide as opposed to 
setting up their own offices in each country. They state that by ‘not being locked into 
one legal service provider, we connect with the best lawyers internationally to meet out 
clients’ specific needs’.69 Firms that are part of the global network similarly maintain a 
presence in their own city, such as Slaughter and May in London and Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York.70 Their location remains based in one 
country, as opposed to spanning the globe. Although cross-border work generally 
ignores confines of place, law firms that remain more concentrated in the one location 
have greater potential to benefit from place. 
 
Globalisation is also increasing competition and commercialisation. Marilyn Warren, 
Chief Justice of Victoria, has noticed the effects of the different patterns of globalised 
legal practice. The first is that there is less responsibility and there are fewer 
opportunities for younger lawyers to engage in a variety of work.71 Secondly, legal 
teams are including ‘non-legal’ professionals, which indicates ‘the nature of legal 
																																																								
68 The cutbacks made by Gadens could be explained by the outcome of Symond v Gadens Lawyers 
Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1578 (31 October 2013) whereby significant damages were 
awarded to the plaintiff. Recent sources indicate that law firms are growing once more and that ‘the Asia-
Pacific region will be the world’s fastest-growing market’ Chris Merritt, 'Asia-Pacific Tipped to 
Spearhead Legal Services Growth', Legal Affairs, The Australian (Sydney), 15 July 2016.  
69  Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Corrs Global Network Corrs Chambers Westgarth 
<http://www.corrs.com.au/global-network/>. 
70 Although Slaughter and May operate as part of the Corrs Chambers Westgarth Global Network, they 
also have offices across the globe. Slaughter and May - Global Reach Slaughter and May 
<https://www.slaughterandmay.com/where-we-work/global-reach.aspx>. 
71  Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'The Access to Justice Imperative: Rights, Rationalisation or 
Resolution?' (Speech delivered at the Eleventh Fiat Justitia Lecture, Monash University Law Chambers, 
Melbourne, 25 March 2014) page 4. 
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advice may be changing’.72 Commercial expectations are changing and commercial 
knowledge is a pre-requisite to legal work due to cost cutting and perceived value 
adding. Finally, young lawyers may have an ‘underdeveloped knowledge of one’s own 
jurisdiction’.73 These three observations are concerning. They are also directly linked 
to place. In a place, a lawyer is relying on the history of the firm, the community of the 
firm and the location of the firm. It is because each of these factors is becoming 
compromised that these new challenges emerge. Other peoples’ places are also 
intruding upon the young lawyers’ place. If practice had remained purely domestic, 
then a young lawyer would be more likely not to specialise, to remain surrounded by 
lawyers and to generate a focus on their immediate area.  
 
Ever increasing complexities of modern business, the rapid changes in its methods, and 
the relations of lawyers thereto, are constantly raising questions concerning proper 
professional conduct that were not contemplated – or even dreamed of…74 
 
This observation was made in 1922, suggesting that the ethical challenges facing the 
globalisation of legal practice in the 2010s are even more profound. ‘Neither law nor 
the legal profession can hope to cope with technological advance without the guidance 
of expert non-lawyers’.75 He adds, ‘lawyers by nature, training and practice are not 
aggressively forward-looking organizational planners’.76  
 
																																																								
72 Ibid 4 – 6. 
73  Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'Open Justice in the Technological Age' (Paper presented at the 
Redmond Barry Lecture, 21 October 2013) page 4. 
74 Thomas Francis Howe, 'The Proposed Amendments to the Bylaws' (1922) 8 436. 
75 Moliterno, above n 58, 207. 
76 Ibid 218. 
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There are three aspects to the changing nature of legal practice. The first relates to 
business structures. Non-lawyers can now own law firms. The second relates to 
professional identity. What will keep law as a profession in this changing world? The 
third is ethical obligations to keep up with the changes and ensure that they do not 
disregard changes or become unfamiliar with the latest challenges.  
 
It is no secret that global law firms are boosting turnover and profits at an alarming rate, 
even considering the impact of the global financial crisis. The billable hour is a source 
of distress for many lawyers, yet the expected rate has climbed since the 1950s. In 1958, 
the American Bar Association recommended lawyers to bill 1300 hours per year.77 Yet 
today, this rate has soared to 1700-2300 hours per year.78 Technology has driven this 
change. 
 
Global law firms are expected to be efficient and any organisational change could result 
in a negative affect on profit margins. With clients demanding lower costs and greater 
efficiency, it can be dangerous for a global firm to test new software. They rarely 
experiment with new technologies and process, preferring to entrench themselves with 
‘expensive legacy systems’.79 A small firm may have an advantage in that respect, as 
they are capable of trying different billing software and document access software to 
best suit their situation as well as their client’s.80  
 
A The Practical Impact of Globalisation on the Legal Profession 
																																																								
77 Harper, above n 57, 79. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Kristi Singal, Becoming an Agile Law Firm: Sometimes Smaller is Better Law Technology Today 
<http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2015/07/becoming-an-agile-law-firm-sometimes-smaller-is-
better/>. 
80 Ibid. 
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There are four main areas where technology is creating an impact on lawyers’ ethics: 
confidentiality, communication, litigation and regulation.  
 
To ensure confidentiality, one can usually encrypt the file or strip the file of identifying 
information. Emails can similarly be encrypted. In the United States, bar opinions of 
different states appear to endorse two opposing views. On the one hand, bar 
associations like the Pennsylvania Bar allow for metadata mining, but the New York 
Bar Association prohibits the action, forming their opinion in 2001.81 Meta data often 
provides pivotal information during electronic discovery, which could also not be 
facilitated as well without cloud computing.  
 
The invention of cloud computing has significantly altered the way lawyers practise 
law and communicate. It facilitates production, storage and retrieval of information. 
Most often, the cloud will exist in a separate location and environment from the lawyer 
using its services. This raises practical issues relating to cross-border access to data and 
potential litigation. Electronic discovery requires greater thought when extracting 
information from a cloud facility, given the technical complexity of the process.82  
Dealing with advanced security systems could also result in a higher price demanded 
by electronic discovery services to carry out investigations.83  
 
																																																								
81  Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S American Bar Association 
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts
_fyis/metadatachart.html>. 
82 James E Cabral et al, 'Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice' (2012) 26(1) Harvard Journal 
of Law & Technology 241, 299. 
83 Ibid 265. 
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Technology that falls into the litigation category can be divided into two sections. The 
first is related to virtual courts and technologies employed to making court more 
accessible and easier to use. These technologies include video conferencing and e-
lodgment services. The second relates to electronic discovery and digital forensics. 
Email is easily becoming ‘the fabric of commercial litigation’.84 However, it can still 
be a distraction to lawyers who may find their case emails next to personal emails or 
spam. Emails can also interrupt the workflow, and due to the sheer volume of emails, 
important information can get lost in the inbox. Emails are often part of discoverable 
material in litigation, which partially eliminates the need to trawl through manila 
folders filled with loose papers. Thousands of documents are now accessible 
electronically, as is the meta data – the data stored within it indicating document origins, 
changes, and storage destination. Meta data is becoming increasingly valuable to legal 
discovery, as it contains the information or data about the electronic document or file. 
Information such as the origins of the document, the author and tracked edits and 
changes can be stored. Electronic discovery is not the only issue facing those engaging 
in litigation. There is growing concern over jurors’ access to Google and Facebook 
during trials.85 Jurors can potentially communicate with a greater number of people due 
to the ease of online communication and can potentially discover their own evidence 
that may prejudice the trial.86 For example, by Googling the defendant’s name, a juror 
may discover the defendant’s past offences or evidence that the judge may have already 
disregarded: 
																																																								
84  Mark Robins, 'Evidence at the Electronic Frontier; Introducing e-mail at Trial in Commercial 
Litigation' (2003) 29(2) Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 219, 220. 
85 For a general discussion of issues relating to jurors’ social media use, see Michael H. Rubin, 'If Social 
media is so Appealing, Why are There Any Ethical Concerns for Appellate Lawyers?' (Paper presented 
at the Bar Association of the Fifth Circuit Continuing Legal Education Program, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
8 October 2013 pages 10-14. 
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The availability of the Internet and the abiding presence of social networking now 
dwarf the previously held concern that a juror may be exposed to a newspaper or 
television program.87  
 
It is far more likely that a juror will access information online,88 and the practice is 
naturally harder to detect and police.  
 
The extensive use of social networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, have 
exponentially increased the risk of prejudicial communication amongst jurors and 
opportunities to exercise persuasion and influence upon jurors.89 
 
Following the issue of jurors’ social media use, the Judicial Conference Committee 
updated the model set of jury instructions in order to deter jurors from using social 
media or from communicating about the cases. The fact that jurors no longer feel a 
place and are experiencing the distanceless-ness that technology brings is impacting 
negatively on courtroom proceedings. In an attempt to counteract the effects, at the 
beginning of the case, jurors are recommended to: 
 
…Not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e-mail, 
Blackberry, iphone, text messaging or on Twitter, through any blog or website, 
																																																								
87 United States v Fumo 655 F.3d 288 (2011). 
88 In Benbrika v The Queen [2010] 29 VR 593, 641 the court stated (at [199]): ‘Finally, as to whether the 
jury had deliberately disobeyed his Honour’s directions not to consult the internet on matters germane to 
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meaning that they should not seek information about the case, rather than using the internet for more 
general purposes. Their innocence in that regard was supported by the lack of any attempt to conceal the 
fact that they had consulted the internet on the meaning of the subject terms’.  
89 United States v Juror Number One 866 F.Supp 2d 442, 451 (PA 2011). 
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including Facebook, Google+, MySpace, LinkedIn, or Youtube. You may not use any 
similar technology of social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here.90 
 
At the close of the case, jurors may not: 
 
Use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because it is 
important that you decide this case based solely on the evidence presented in this 
courtroom. Information on the Internet or available through social media might be 
wrong, incomplete or inaccurate.91 
 
Issues relating to social media are not exclusively felt in the United States, as, for 
example, Queensland jurors have also been dismissed due to Facebook use and not 
interacting with fellow jurors.92 Compared with jurors, lawyers have been permitted to 
use social media in order to research prospective jurors, provided that there is no 
attempt to engage the juror by communicating with them or ‘friending’ them. 93 
Lawyers may also use the Internet to gauge public opinion and discussion.94 These 
issues will be discussed at greater length in chapters six and seven.95 
 
Access to data is the main issue that arises when cloud computing systems are 
implemented. Often, information will be stored outside the ‘home’ jurisdiction on 
																																																								
90 Proposed Model Jury Instructions The Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on or 
Communicate a Case (prepared by the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case 
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91 Ibid. 
92 R v PAR [2015] Qd R 15. 
93 Friending is a colloquial term used when someone sends a friend request on Facebook to another. Once 
two people are friends, they can connect and see each others’ updates. 
94 Sluss v Commonwealth 381 S.W.3d 215 (2012). 
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servers across the world.96 Accessibility issues also need to be considered. Data must 
be accessible easily extracted. This is especially relevant to information flowing in and 
out of Europe, where far-reaching laws expect data to be accessed and stored properly 
outside of the country.97 However it has been noted that, ‘with a broad theme of 
globalisation and international trade and commerce, this does not mean that States are 
more willing to allow the exercise of foreign judicial power within their territory’.98 
Care must be taken to avoid client information being passed on to an unauthorised 
source. Privacy considerations will be discussed further in chapter five.99 
 
Regulation ultimately needs to address risk management. In this changing world risk 
management will provide a framework that considers current technological risks and 
predict future risk. Recently when companies have contravened compliance protocols 
and codes, the courts have not been as lenient as they have been in the past. Risk 
management is becoming an important aspect to business as well as legal practice, in 
order to mitigate and minimise the effect of contravened protocols and the eventual 
cost.   
 
In the United States, issues have arisen when national organisations have been subject 
to state laws and ethical standards. In Missouri, LegalZoom, a company that provides 
legal documents for a fee, was found to have engaged in the ‘unauthorized practice of 
law’.100 It was the human element of requiring judgment of legal matters that was 
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provided by the LegalZoom ‘decision tree’ that constituted the main breach. Similar 
cases have been heard in California and Texas. 101  There appears to be a distinct 
difference between administrative and simple document based advice as opposed to 
introducing a human element to assist with decisions and filing of the forms. 
LegalZoom has continued to be the subject of unauthorised legal practice court cases, 
as in North Carolina it was found that the fact that they were providing legal advice that 
‘includes the selection of terms and clauses within a legal document as well as the 
selection of which template to use’.102 This, again, goes beyond mere auto-completion 
of documents at the client’s wish. If a software program either engages in the equivalent 
of human judgment, or provides a replica human judgment through a code, this will 
often involve a breach of ethical rules or restrictions on rights of practice.  
 
Place is entirely removed from this sort of legal service provider and practice directives 
and court decisions are reflecting this. It is clear that location is a key determining factor 
when making these decisions. LegalZoom and similar businesses are suffering because 
of their lack of location and, subsequently, the conflict between jurisdictions.  The most 
pertinent issue to legal practice in global firms is ensuring that jurisdictional issues and 
limitations are recognised. Technological advancement also challenges professional 
obligations, owing to the increase in legal services being offered by non-lawyers as well 
as confusion around the lawyer-client relationship being formed. Regulation becomes 
different, because lawyers are now representing clients and are sending work to other 
jurisdictions.   
 
																																																								
101 Re Reynoso 477 F3d 1117, 124 (9th Cir. 2007) and Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v Parsons 
Tech, Inc. 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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The case of Dow Jones v Gutnick was one of the first cases in Australia that addressed 
and acknowledged globalisation as a factor that gives rise to new legal challenges.103 It 
was the international communications that created liability. Although the court 
considered the impact of the Internet on the law of defamation, it rejected any 
suggestion that a new analytical framework was required for the common law in this 
Internet age. Justice Kirby held that ‘courts throughout the world are urged to address 
the immediate need to piece together gradually a coherent transnational law appropriate 
to the “digital millennium”’.104  
 
The case involved defamatory material that was used and accessed in a Victoria from 
an online newspaper uploaded in New Jersey. Although the material was downloaded 
in the United States, the plaintiff therefore felt its effect in Victoria, and, as was claimed, 
its impact on his reputation. ‘The fundamental premise of the appellant’s arguments 
concerning the reformulation of the applicable rules of defamation depended on the 
technological features of the internet’. 105   Aside from generally recognising 
globalisation and the ‘digital millennium’, the case was significant in many ways and 
is a useful reference point for the analysis of technological advancements. 
 
The distanceless-ness nature of the Internet was addressed: 
 
First, the Internet is global. As such, it knows no geographic boundaries. Its basic lack 
of locality suggests the need for a formulation of new legal rules to address the absence 
of congruence between cyberspace and the boundaries and laws of any given 
																																																								
103 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575. 
104 Ibid 628. 
105 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 625. 
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jurisdiction. There are precedents for development of such new legal rules. The Law 
Merchant (lex mercatoria) arose in medieval times out of the general custom of the 
merchants of many nations in Europe.106 
 
 
 
This indicated that, potentially: 
 
…the advent of the Internet suggests a need to adopt new principles, or to strengthen 
old ones, in responding to question of forum or choice of law that identify, by reference 
to the conduct that is to be influenced, the place that has the strongest connection with, 
or is in the best position to control or regulate, such conduct.107 
 
The effect of globalisation is felt by law makers as well as the courts: 
 
To wait for legislatures or multilateral international agreement to provide solutions to 
the legal problems presented by the Internet would abandon those problems to 
“agonizingly slow” processes of lawmaking…108  
 
Place is referred to again discretely, to recognise different norms between cultures: 
 
The law in different jurisdictions, reflecting local legal and cultural norms, commonly 
strikes different balances between rights to information and expression and the 
protection of individual reputation , honour and privacy.109 
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The court also recognised that the location element of place had been assumed as, 
‘…Simply to apply old rules, created on the assumptions of geographical boundaries, 
would encourage an inappropriate and usually ineffective grab for extra-territorial 
jurisdiction’.110 
 
Dow Jones reflected Heideggerian sentiment in assessing technology as neither 
completely positive nor negative: ‘Whilst the Internet does indeed present many novel 
technological features, it also shares many characteristics with earlier technologies that 
have rapidly expanded the speed and quantity of information distribution throughout 
the world’.111  Concern was noted over the potential problems where ‘technology is 
itself overtaken by fresh developments’ and that the ‘full potential of the Internet has 
yet to be realised’.112 Early cases predicted greater possibilities for criminal activity, as 
‘the extent of criminal activity across borders is likely to be greatly increased as a result 
of developments in and the use of electronic technology to effect 
transactions’.113Although technology is consistently developing, the Internet is the next 
phase that would benefit from guidance in common law, express rules, especially ones 
that would seek to preserve place, could be well received. 
If new laws were to be formulated, Kirby J provided some guidance: 
 
The new laws would need to respect the entitlement of each legal regime not to enforce 
foreign legal rules contrary to binding local law or important elements of local public 
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policy. But within such constraints, the common law would adapt itself to the central 
features of the Internet, namely its global, ubiquitous and reactive characteristics.114  
 
The alternative, in practice, could be ‘an institutional failure to provide effective laws 
in harmony, as the Internet itself is, with contemporary civil society – international and 
national’.115 As globalisation was never defined in this case it is difficult to suggest its 
impact on the definitive legal questions. However by discounting the ‘high-minded 
concept’ of globalisation, the role technology plays in the construction of place was 
equally discounted. The court rejected an Internet-specific single publication rule based 
on the fact that ‘judges have adapted the common law to new technology in the past’.116 
 
 ‘One of the advantages of ‘thinking globally’ is that it identifies those issues which are 
truly international and those which hare domestic or region-specific’.117 In Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Chen, (the ‘Sydney Opera House’ case) a 
misleading foreign website was not tolerated. It was held that consumers are now part 
of an Internet world and as such, the courts must recognise that.118 By recognising the  
increasing use of the Internet and the frequency of cross-border transactions, the courts 
not only validated the importance of technology, but demonstrated the reach of 
Australian law. The Federal Court asserted its place by limiting the negative effect the 
foreign website had in Australia.   
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The cloud is a highly valuable piece of technology in the modern law firm, but even the 
use of cloud providers such as Dropbox is not immune from being called into question 
during legal proceedings.119 In 2014, the case of Conveyor & General Engineering Pty 
Ltd v Basetec Services Pty Ltd120 found that using Dropbox was an inappropriate and 
ineffective means of service. Basetec sent an email to Conveyor & General 
Engineering’s solicitors, as well as the Authorised Nominating Authority with a link to 
their Dropbox account containing submissions and an adjudication application.121 This 
case is significant in demonstrating the impact technology has on practice and how the 
law is not dealing with the significance of place.  
 
Section 11 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2001 (Qld) was subject to scrutiny to 
ascertain whether or not an email was valid service.122 The Court held that ‘the material 
within the Dropbox was not part of an electronic communication as defined. None of 
the data, text or images within the documents in the Dropbox was itself electronically 
communicated, or in other words communicated ‘by guided or unguided 
electromagnetic energy.’ 123  Rather, there was an electronic communication of the 
means by which other information in electronic form could be found, read and 
downloaded at and from the Dropbox website. The parties should also have agreed to 
electronic service to comply with section 11 and this did not happen.  
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This decision greatly impacts virtual firms and any firms that engage in ‘a paperless 
office’. Service needs to be agreed to in a contract, thus in the future a cloud method of 
service must be explicitly stated. The fact that a hard copy of documents is often 
required, indicates that the place of the cloud is still a talking point. However the history 
of place is relied upon with paper documents. Lawyers remain subject to the tradition 
of hardcopy and the security that comes with it.  
 
Another case involving cloud services is Trusted Cloud Pty Ltd v Core Desktop Pty 
Ltd.124 In defining a cloud, the court openly acknowledged the differing locations 
between the original material and where it was stored.  
 
A cloud computing service is a service for storing, accessing and retrieving computer 
data over the internet. Such services are generally operated from machines located in 
premises remote from the places where the data was created.125 
 
The case involved deliberation over whether the five ex-employees of Trusted Cloud 
stole confidential information and intellectual property and subsequently benefited 
from the information by poaching clients for Core Desktop.126  The following excerpt 
from the ‘first affidavit’ explains the services TPG offers to business and government: 
 
The customer’s data and software applications (for example, Microsoft Office for 
documents, Outlook Express for emails, Internet Explorer for searching the Internet) 
are installed on and run off that virtual server. A customer is able to connect remotely 
to the virtual server (for example from a desktop or laptop computer) using a software 
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program such as Citrix which requires the customer to provide a unique identifier and 
password. Once the customer has connected to the virtual server, the screen of the 
remote desktop or laptop computer will display the customer’s software applications 
(which are running on the virtual server) and allow the customer to access their data 
(which is stored on a portion of a shared storage device owned by Trusted Cloud that 
has been allocated to the customer).127 
 
In order to protect the information, Trusted Cloud ensure that ‘confidentiality 
provisions in employment agreements’ and computer networks and information access 
are restricted to certain employees. 128  However, the ex-employees of TPG still 
managed to deliver copied documents to Core Desktop. Information such as cost 
pricing, Microsoft license keys and copies of revenue from a client were among the 
information taken.129  This was achieved by installing synchronisation software on 
cloud run services, which would transfer the information back to Core Desktop.130 Core 
Desktop was ordered not to use, transmit, disclosure or reproduce any of the documents 
and that they be restrained from removing, altering and destroying any of the related 
documents.131 This case demonstrated the potential for misuse of the cloud. Instead of 
stealing physical files in a secure physical location, electronic files may also be 
stolen.132 The difference is, that the document may exist in one place that is entirely 
separate from the thief’s place. In this case, electronic information was stored in a cloud 
overseas, yet was able to be instantly obtained by someone in Australia. Place was not 
present in this situation.  
																																																								
127 Ibid [20]. 
128 Ibid [22]. 
129 Ibid [35]. 
130 Ibid [34]-[35]. 
131 Ibid [5]-[7]. 
132 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 308H. 
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B Making Technological Decisions in Law Firms 
 
In a law firm, the technology employed to assist staff is of utmost importance. 
Technology investments are made within companies looking to increase access to 
justice. Barriers to implementing technology include lack of uniformity, resistance to 
change, lack of guidelines and a lack of policy framework.133  A specific example given 
is the introduction of ‘form completion programs’ that automate certain processes for 
the client. ‘Insufficient triage’ is the main problem as concern arises when the computer 
program cannot tell whether or not the situation is too complex or whether referrals to 
more experienced lawyers are necessary.134 A typographical error might also change 
the meaning of a form – such an issue is likely to be picked up by a lawyer, rather than 
the computer. To combat resistance to change, it is suggested that grants be offered to 
those who pilot the new technology.135 Technology developers could also offer free 
licenses to firms under a certain size, or run evaluations as to whether or not the 
technology has been well received.136 It is obvious that all technology comes with a 
cost – even free productivity programs or social media sites for marketing. ‘Technology 
projects have startup costs, maintenance costa, and training costs’.137 Although these 
costs are likely to be negligible to a global law firm, smaller firms and sole practitioners 
would be disadvantaged in this respect. The most troublesome issue that acts as a barrier 
to change is a lack of guidance for making technological decisions. Although the 
information is often available through deep and methodical research, the opportunity 
																																																								
133 Linda Rexter and Phil Malone, 'Overcoming Barriers to Adoption of Effective Technology Strategies 
for Improving Access to Justice' (2012) 26(1) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 305. 
134 Ibid 308. 
135 Ibid 309. 
136 Ibid 310.  
137 Ibid 312. 
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cost arises once again. Although ‘many courts and legal aid organizations now have 
years of experience developing, deploying and evaluating a wide variety of access to 
justice technologies’, difficulty arises when time and resource constraints can limit 
staff’s access to knowledge and knowing how to apply it.138 A method to combat this 
could be more direction from law societies as well as recommendations and a free 
exchange of information between firms of similar standing.  
 
The American Bar Association provides a number of resources through their website 
for lawyers or IT professionals to view in order to evaluate whether a technology is 
right for their firm. 139  Topics covered on the website include, encryption, cloud 
computing and software as a service for lawyers, cloud ethics opinions around the U.S., 
Metadata ethics opinions around the U.S., practice and case management software, and 
time and billing software.140 A number of legal technology surveys are available for 
download on the site, that covers technology basics and security, law office technology, 
litigation and courtroom technology, web and communication technology, online 
research and mobile lawyers.141 A technology buyer’s guide is also available, spanning 
58 different categories from accounting and finance to webinars and word 
processing.142  
																																																								
138 Ibid. 
139 Researching Law Office Technology: Selected Resources | Legal Technology Center American Bar 
Association 
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/charts
_fyis/technologyresearchfyi.html>. 
140 Ibid. 
141  Publications | Legal Technology Resource Center American Bar Association 
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/publications.ht
ml>. These reports are available years for download from the American Bar Association shop. The 
average price is US$350, or US$300 for American Bar Association members. You do not get unlimited 
access to the file after purchase, you can only access the file for 12 months and are allowed eight 
maximum downloads of each report within that time.   
142  Buyer's Guide - ABA Legal Technology Buyers Guide American Bar Association 
<http://buyersguide.americanbar.org>. 
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Although lawyers are taking up new technologies, their adoption is slow – this is not 
necessarily due to ethical concerns. Often adoption is ‘reactive, not proactive’ and that 
‘law firms have been structured around being in the “middle majority”’.143 Law firms 
are reluctant to lead change, preferring to stay in line with their peers. If innovation 
happens, it is often in line with client demand, rather than internal innovation 
strategy.144 
 
Recent surveys have identified key areas of technological concern for lawyers.145 In 
response to questions relating to staff training within firms: 
 
Less than 50 percent of firms have instituted training, 24 percent of all survey 
respondents reported that their law firms were not addressing the issue of technology 
competency at all and 63 percent of small firms responded that they had no training 
programs whatsoever.146 
 
However, these statistics are counted by the fact that: 
 
93 percent of all law firm leaders think a focus on practice efficiency is now essential 
and less than 30 percent of law firms with under 250 attorneys say they have 
																																																								
143  Mary Jutten, Examing Legal Tech Adoption Part I Law Technology Today 
<http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2015/09/examining-legal-tech-adoption-part-i/>. 
144 Ibid. 
145 It is noted that although these surveys do not come from academic, peer-reviewed sources, they 
provide a general insight into lawyer technology use in firms in the US. 
146 Kevin Harrang, By the Numbers: Attorneys' Love-Hate Relationship With Technology Legal Tech 
News <http://www.legaltechnews.com/home/id=1202738959672/By-the-Numbers--Attorneys-
LoveHate-Relationship-With-Technology?slreturn=20150918013807> citing InsideLegal’s Technology 
Purchasing Survey 2015. 
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significantly changed their strategic approach to improve their efficiency. By 
comparison, 57 percent of firms with 250+ lawyers are doing so.147 
 
This demonstrates a difference in technology use based on the place of the lawyer. 
Lawyers in small firms are being relatively disadvantaged due to the fact that they are 
not receiving the same amount of support or guidance that lawyers in large firms 
receive. Small firms are also not as receptive to changing strategic direction to 
incorporate technological change. This in turn will render them uncompetitive in the 
global market. Although technology use has the potential to disrupt place, if technology 
is implemented into a firm without correct assessment or training, it may also possibly 
be an even greater challenge the lawyers’ ethics than if they had not adopted any 
modern technology at all.  
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
Globalisation, as facilitated by technology, is causing the business of law to evolve and 
to become defined by the changing business landscape. Globalisation is affecting 
lawyers from all different backgrounds and is affecting the way that lawyers work. 
From the lawyer in the global firm to the sole practitioner in a rural village, no lawyer 
is immune to the changes brought about from globalisation. To understand 
globalisation properly, the underlying theories of modernity assist to explain the 
societal change. Through Heidegger, this is linked to place and subsequently to 
lawyers’ ethics. Heidegger valued tradition, which he believed could then be used to 
aid future developments. These developments could include anything from developing 
																																																								
147 Ibid citing Altman Weil’s Law Firms in Transition 2015 report. 
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the idea of what it is to be, through to technological developments which can assist in 
developing the being as well. By predicting that, ‘all distances in time and space are 
shrinking, and that ‘[m]an now reaches overnight, by places, places which formerly 
took weeks and months of travel’, Heidegger summarised the key theme that is found 
in globalisation theories today. 148  Technology has facilitated globalisation by 
eliminating geographic boundaries and constraints. Similarly, it has the potential to 
facilitate the obliteration of place.  
 
Globalisation theories are frequently underpinned by theories of modernity. Qualities 
of the modern age such as the pace of change, scope of change and nature of modern 
institutions are all creating an environment that is changing the nature of the legal 
profession. The legal profession has always experienced change, but the proliferation 
of technology has accelerated the changes to extreme levels. Business structures are 
changing to allow non-lawyers to own law firms, billable hour expectations are 
increasing and technology is allowing lawyers to always be ‘on call’. 
 
The idea of profession as well as the lawyers’ own identity is being challenged and 
questioned. Changes in social institutions affect the community aspect of place, which 
also compromises the history of the place. When these two qualities are lost, a lawyer 
may lose part of their identity, which is constructed by their place in the world.  
 
Globalisation is therefore creating new situations that require different ethical 
approaches. The changing nature of their workplace, clients and quality of the work are 
all elements that have the potential to affect lawyers’ ethics. Some scholarly sources 
																																																								
148 Heidegger, above n 7, 163. 
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acknowledge changes, such as technological advancement and a global profession, but 
there is a distinct ethical lag. Lawyers’ identities are still strongly linked to place and 
may have to be. If place is removed by the proliferation of technology in the workplace, 
there is a risk that the lawyer’s ethics will suffer.  
 
The following chapters will elaborate on the specific issues facing the profession. These 
issues will be categorised into the areas of confidentiality, communication and 
litigation.  Technologies such as cloud computing and outsourcing, social media and 
advertising, and electronic discovery and courtroom technology will be addressed to 
demonstrate how each is affecting areas of lawyers’ professional conduct requirements.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In the following chapters, the three core components of place (location, community and 
history) will be used to explain how the core requirements and areas of legal practice 
and regulation rely upon place if they are to function successfully. It is argued that place 
is an integral aspect of the development and stability of professional rules and lawyers’ 
moral codes. 
 
Confidentiality is at the core of legal practice for protecting clients and fostering 
confidence in the legal system.1 Clients must have the highest trust and confidence in 
their lawyer2 and are entitled to the ‘single minded loyalty’ of their lawyer.3 The very 
nature of the lawyer-client relationship is steeped in confidentiality and forms the 
foundation of the fiduciary duty.4 However, technology is currently being utilised in 
such a way that poses a threat to confidentiality. In all common law countries being 
considered, information held in clouds may be subject to security breaches if not 
managed properly. Information is routinely being sent to foreign countries for basic 
legal work to be completed.  
 
																																																								
1 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222, 236; Mike Pero Mortgages Limited v Pero 
[2014] NZAR 1459; Ismail-Zai v The State of Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 379. 
2 Smith v Dean 240 SW.2d 789, 791 (1951).  
3 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18-19. 
4 See generally Gino Dal Point, Law of Confidentiality (LexisNexis 2014) and Lindgren, 'Fiduciary Duty 
and the Ripoll Report' (2010) 28 Company and Securities Law Journal 435, 438. 
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This chapter expands upon chapter three and reintroduces Heidegger’s ideas of the 
hidden and concealment. These concepts assist in constructing place by highlighting 
the importance of revealing and the ‘forgetfulness of being’ which compromises place. 
 
The first section revisits Heideggerian concepts and uses them in an analysis of the 
cloud and outsourcing in order to demonstrate how place affects lawyer’s ethics when 
engaging these technologies.  
 
The second section of this chapter deals with confidentiality and how it is challenged 
by cloud computing and, subsequently, the outsourcing of legal work. This technology 
is challenging place, by removing the lawyer’s place and substituting it with the place 
of data storage providers and the place of outsourcers.  
 
The third section addresses the regulatory and statutory approaches in the relevant 
common law jurisdictions, in order to guide their lawyers through their ethical 
obligations when using new technologies.  
 
II HEIDEGGERIAN TRUTH, REVEALING AND UNCONCEALMENT 
 
Heidegger describes the disclosure of Dasein as an original phenomenon of truth.5This 
theory of truth relies upon determinations of unconcealment and disclosure.6  
 
																																																								
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Joan Stambaugh trans, State University of New York Press, revised 
ed ed, 2010), 221. 
6  Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth' in Christopher Macann (ed), Critical Heidegger 
(Routledge, 1996) 228. 
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In chapter four, history and tradition were addressed as an element of place, which 
relates to Heidegger’s concept of revealing. In order to understand the world around 
them, Dasein must constantly experience revealing. Something is revealed once the 
essence of the thing is fully understood and nothing remains hidden. 
 
Confidential information is ultimately hidden from everyone but the lawyer and the 
client. When the data is outsourced, it originates with the lawyer, but is hidden before 
it is revealed to the lawyer once more. The outsourcers experience the hidden to an even 
greater extent than the lawyer does. Only information relevant to the outsourcer is 
disclosed in an effort to heighten the security of the information, so outsourced staff 
may work on one area of the case or complete basic due diligence for litigation. They 
experience their place entirely, but do not have enough access to the lawyer’s or the 
client’s place to become part of it. Their place encroaches on the client’s place. Yet 
both play a vital part in furthering the client’s case. The outsourcing agent as Dasein 
cannot possibly know all of the information which is concealed. The cloud in theory 
should be a technology that could aid in revealing. Yet the information is distant 
without being properly revealed. 
 
A technology such as the cloud requires examination to challenge the assumption that 
any new technology is automatically seen as an improvement. ‘Technological thinking 
is thinking in view of a manipulative practice, and we are becoming ever more aware 
of the dangers which attend an uncritical extension of calculative-manipulative 
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thinking’.7 The cloud has not yet been critically evaluated against place to prove its 
worth to lawyers.  
 
Heidegger questions the essence of technology.8 When the essence of the technology 
can be responded to, technology may then be experienced within its own bounds. 
Technology must be interacted with in order for the truth to emerge. ‘Technology is a 
mode of revealing. Technology comes to a presence in the realm where revealing and 
unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens’.9 The truth will result in a 
free relationship, where the relationship between the individual and technology is not 
compromised.  
 
‘The unconcealment of the unconcealed has already propriated whenever it calls man 
forth into the models of revealing allotted to him’.10 By this, Heidegger means that 
interaction with technology is vital. With technology forever on standby, just waiting 
for someone to make use of it, a person may never control unconcealment. It is the 
technology which can control the person, ultimately amounting to a danger to the 
person’s existence. ‘The danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is 
unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-
reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of standing-
reserve, then they come to the point where they will have to be taken as standing-
reserve’.11  The suggestion is that technology will eventually turn the human mind into 
																																																								
7 Christopher Macann, 'Heidegger's Kant Interpretation' in Christopher Macann (ed), Critical Heidegger 
(Routledge, 1996) 96, 117. 
8 BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR III ETHICS OF TECHNOLOGY and 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT II HEIDEGGERIAN TRUTH, REVEALING AND 
UNCONCEALMENT. 
9 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology' in David Farrell Krell (ed), Basic Writings 
(Harper Perennial, 2008) 307, 319. 
10 Ibid 324. 
11 Ibid 332.  
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a state that never questions something that may be stuck on stand by. The mind will 
never question and always forget what it is. Ultimately the place is compromised too. 
The cloud is already a concealed and mysterious idea. It is not tangible. Its contents are 
hidden away from physical attainment. It consistently exists in the background, waiting 
for instruction. 
 
‘Technology is not demonic; but its essence is mysterious. The essence of technology, 
as a destining of revealing, is the danger’. 12  Destining starts one on the path to 
revealing, yet they cannot get past enframing - which banishes one to a singular mode 
of revealing. The essence of the cloud, existing on standby, does not assist in revealing. 
It conceals the importance of bringing-forth and blocks it. If technology is not properly 
questioned to reveal, enframing will endure. The cloud contributes to the ongoing 
enframing. All this leads to the obliteration of place. 
 
‘The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal 
machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in is 
essence’.13  By using technology blindly and not observing the importance of place or 
an awareness of being there, the essence will change the essence of man. ‘The essential 
unfolding of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all 
revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will represent itself only in 
the unconcealment of standing-reserve’. 14  To maintain the truth and the free 
relationship with technology, it must be questioned and never be blindly accepted.  
 
																																																								
12 Ibid 333.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid 339. 
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To define the essence of a technology and ascertain the means of the technology, 
Heidegger looked to ancient philosophy to find four causes: causa materialis (material 
explanation), causa formalis (formal explanation), causa finalis (final explanation) and 
causa efficiens (efficient or moving explanation). 15  Providing these causes are 
questioned and the character of their unification is discussed, they can contribute to 
establishing the bringing-forth of the essence.  
 
‘Essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen 
in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, 
fundamentally different from it’.16 Heidegger then suggests that ‘such a realm is art’.17 
‘Thus questioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with 
technology we do not yet experience the essential unfolding of technology’.18 I suggest 
that such a realm may be ethics, a framework against which technology may be 
considered. So long as lawyers constantly question and evaluate, their place may not 
be lost entirely. But ultimately, lawyers are using technology that conceals their being. 
There is little that is currently being done to prioritise place. Subsequently, if their being 
is concealed, their place is lost. Place must take priority in order for the lawyer to remain 
ethical in all situations. For example, often ‘reasonability’ is a common standard that is 
used when judging ethical standards.19  Without a place, how can the lawyer define the 
reasonable?  
 
																																																								
15 Heidegger above n 5, 313-314. Aristotle used the word ‘aition’, which developed a more abstract 
meaning in a philosophical context. ‘Cause’ can be more plainly described as ‘explanation’. 
16 Ibid 340. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid. 
19 For example, the Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules makes reference to ‘reasonable’ 34 times, the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct refers to ‘reasonable’ 46 times and the 
Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct makes reference to ‘reasonable’ 17 times. 
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Many legal norms take the form of open-ended, unspecified general terms that 
obviously require resort to implicit background understanding… ‘reasonable (as 
applied to conduct or price)…are merely examples of a vast class of general terms that 
play central roles in key bodies of law that have no literal interpretations... many of 
these terms are understood to incorporate the values either of society at large or of some 
nonsovereign social group.20 
 
 Reasonability can only be ascertained when attached to place. What is reasonable in 
one country may not be reasonable in another, because they do not share a common 
location, a common history nor a common community. Yet through the cloud and 
outsourcing, these conflicting places are meant to abide by the same rules. 
Reasonability must be grounded in place. To look at the hypothetical ‘man on the 
Clapham omnibus’21 and related incarnations such as the ‘person on the Bourke Street 
tram’,22 ‘soin d’un bon père de famille23 and the ‘Shau Kei Wan Tram’24 is to look at 
place. A reasonable person is one who is guided and shaped by his or her own place. 
Place always assists in developing the reasonable.  
 
As such, place is contributing to lawyers’ ethical development by way of giving them 
a grounding and a context in which to base their values. Even if a lawyer chooses to be 
ethical by pure observation of professional rules, these rules are still grounded in place. 
The danger comes when place is eroded by new technologies that are seen as ‘new and 
improved’ models of service, when really they may be compromising lawyers’ ethics.  
																																																								
20 William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1998) 39. 
21 Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205. 
22 Re Sortirios Pandos and Commonwealth of Australia [1991] AATA 18 [88]. 
23 St Arnaud v Gibson  (1898) 13 Quebec CS 22, 26-28. 
24 Ng Chiu Mui and  Securities and Futures Commission Application No 7 of 2007 ‘the SFC considers 
that she is not a fit and proper person to be licensed is unlikely to stimulate any surprise in the breast of 
that mythical (and fair-minded) observer, the man on the Shau Kei Wan tram’. 
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III CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Generally, there are three legal sources of confidentiality: contract, equity and 
professional rules.25 In contract, confidentiality is an implied term applicable to the 
lawyer’s retainer.26 In equity, protection applies to the information itself and is a more 
discerning source than contract. Professional rules often outline an explicit duty of 
confidence, often outlining that the information is confidential to the client and had to 
arise in the course of providing legal services.27 
 
Confidentiality exists as a protection for the client who is dependent upon on the 
lawyer. The lawyer ultimately needs to protect the clients’ right to confidence, unless 
there is proof that a future crime will be committed. Privilege does not extend to 
communication which relates to fraudulent or criminal endeavours28 ‘Any confidential 
information which has been disclosed by a client in furtherance of a criminal or 
fraudulent enterprise can be disclosed by his lawyer without breaching any confidence 
as confidence does not protect that which is excluded from privilege’.29 If a lawyer is 
in possession of incriminating information that may assist with their client being 
convicted of a crime, there is no obligation to disclose it.30 This demonstrates that it is 
more important to preserve lawyer-client confidentiality than to convict a possible 
																																																								
25 G E Dal Pont, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2013) 334-335. 
26 Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1998) 48 NSWLR 1, 48-52. 
27 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012) r 9.1.  
28 Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence: The Protection of Confidential Information (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) [9.110]. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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criminal. Privilege cannot be breached for the greater public interest, as the public 
interest has already been referenced to develop the scope of privilege.31 
 
Authorisation is a necessary component of the lawyer-client relationship to enable the 
lawyer to disclose information to others to assist with the client’s case. It is the client’s 
right to waive the obligation not to disclose confidential information, expressly or 
impliedly.32  In Australia, an inconsistency test is used to determine whether or not a 
client has waived professional privilege over communication. 33  Most often the 
authority is gleaned from the retainer and is given by the client implicitly. Considering 
the intention of the retainer is usually to further the interests of the client and their case, 
the lawyer may not use authorised information to further their own interests, or the 
interests of another client.34 Information may be distributed to other lawyers within the 
law firm, as the retainer is with the firm.35 The information may also be disclosed to 
lawyers outside the firm in a ‘non-identifiable form’36 or to counsel for advice.37 If files 
are transferred from one lawyer to another in a different practice, express client consent 
is required.38  
 
It is also possible for the client to impliedly grant their consent to disclose their 
information to third parties.39 However, whilst the information can be disclosed to 
																																																								
31 It cannot be an emphasis. When I deal with technology it is not the intention to deal with the use of 
legal analytics and machine learning that undoubtedly raise questions of confidentiality 
32 Ibid r 9.2.1.  
33 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, 13-14. 
34 Fordham v Legal Practitioners Complains Committee (1997) 18 WAR 467, 486. As a disciplinary 
proceeding, Fordham was fought on the basis that the duty of loyalty extended, even though the 
information was already in the public domain. 
35 Dal Pont Above n 25.   
36 McKaskell v Benseman [1989] 3 NZLR 75, 88. 
37 Dal Pont above n 25, 339. 
38 Re Mandelman (1994) 514 NW 2d 11 (1994). 
39 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012) r 9.2.1. 
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further the case, this is usually to another lawyer or to counsel. The information 
provided to the outsourcing firm is usually identifiable and staff are not legally trained, 
often working from another jurisdiction. A client may not understand the immediate 
implications or realise that their consent extends so far as to take their confidential 
information off shore. The lawyer should make this clear to their client at the time.   
 
If confidentiality is breached or information has been disclosed without authorisation, 
there are a number of resulting actions a lawyer may be subjected to. The lawyer may 
lose clients, damage their reputation or be subject to disciplinary action. They may also 
face civil liability or an injunction from acting. As a consequence, outsourcing and the 
use of cloud computing are two areas relating to technology and place that may be of 
concern to lawyers.40 Law societies around the world have released advice for lawyers 
regarding use of the cloud.41 
 
In global law firms, privilege not only applies to communication between lawyers in 
the home jurisdiction, but also communication with foreign lawyers.42 Whilst client 
rights are a priority in some common law jurisdictions, as evidenced by the professional 
conduct rules, in some civil law jurisdictions there is no right to waive confidentiality 
																																																								
40 Recent reports produced by Australian law societies have identified other issues such as metrics, 
machine learning and artificial intelligence as other technological issues that lawyers face, but this thesis 
will focus on the selected technologies identified in earlier chapters. See for example The Law Society 
of New South Wales, Report on the Commission of Inquiry into the Future of Law and Innovation in the 
Profession (2017) chapter two; The Law Institute of Victoria, Disruption, Innovation and Change: The 
Future of the Legal Profession, (2015) 30; American Bar Association, Report on the Future of Legal 
Services in the United States, (2016) part II. 
41  Alabama Bar Association Opinion 2010-02, California Bar Association Opinion 2010-179, 
Connecticut Bar Association Informal Opinion 2013-07, Law Society of Scotland, Law Society of 
Scotland Practice Rules (at November 2011) Div B, The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, 
Cloud Computing Practice Note, The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner  
<http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Practice%20Note%20Cloud%20Computing%20AC.pdf>   
42 IBM Corp v Phoenix International (Computers Ltd [1995] F.S.R 184. 
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and all lawyer communications are confidential.43 For example in France ‘lawyers may 
not be released from this obligation3 by the clients’.44 If the obligation of confidence is 
mixed with ‘uncertain jurisdictional status’, the court attempts to minimise the effect in 
order to grant greater significance to the confidence.45   
 
In relation to confidential information that employees might hold, confidentiality 
covenants may prove useful in the contract of employment. There is difficulty in 
drawing the line between confidential information and general skill the employee may 
have gained from their position. A covenant must be specific, rather than general in 
order to work to full effect.46 The specificity would not necessarily be practical for 
employees of outsourcing companies whose work is based in confidentiality.  
 
A Concurrent Conflicts of Interest and Conflicting Duties of Disclosure 
 
The lawyer-client relationship must be one of undivided loyalty.47 As such, lawyers 
must avoid acting for clients who have conflicting interests. Once the retainer has 
expired, the lawyer owes no fiduciary loyalty to the client.48 However, the former client 
may have grounds of complaint under the duty of confidentiality. 49 A lawyer is also 
																																																								
43 James Moliterno and George Harris, Global Issues in Legal Ethics (Thomson West, 2007) 83. 
44 Ibid 86. 
45 Aplin et al, above n 28, [11.19]. 
46 Ixora Trading Incorporated v Jones [1990] FSR 251, 258-9. 
47 There are many cases that uphold this duty. In Employers Casualty Co. v Tilley 496 SW2d 552 (Tex 
1973), whereby a lawyer employed by an insurance company becomes the legal representative of the 
insured (when hired to defend a personal injury claim), and as such he owes the insured the same type 
of unqualified loyalty as if he had been originally employed by the insured. This principle is reflected in 
other states in the United States - see for example Borissoff v Taylor & Faust 33 Cal. 4th 523, 530, 93 
P.3d 337 (2004); Estate of Spivey v Pulley 663 NY.S.2d 293 (1988). 
48 An overview of conflicts of interest is being provided to illustrate the role of the lawyer and the 
potential for technology to influence or create future conflicts.  
49 Sandro Goubran, 'Conflicts of Duty: The Perennial Lawyers' Tale - A Comparative Study of the Law 
in England and Australia' (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 88, 111. 
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‘immune from liability to third persons arising from his performance… in good faith 
on behalf of, and with the knowledge of his client, unless such third person is in privity 
with the client or the attorney acts maliciously’.50 This principle is based in the rationale 
that ‘the obligation of an attorney is to direct his attention to the needs of the client, not 
to the needs of a third party not in privity with the client’.51 In regards to in-house 
counsel, no lawyer-client relationship exists when the interests of the directors (such as 
personal interests) do not match that of the corporation.52 A lawyer will not owe the 
director a duty. Each duty or relationship is based on a place that differentiates them 
from one another. 
In Australia, in-house lawyers are subject to a more liberal approach to legal 
professional privilege than their counterparts in the EU. Privilege extends to in-house 
lawyers and the communications they produce. Common law principles underpin 
Australian legal professional privilege and makes no exclusion for in-house lawyers.53  
 
The European Court of Justice first recognised legal professional privilege in 1982 in 
the case of AM & S v European Commission (Case C-I55/79)54 and reaffirmed in 2010 
in the Akzo Nobel case.55 
 
 A restrictive approach is taken in the EU, because privilege only applies to independent 
lawyers. This is based on the reasoning that it is impossible for an employee (the in-
house lawyer) to ignore the commercial strategy pursued by the company they are 
																																																								
50 Scholler v Scholler 462 N.E.2d 158, 163 (1984). 
51 Simon v Zipperstein 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1987). 
52 Hile v Firmin, Sprague and Huffman Co. LPA 71 Ohio App. 3d 842. 
53 For a summary of the common law principles, see Archer Capital 4A Pty Ltd as trustee for the  Archer 
Capital  Trust 4A v  Sage Group  plc (No 2) [2013] FCA 1098 (24 October 2013). Para 9-15. 
54 ECJ, May 18th, 1982, AM & S Europe v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] ECR 1575. 
55  Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v Commission (Case C-550/07 P) [2010]. 
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employed by.56  Therefore, communications produced by in-house lawyers are not 
protected by privilege. This is partially because a ‘considerable number of Member 
States do not allow in-house lawyers to be admitted to the Bar or Law Society and, 
accordingly, do not recognise them as lawyers established in private practice’.57 Non 
EU lawyers are similarly excluded from privilege, given that, 'it would not [...] be 
possible to ensure that the third country in question has a sufficiently established rule-
of-law tradition which would enable lawyers to exercise their profession in the 
independent manner required and thus to perform their role as collaborators in the 
administration of justice’.58 
 
Concurrent conflicts – that is, conflicts of duties owed to two different clients whose 
interests are at odds with each other - are the ‘very heartland of fiduciary law’.59 Most 
often, the issues arising from this sort of conflict are matters under ‘the general law of 
negligence, breach of contract and, particularly, confidential information’.60 Whilst 
these fiduciary duties are not unique to lawyers, it is noted that highly specialised areas 
of practice and the emergence of very large firms exacerbates the potential for 
conflict.61  
 
There is an absolute ban on representing two clients in litigation, for the obvious 
reasons of conflict.62 In situations where the lawyer owes a duty of confidence to two 
																																																								
56 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 60( 2), 545, 546. 
57 Above n 52 para 171. 
58 Case C-550/07 Akzo Nobel Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v European Commission, Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, 29 para 190. 
59 Paul Finn, 'Developments in the Law; Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession' (1980-1981) 94 
Harvard Law Review 1244, 1292. 
60 Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1, 47-48. 
61 Stephen Corones, Nigel Stobbs and Mark Thomas, Professional Responsibility and Legal Ethics in 
Queensland (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2014) and see Village Roadshow v Blake Dawson Waldron 
[2003] VSC 505 [49]. 
62 Re a Firm of Solicitors [1992] 2 WLR 809, 820. 
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conflicting clients whose interests conflict, each client must give their consent before 
the information is disclosed to the other party.63  
 
Firms (as opposed to individual lawyers) are not exempt from this obligation of 
confidentiality and the duty to avoid conflicts, as firms are overwhelmingly the ‘entity’ 
that is retained.64 ‘A firm is therefore in no better position than a sole practitioner if it 
purports to act for separate clients whose interests are in contention’.65 Both the lawyer 
and the firm utilise similar technology to complete the aims of their clients. There will 
be no differentiation between technology, just as there is no differentiation between 
individual or company.  
 
It is otherwise where the court’s intervention is sought by an existing client, for a 
fiduciary cannot act at the same time both for and against the same client, and his firm 
is in no better position. A man cannot without the consent of both clients act for one 
client while his partner is acting for another in the opposite interest.66 
 
Intervention by the court is sometimes necessary if a breach of confidentiality is to be 
prevented. 
 
A court will usually intervene in a case in which a solicitor is employed by or becomes 
a partner in a second firm which is acting in proceedings against the solicitor’s former 
client only to prevent a misuse of confidential information.67 
																																																								
63 This may occur in conveyancing, when a lawyer acts for the mortgagee and mortgagor. See for 
example Mortgage Express Ltd v Bowerman & Partners [1996] 2 All. 
64 Mallesons Stephen Jacques v KPMG Peat Marwick (1990) 4 WAR 357, 374. 
65 Blackwell v Barroile (1994) 51 FCR 347, 360. 
66 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222, 234. 
67 Des Vins De Bourgogne v Red Earth Nominees Pty Ltd (t/a Taltarni Vineyards) [2002] FCA 588, [18]. 
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Intervention may also occur in the case where the conduct of solicitors who are officers 
of the court needs to be controlled.68 This is one way of controlling the issue of ‘double 
deontology’, whereby lawyers need to deal with competing ethical frameworks from 
different jurisdictions. An injunction has been granted against solicitors acting for a 
client because of ‘the danger of misuse of confidential information; a breach of 
fiduciary duty of loyalty and the desirability of restraining solicitors as officers of the 
court’.69 Jurisdiction rests on the power of the Court to keep control over its officers.70 
However, the ‘jurisdiction is to be regarded as exceptional and is to be exercised with 
caution’ in the case of exercising supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors.71 
 
B Consecutive Conflicts of Interest 
Within professional organisations it is common to act for a client on one occasion but 
against them at a later time.  This can result in confidential information flowing to the 
firm for one action that may jeopardise another. Does the duty of confidence preclude 
a lawyer’s partner acting for a client where another client’s confidential information is 
relevant?72 To avoid conflicts, firms may try to erect information barriers (also known 
as ‘Chinese walls’ or ‘paper walls’) to prevent the material obtained in the course of 
acting for one client being divulged to other staff acting for another party. Such actions 
may include ensuring staff do not work on both matters, conducting competing matters 
in different departments and setting up separate servers for separate matters so no 
																																																								
68 Yunghanns v Elfic Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 3 July 1998). For further 
discussion of this principle, see Rakusen v Ellis, Munday and Clarke [1912] 1 Ch 831 and Davies v 
Clough (1837) 8 Sim 262, 267. 
69 Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 248. 
70  Mills v Day Dawn Bloch Gold Mining Co Ltd (1882) 1 Queensland Law Journal 62, 63. And 
subsequently recognised in Black v Taylor [1993] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 403 and Macquarie Bank 
Ltd v Myer [1994] 1 VR 350, 351-2. 
71 Kallinicos v Hunt  (2005) 64 NSWLJ 561, 582. 
72 Aplin et al, above n 28, [9.113]. 
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information may be used for alternative purposes. 73  However, this may not be 
enough.74 In Australia, there are currently Information Barrier Guidelines available to 
guide the conduct of lawyers and law firms.75  The guidelines need to be read in 
conjunction with professional conduct rules so as to best maintain professional duties.  
 
An information barrier, properly constructed… is an important element in ensuring that 
the duty of confidentiality is maintained thereby allowing a law practice to act against 
a former client without breaching its duty to preserve the confidences of that client. It 
may also present an effective rebuttal of the presumption of imputed knowledge.76 
 
In order to be effective, the barrier must prevent accidental or inadvertent disclosure of 
information as well as deliberate disclosure.77  ‘The duty to preserve confidentiality is 
‘unqualified. It is a duty to keep the information confidential, not merely to take all 
reasonable steps to do so’.78 The test to be applied to determine the conflict is that there 
must be no real risk of disclosure, rather than a fanciful or theoretical risk. 79 
Professional conduct rules reflect this.80 
 
An injunction may be brought to prevent a lawyer or firm acting for another client 
(concurrently or successively) on the basis of a potential or actual breach of confidence. 
If a consecutive conflict arises, the action stems from a free standing duty of confidence 
																																																								
73 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222. 
74 ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2007] FCA 963. 
75 See for example New South Wales Law Society and Law Institute Victoria, Information Barrier 
Guidelines Queensland Law Society <http://ethics.qls.com.au/sites/all/files/files/info_barriers_-
_guidelines_-_nsw_law_soc_and_liv.pdf>.  
76 Ibid 2. 
77 Asia Pacific Communications Limited v Optus Networks Pty Limited [2007] NSWSC 350 
78 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222 235-6. 
79 Ibid. See also Marks & Spencer v Freshfields [2004] EWCA Civ 741 
80 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012) r 11; Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (at 10 March 2016) r 3.4.	
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as the fiduciary relationship is contained only within the retainer. 81  Precise 
identification is required of confidential information by the former client.82 
 
‘An effective Chinese Wall needs to be an established part of the organizational 
structure of the firm, not created ad hoc’.83 If the technology employed by a firm is not 
adequate enough to create the Information Barrier, then the technology used in the firm 
is contributing to this difficulty. Although technology has improved and developed 
since the 1990s, its growth is connective and expansive. More sophisticated programs 
may indeed provide better security for information. But it is still concerning that a 
system designed to prevent breaches of confidential information may also contribute to 
a future breach.  
 
‘If not effectively maintained or policed, [Chinese walls] create a concomitant risk of 
overlap not only of matters being concurrently pursued across the client base, but also 
of individual clients’. 84  Australian courts have taken an unsympathetic view to 
Information Barriers, highlighting the severe criticism they face in the United States.85 
Technological advances that create the modern information barrier are potentially 
creating greater internal problems within firms.  
 
IV CLOUD COMPUTING 
																																																								
81 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222, 235-6.  
82 Carindale Country Club Estate Pty Ltd v Astill (1993) 42 FCR 307, 314-315. 
83 Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1992] 2 AC 222, 237. 
84 Corones, Stobbs and Thomas, above n 52, 398. 
85 Mallesons Stephen Jacques v KPMG Peat Marwick (1990) 4 WAR 357, 374. Internal procedures and 
the policing of information barriers is an example of a practical issue in erecting information barriers. 
See Calgas Investments Ltd v 784688 Ontario Ltd (1991) 4 OR (3d) 459.  
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The cloud is now vital to the global practice of law, as well as many regional and rural 
law firms. A cloud software program is a virtual storage program that is hosted on 
servers across the globe. Users of ‘the cloud’ may access saved information from any 
Internet enabled device, anywhere in the world. This is in comparison to information 
stored on a localised hard drive in a fixed location.  
 
The main benefit of cloud computing is that it is highly practical and convenient, as the 
lawyer may access their files anywhere and allow access to others. It is also a cost 
effective solution to the problem of having a mobile source of materials and 
information, as hardware does not need to be purchased – only a cloud license is needed. 
There is no need for a small firm to spend thousands of dollars creating an IT solution 
in order to compete with larger firms.  
 
There are many definitions of what the cloud actually is, but the most acceptable 
definition comes from the National Institute of Standards and Technology:86  
 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, 
storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is 
comprised of five essential characteristics, three service models and four deployment 
models.87 
 
																																																								
86 Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing NIST Special Publication 
800-145 National Institute of Standards and Technology 
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf>. 
87 Richard Hill et al, Guide to Cloud Computing: Principles and Practice (Springer Science and Business 
Media, 2012) 9.  
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Cloud computing has five essential characteristics. 88  On demand service is in 
comparison to traditionally hosted IT infrastructure such as data storage. 89  The 
information stored is not instantly accessible, which is the compromise for not having 
to purchase additional hardware. To be effective, the cloud ‘should incorporate 
sufficient agility and autonomy, [and] that requests for more resource are automatically 
and dynamically provided in real time without human intervention’.90 
 
Broad network access indicates that cloud computing needs to be accessible through 
any available devices such as a computer or internet connected phone or tablet. The 
connection needs to be established via standard mechanisms and protocols.91 
 
Resource Pooling ‘brings together aspects of grid computing (where multiple compute 
resources are connected together in a coordinated way) and hardware virtualisation’.92 
This results in large-scale efficiencies to give the consumer an appearance of 
homogenous resources, even when the physical location of the cloud remains hidden. 
Rapid elasticity ensures that the consumer’s experience of the cloud is based in a 
perception that the resources of the cloud are limitless. This is because of the self-
management of the cloud in relation to automatic requests for extra resources.93 Finally, 
the cloud provides a measured service that optimises available infrastructure, as well 
as being transparent in its metering service.94 
 
																																																								
88  Janine Anthony Bowen, 'Cloud Computing: Issues in Data Privacy/Security and Commercial 
Considerations' (2011) 28 Computer and Internet Law 1. 
89 Hill, above n 78. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid. 
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These five characteristics work together to form a seamless and transparent product that 
provides convenience and ease of use to the consumer.  
 
There are also four deployment models of cloud service: the private cloud, which 
remains linked to an organisation only; a community cloud that distributes the service 
across multiple organisations; a public cloud, available to large entities; and a hybrid 
cloud, which comprises one or more of the above methods of service, but will share 
data and applications.95 Law firms of different origins and sizes can utilise any of these 
deployment models.96 However, owing to their conservative nature, it is rare for law 
firms to use the public cloud model.97 
 
In addition to the basic service and deployment models, it is important to consider the 
commercial nature of the business in deploying the cloud and how the service models 
can benefit cloud adoption within the firm. By analysing the function, costs and benefits 
to the business can be ascertained. 
 
The cloud differs from previous examples of technology implementation that have also 
been adopted to improve profitability. Compared with grid computing and service 
oriented architecture, the cloud requires relatively little expenditure and ‘reduces 
traditional barriers such as raising capital funds, lengthy procurement procedures and 
human resource investment’.98 There is also the benefit of business agility, which 
																																																								
95 Ibid 1-2.  
96  Cloud Computing The Law Society UK <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-
services/advice/practice-notes/cloud-computing/>. 
97 Matthew Finnegan, Hogan Lovells 'Breaks the Mould' with Legal Sector Cloud HR Deployment 
Computer World UK <http://www.computerworlduk.com/cloud-computing/hogan-lovells-breaks-
mould-with-legal-sector-cloud-hr-deployment-3460572/>. 
98 Ibid 13.  
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removes requests from key stakeholders to design and specify new systems from the 
ground up.99 Finally, ‘the pay per use model of cloud computing can realise operational 
savings beyond the costs of the potential extra hardware requirement’.100  
 
In a law firm, each service model can be of assistance to benefit the business. 
Infrastructure as a Service bundles servers, storage and networks together to provide 
rental of a system, rather than ownership. This suits firms that want to control platforms 
and need to quickly change the specification cheaply and efficiently.101 A law firm 
could use this service to manage documents and gain storage that is accessible across 
all different departments.  
 
A Platform as a Service is ‘a complete set of software that enables the complete 
application development life cycle within a cloud’.102 Specialised applications are not 
as suitable to ‘PaaS’ and there is a lack of portability. However, a law firm may use 
‘PaaS’ to have greater control over the process of developing in house applications. 
Finally, Software as a Service – ‘SaaS’ - is the easiest way to incorporate cloud 
computing into a business..103 It is not just about prepackaged software, but also about 
customisation.  
 
As an example of technological programs used within law firms, a law firm based in 
Perth, Lavan Legal, currently deploys the program ‘NetDocuments’ 104  to enable 
																																																								
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid 14. 
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid 15.  
104  NetDocuments NetDocuments <http://www.netdocuments.com>. ‘NetDocuments is the leader in 
cloud-based document management. Since 1999, firms of all sizes have been reducing costs and 
increasing productivity with client, matter and project centric workspaces, enterprise search, built-in 
disaster recovery, and anytime, anywhere, any device access to their documents’. 
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lawyers to work away from the office and access email and documents anywhere, 
anytime.105  The main motivator of going to a SaaS system such as NetDocuments was 
that is was more secure than the individual lawyer installing a personal cloud such as 
Dropbox, which Lavan Legal’s IT director believes to be less secure than the 
alternative. By giving lawyers flexibility over their workload, there is more opportunity 
to work from home. NetDocuments can use any device, but Lavan Legal has a bring 
your own device policy in order to maintain security.106 Another program, Autonomy 
iManage,107 is a rival to NetDocuments, yet is used extensively in Australian law firms. 
NetDocuments as an SaaS provides greater integration of the cloud and the subscription 
cost is more attractive than the upfront costs of Autonomy iManage. There is also added 
security with NetDocuments. Even if the cloud supplier changes their business 
operation or closes, a local service carries copies of all documents in case of disaster. 
That also gives Lavan law the freedom to move to a different provider in the future if 
necessary.108 Although a one-sided account of these particular technologies, it provides 
an example of how cloud computing is integrated into legal practice.  
 
A cloud program comprises strings of code, written on a computer. It takes the form of 
a software program that may be accessed anywhere in the world with an internet 
connection. It stores computer files as dictated by the user. The effect of the cloud is 
																																																								
105  Adam Bender, Perth Law Firms Wards off Dropbox with SaaS Content Management System 
Computer World 
<http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/527014/perth_law_firm_wards_off_dropbox_saas_content
_management_system/>. 
106 Ibid.  
107  Legal Document Mobile Access and Legal Content Management HP Autonomy 
<http://www.autonomy.com/offerings/enterprise-content-management/legal-content-management>. 
This system is ‘a comprehensive content management solution that provides automated capabilities and 
intuitive information delivery to help mitigate risk and proactively collaborate on demand. Our solution 
helps law firms and corporate legal departments to improve productivity and enhance customer service 
by managing electronic content intuitively and conveniently’. Features include email management, 
secure collaboration, scalability, mobile access and advanced search. 
108 Ibid.  
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increased productivity, flexibility and sometimes profits if it is utilised by a company, 
rather than a home user who simply wants to backup their files. In the Heideggerian 
sense, each of these elements is mutually responsible for the cloud.109  
 
All the elements of the cloud result in the cloud being ‘brought-forth’. The essence is 
on its way to being revealed when its purpose is clarified. Yet the way the end user 
interacts with it starts to obfuscate and interfere with the true essence of the cloud. The 
fact that the cloud is left on stand by, constantly waiting for interaction, challenges the 
ordering.  When ordering is challenged, the nature of the cloud is not revealed in its 
truest form. In order for lawyers to use the cloud ethically, its purpose must be clear. 
A Ethics of the Cloud 
The main issue is that a cloud may take one to a jurisdiction that is foreign to the law 
firm’s home jurisdiction without one being aware of it. The cloud introduces competing 
places, sometimes without the user even realising it. When places compete, the ethics 
that are linked to one place similarly compete with one another.  
 
For many years, the acceptable method of storing clients’ details was on site with 
communication occurring face to face. Yet the cloud now allows client details to be 
stored in a server, often at an offshore location. This raises concerns relating to data 
security and privacy. Cloud computing is not explicitly referenced in professional 
codes, but guidance is provided in practice directions. The American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct instead refer to qualities such as competent 
representation, confidentiality and supervision obligations to consider when using a 
																																																								
109 Refer to Heidegger, above nn 9-14. 
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cloud service.110 The Commission on Ethics 20/20 called for the need of lawyers to 
understand and utilise technology in order to promote their client’s objectives – 
‘understanding relevant technology’s benefits and risks’ 111  is important as is 
‘reasonable care may call for the lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and 
potential risks’.112  
 
Lawyers must also consider the law of the country the cloud is in.113 In particular 
‘lawyer confidentiality obligations are complementary with privilege against 
compelled disclosure’, the two are ‘conceptually different nonetheless and therefore 
mutually independent’.114 These complementary obligations are fixed to a location. 
Place simply cannot be escaped. The lawyer is constantly compelled to consider the 
places around them.  
 
An increasing number of bar associations have issued guidance on use of the cloud and 
the ethical issues that come with it. The main feature of these opinions is the element 
of reasonable care.115 It may extend to the lawyer, who, ‘must ensure that the data in 
the server is protected by privacy laws that reasonably mirror those of the United States’ 
plus they recognise that ‘some data may be too important to risk inclusion in cloud 
																																																								
110 American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct  (at [2002]) rr 1.1, 1.6 and 5.3. 
111  Ethics 20/20 Committee, Introduction and Overview American Bar Association 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20121112_ethics_20_20_ov
erarching_report_final_with_disclaimer.authcheckdam.pdf> 8. 
112 New York State Bar Association Opinion 782 (December 8 2004). 
113 Louise Lark Hill, 'Cloud Nine or Cloud Nein? Cloud Computing and Its Impact on Lawyers' Ethical 
Obligations and Privileged Communications' (2013)  Journal of the Professional Lawyer 109, 124 
114 Eric Gippini-Fournier, 'Legal Professional Privilege in Competition Proceedings Before the European 
Commission: Beyond the Cursory Glance' (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 967. 
115 See below n 107 to review the wording of each opinion. E.g. The New Jersey Opinion 701 states that 
the ‘touchstone’ for reasonable care requires that ‘(1) the lawyer has entrusted such documents to an 
outside provider under circumstances in which there is an enforceable obligation to preserve 
confidentiality and security…’. 
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services’.116 The majority of outsourcing providers will utlise security measures such 
as firewalls and encryption as well as ensuring only authorised employees may access 
certain confidential information.117 Employers may also disable computer ports that 
would allow an employee to transfer data to a removable device to take outside the 
premises. 118  Interestingly, lawyers are still not completely invested in this new 
technology – suspicion still remains. Although the guidance is available, it may be 
difficult for the lawyer to gauge what constitutes reasonable behaviour without 
reference to place. The rules also assume a high level of control over technology. But 
when information is stored in the cloud, there are aspects that are beyond the lawyer’s 
control.  
 
Under evidence law, there is debate over whether video footage retains privilege if the 
material is not actually confidential, such as in the case of surveillance footage.119 If 
video as a technology is subject to these concerns, more advanced forms of technology 
that are used in the course of legal practice may be subject to similar doubts.  
 
B Cloud Policy 
A common theme in law firms’ privacy policies is a reference to data being stored by a 
third party. For example, Herbert Smith Freehills – a global firm centred in London - 
privacy policy currently states: 
 
																																																								
116 Pennsylvania Formal Ethics Opinion 2011-200 (2011), Alabama Bar Association Formal Opinion 
2010-02, California  Bar Association Opinion 2010-179, New Hampshire Bar Association Formal 
Opinion 2012-13/4, Ohio Bar Association Informal Advisory Opinion 2013-03, Oregon Bar Association 
Opinion 2011-188, Virginia Bar Association Legal Ethics Opinion 1872, Wisconsin Bar Association 
Formal Opinion EF-15-01. 
117 Ethics 20/20 Committee, above n 102, 12. 
118 Ibid Rule 4. 
119 Dal Pont above n 25, 376. 
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We take reasonable steps to hold information securely in electronic or physical form. 
We store information in access controlled premises or in electronic databases requiring 
logins and passwords. We require our third party data storage providers to comply with 
appropriate information security industry standards. All partners and staff and third 
party providers with access to confidential information are subject to confidentiality 
obligations. The data that we collect from you may be transferred to, and stored at, a 
destination outside the European Economic Area. It may also be processed by staff 
operating outside the European Economic Area who work for us or for one of our 
suppliers.120 
There are three elements to this type of policy. There is information stored in electronic 
form, third party data storage providers and confidentiality obligations. There is 
specific reference to ‘a destination outside the European Economic Area’ which allows 
free movement through some European Union member states and European Free Trade 
Association states.  This could raise questions of differing views on information 
privacy. Once information is outside the European Economic Area, legal control of the 
information potentially becomes more difficult. If the information leaves the European 
Economic Area, there are greater legal difficulties in enforcing a foreign judgment – 
and especially an injunction – than there would be when inside the European Economic 
Area. The Brussels I Regulation 121  and the Lugano Convention 122  allow for 
																																																								
120  Herbert Smith Freehills Privacy Policy Herbert Smith Freehills 
<http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/privacy-policy>. 
121 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
[2012] OJ L 351/1 (Brussels I Regulation). 
122  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters between EU, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, Lugano, 30 October 2007, [2009] 
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applications for registration of judgments in foreign jurisdictions. This leads to the law 
being able to be enforced freely with few constraints.123 
 
Data privacy laws around the word have recently been enacted or revised.124 ‘An 
examination of such initiatives shows a tendency toward wide extraterritorial 
jurisdictional claims – claims that directly impact upon U.S. businesses engaging in 
business activities overseas, such as through an online presence.125  
 
Data protection in the European Union is more formalised and rigorous compared to 
many other jurisdictions.126  The right to privacy is highly developed. Part of the data 
protection methods was a scheme devised between the European Union and the United 
States in 2000, designed to allow data to be transferred back and forth between 
jurisdictions. This scheme has been described as ‘the most comprehensive piece of 
modern data privacy legislation’.127 This scheme governed cloud computing since large 
companies such as Facebook, Amazon and Google could successfully utilise service 
providers in foreign jurisdictions to host their private customer data.128 However, it is 
not simply large online businesses that deal purely in electronic commerce. Any 
business with an online presence –  a law firm included – is now exposed to foreign 
law.129  
																																																								
123 For Australian legal practices, statute also dictates that certain data must be stored within the country. 
Whilst not immediately relevant to lawyers, health professionals need to store health records locally and 
the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) places conditions on the trans-border flow of personal information. 
124  Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, 'The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law - Its Theoretical 
Justification and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses' (2014) 50 Stanford Journal of International Law 
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127 Margaret G. Stewart, 'Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A report on Global 
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128 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (European Union Court of Justice, C-362/14, 
6 October 2015) [106]. 
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In a recent decision by the European Court of Justice, the Safe Harbour Scheme was 
rendered concluded to be invalid.130 This decision now creates a direct conflict of laws 
between the United States and Europe. In 2013, Max Schrems, an Austrian Law 
Student, lodged a complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner regarding his 
Facebook Data. Schrems requested that the Commissioner ‘exercise his statutory 
powers by prohibiting Facebook Ireland from transferring his personal data to the 
United States’.131 The Commissioner rejected Schrems’ complaint, stating that the Safe 
Harbour Scheme protected the data adequately. On appeal to the Irish High Court, the 
court questioned whether a national authority is bound by the Commissioner’s finding.  
 
The Court of Justice decided whether the Irish Commission had the effect of preventing 
a national supervisory authority from investigating the complain. The Court ultimately 
decides whether or not a Commission decision is valid. Once that was established, the 
Court decided whether the Safe Harbour Scheme was invalid. In the United States, the 
Safe Harbour Scheme not applicable to public authorities:  
 
National security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements’ have 
primacy over the safe harbor principles, primacy pursuant to which self-
certified United States organisation receiving personal data from the European 
Union are bound to disregard those principles without limitation where they 
conflict with those requirements and therefore prove incompatible with them.132  
 
																																																								
130 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (European Union Court of Justice, C-362/14, 
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131 Ibid [28]. 
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This indicates that the public authorities in the United States may interfere with the 
rights to privacy that the European Union guarantees. Specifically:  
 
Legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised 
basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life.133 
 
 
Part of the law dictates that personal data may only be transferred providing that 
‘adequate’ privacy protections are in place. In order to comply with EU Directive 
95/46/EC. The directive defines personal data as:  
 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person …; an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified directly, or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, psychological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.134  
 
As a result of this decision, regional authorities may now have the right to regulate the 
transfer of data between states. The Safe Harbour Scheme produced a single set of 
privacy standards relating to data transfer, however, the businesses in the United States 
that were subject to the scheme are now subject to regulator interpretation of their 
chosen privacy safeguards – if deemed insufficient, data transfer could be banned. 
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Ultimately, the issues raised in this case are symptomatic of the global nature of the 
Internet. The Internet is placeless, which makes it far harder to regulate. The issues 
arise when information gets transferred from one place to another. When the place is 
identified, the data can be best protected. So long as law firms continue to send data 
overseas, they will need to recognise the potential risks involved. The Safe Harbour 
decision sends a reminder to firms to remain vigilant when utiling technologies that 
sends client information across borders.  
 
C Government Access to Cloud Data 
 
Governments across the world require a level of access to online data in order to execute 
their national security policies and investigate allegations relating to serious offences 
such as cybercrime and terrorism. A government is not just limited to its own physical 
location when accessing cloud data, and may cross virtual borders in order to access 
the data they require. This is enabled by Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties.  
 
In the United States, the Patriot Act135 and the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act136 provide for access. ‘Companies can be forced to turn over data to the United 
States government, even without notice to the customer’.137 In Australia a judge may 
grant a search warrant or an ASIO computer access warrant, granted by a government 
minister. The police may also request a production notice. Similarly in the United 
Kingdom, a judge may grant a search and seizure warrant or the authorities may obtain 
																																																								
135  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
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137 James Ryan, 'The Uncertain Future: Privacy and Security in Cloud Computing' (2014) 54 Santa Clara 
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a disclosure order. No law forbids a cloud company from providing the information, 
yet corporations somehow have to secure their data.138 
 
Microsoft UK managing director Gordon Frazer stated that there was no guarantee that 
the private data from their European customers stored in EU-based data would not leave 
the European Union under any circumstances.139 For Microsoft, the circumstances in 
which it might have to disclose information held in the cloud include a demand made 
for its use that implicitly refers to the weaker ability to control disclosure of information 
once it passes outside the European Union or the European Economic Area. This 
includes a Patriot Act request. This admission triggered the Dutch government to ban 
US cloud providers from servicing government IT contracts.140 ‘The risk of access by 
US authorities to cloud data is realistic and should form an integral part in any decision 
making process to move data into the cloud’.141 Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows 
US authorities to send National Security Letters to US companies that have personal 
data stored in the EU. There is now nothing unique in governments having the ability 
to read information worldwide, but it completely circumvents EU or member state 
legislation.142  
 
Lawyers need to be aware of these levels of access owing to their increased use of 
technologies that cross borders, such as the cloud. Although it was always possible for 
																																																								
138 Jared A Harshbarger, 'Cloud Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building Trust with United 
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<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriot-act-can-obtain-data-in-europe-researchers-say/>. 
142  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), 107-56 USC (2001) s215. 
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a government to access privileged information, the fact that information is stored in the 
cloud makes it easier to access the material. The cloud alone poses the threat to 
privilege.  
 
V OUTSOURCING 
 
Outsourcing is increasingly becoming an invaluable tool for law firms that are under 
pressure to maximise their profits and billing time. Outsourcing and use of the cloud 
go hand in hand. Both provide a rapid exchange of information, with the cloud 
facilitating outsourcing. Outsourcing provides many benefits such as expediency and 
lowered costs, freeing up lawyers to engage in work that requires specialist legal 
knowledge, rather than administrative tasks.  Outsourcing originally referred to sending 
work to third parties within the home jurisdiction, but this practice eventually expanded 
to overseas outsourcing.143 Critics may view outsourcing as a means of exploitation, 
generating profit for large businesses at the expense of ‘second- and third-world 
workers’, as well as the works from whom the work is being outsourced.144 Although 
outsourcing is not merely a modern phenomenon, the advent of technologies such as 
the Internet and cloud computing has facilitated its substantial growth – it is currently 
a multi-billion dollar industry. 145  Other activities that an outsourcer may provide 
include litigation services (discovery and case management), intellectual property 
services, compliance services (regulatory and company policy review), services 
																																																								
143 Aaron R Harmon, 'The Ethics of Legal Process Outsourcing - Is the Practice of Law a Noble 
Profession, or is it Just Another Business?' (2008) 13(1) Journal of Technology Law and Policy 41, 48. 
144 Ibid 49. 
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procurement (contracts and service agreements), employment services and property 
services (purchase, lease or sale of physical property.146  
Prior to legal process outsourcing (LPO) - the main focus here - , there was business 
process outsourcing (BPO) and knowledge process outsourcing (KPO). 147  BPO 
focused primarily on generating high volume routine work that did not have a direct 
impact on revenue function.148 However, modern BPO relies on ‘solutions-oriented’ 
customer service, which has spawned KPO and LPO. Instead of providing simple 
clerical services, KPO requires outsourcing providers to use judgment and create 
solutions for their clients. 149  Legal services that are capable of being outsourced 
include, litigation support; transaction support; intellectual property services; legal 
research; corporate secretarial work, and administrative services.150  Each of these 
services has the potential to compromise client data security and breach confidentiality 
obligations. In order to do the work, identifying information has to be sent to the 
outsourcer. The place of the information changes rapidly.  
 
The vast potential of legal outsourcing is only one of the benefits. Outsourcing allows 
law firms to benefit financially, as well as improving response time to clients. Small 
organisations can also benefit by accessing support work for a lesser cost than 
employing someone at the home office. Some outsourcing providers can also provide 
																																																								
146 Mary Lacity, Leslie Willcocks and Andrew Burgess, The Rise of Legal Services Outsourcing: Risk 
and Opportunity (Bloomsbury, 2014) 97, 20. 
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24 hour around the clock service, which can be invaluable in litigation or cross-border 
transactions.151 
 
As there are positives, there are also negatives to outsourcing. The first issue is that 
information leaves the home jurisdiction and travels into a foreign one. Some matters 
and the data attached may not be able to lawfully leave the home jurisdiction.152 The 
second issue is quality control: a lack of process maturity and market structure. ‘IT 
departments have been able to define the work that they do in specific processes and 
frameworks… and whilst legal work can also be mapped into processes, this is currently 
the exception rather than the rule’.153 Whereas a traditionally outsourced arrangement 
consists of only a client and provider, the legal market introduced a third party, which 
is the law firm.154 The third issue relates to professional conduct. Ethical rules may not 
be observed and clients may not be aware their business is being taken off-shore. The 
likelihood of a conflict between clients is also heightened. Whilst many agree that the 
foundations of law will continue, some are questioning the ethical implications that 
come with a newer and more technologically indebted profession. ‘I am less confident, 
however, about the preservation of the “core professional values of the American Legal 
Profession” in this new world of technology-driven and globally construed practice’.155 
This is relevant to outsourcing because of the increased reliance on technology to 
facilitate this profession-changing working process. Now that information is being sent 
to other jurisdictions through the internet, the risks are heightened.  
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Ethical issues arise due to potential security breaches, confidentiality issues and the 
possibility that non lawyers will engage in legal work, or that legal work is being done 
without adequate supervision. ‘An attorney considering LPO should not be comforted 
and reassured by the knowledge that other outsourced businesses care about security 
too. The legal profession may have become progressively more corporate and 
automated, but an attorney still has a fiduciary relationship with her client that goes 
beyond the mere “business” of practising law.156 The fiduciary duty is what separates 
the legal profession from many other industries that currently utilise outsourcing 
services. Lawyers have to be sensitive to their heightened duty of confidentiality. Place 
once grounded most of the information lawyers received, as well as grounding lawyers 
themselves. There is a distinct loss of place when outsourcing is involved in the legal 
transaction. 
 
Law firms do not solely focus on foreign outsourcing. In Australia, there are currently 
moves to establish low-cost outsourcing centres in Australia. Elevate Services, an 
international outsourcing company, plan to establish a centre outside the capital 
cities.157 Extigent already have a centre in Rockingham, Western Australia, where 
paralegal work is conducted and legal work is sent to Cape Town. Elevate plan on 
sourcing similar regional locations in other states with the driving force being a growth 
in information that is too sensitive to send to India.158 The managing director of Elevate 
states that the outsourcing centres are not just about saving costs, but increasing 
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flexibility and possibly increasing quality.159 Owing to the difficulty of firing staff at 
law firms, outsourcing centres provide a business model where human capital can be 
increased or reduced according to fixed costs.  
 
This Australian drive mirrors a move by Herbert Smith Freehills (London) to create an 
outsourcing centre in Belfast, to capitalise on lower costs, while still maintaining 
quality and location. By doing so, Herbert Smith Freehills keep their information and 
data within the European Union. The firm offers discovery, due diligence and contract 
management through the Belfast office and, as a result, aims to benefit clients by saving 
them costs and keeping their work and information onshore.160 
 
A Outsourcing Overseas– Jurisdictional Issues 
 
One area of concern is the fact that most outsourcing providers are based in countries 
foreign to the principal source of information. This raises issues in relation to differing 
ethical standards, as well as issues with the country’s legal system itself. In India, there 
are three forms out legal outsourcing from the United States: in house Indian lawyers 
and paralegals hired for Indian subsidiaries of American companies; Indian lawyers and 
paralegals hired to do contract work for American firms, and third party vendors who 
provide the link between American firms and Indian workers.161 India is appealing as 
an outsourcing base owing to tax breaks for outsourcers, subsidies for the property and 
incentives from the Indian government. 162  However, India’s legal system is 
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‘backlogged’ and ‘unduly expensive’ and almost disconnected from the legal work that 
workers are completing.163 If a legal issue arose that needed to be heard in India, the 
backlog would make it highly inconvenient for the party in another jurisdiction.  
 
The Philippines also currently has an improving business environment, and the relative 
resilience of the economy means it is an attractive place for firms to base an outsourcing 
centre. It has a mixed civil and common law tradition originating from Spain and the 
United States. It is currently the third largest pool for information technology work in 
the Asia Pacific region, and this, coupled with some of the lowest business costs 
worldwide, means that it will most likely continue to grow as a favoured outsourcing 
destination. Similarly to India, there are incentive regimes available to encourage 
companies to outsource to the Philippines. 164 These benefits range from special income 
tax and income tax holiday incentives to exemptions from import duties and zero rated 
value-added tax. Companies may also claim deductions from taxable income for labour 
and training expenses.165 Thus, the differing jurisdictions also pose differing risks and 
benefits.  
 
B Problems with Overseas Outsourcing 
The minimum wage is something that differs greatly between the United States, United 
Kingdom, Australia, and some Asian counterparts. In India, the minimum wage is set 
by legislation, but there is little evidence that it is adhered to in some firms. In the 
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Philippines, a lawyer with three years post admission experience would earn the 
equivalent of approximately £10,000 - £15,000, whereas their London counterpart may 
earn £75,000 - £80,000.166 Also in India, there is a backlog of cases, with some in the 
lower courts amounting to over two million and in the state courts over 100,000.167 The 
Indian government accounts for approximately two thirds of the cases as most are 
criminal, but ‘often branches of the government are suing each other over contracts, 
land and other matters’.168 Civil litigation is painfully slow, and therefore adds costs if 
a firm or an individual wishes to sue for a breach of confidentiality. 
 
Studies have also shown that the written contractual agreements between the 
outsourcing provider and law firm are not as mature as they are in IT and business 
contracts for example.169 This is particularly evident in the area of pricing and Service 
Level Agreements (SLAs). The SLAs were ‘limited to the quality and/or timeliness of 
work and spot checks on client satisfaction’.170 Clients were generally satisfied with the 
outcomes.171  
 
Since the cloud industry is still in its relative infancy, standard contract terms between 
the law firm and the provider remain basic and often favour the cloud provider.172 In 
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order to accommodate compliance and validity within the user’s jurisdiction, six types 
of terms have been identified that require negotiation: 
 
1. Exclusion or limitation of liability and remedies, particularly regarding data integrity and 
disaster recovery; 
2. Service levels, including availability; 
3. Security and privacy, particularly regulatory issues under the European Union Data 
Protection Directive; 
4. Lock-in and exit, including term, termination rights, and return of data on exit; 
5. Providers ability to change service features unilaterally; and 
6. Intellectual property rights.173 
 
Points one, two and three are particularly pertinent to law firms as any issues that fall 
into those categories have a direct impact on their ethical standards. Equally, points one 
to three are affected by place. Data integrity, privacy and security is prone to greater 
compromise when place is removed. Service levels and availability of third parties may 
have an impact on the lawyer’s duty to provide a standard or service. Owing to the 
place of the service provider, the quality and availability cannot be ascertained 
immediately.  
 
It has been shown that cloud providers may be unwilling to negotiate owing to a lack 
of in-house legal resources. This drives providers to standard click-wrap online 
agreements – when terms have to be clicked through to be agreed, there is very little 
room for change.174 Some contractual terms could result in reduced control if the terms 
are not scrutinised. For example in the past, the Microsoft Office 365 ‘P’ Plan limited 
the quantity of emails that could be received in a 24 hour period.175 If this caused a 
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lawyer to miss a vital communication from a client, or was simply regarding a case file, 
the lawyer could be failing his duty to communicate effectively. 
 
Another issue arises when lawyers working on cloud contracts do not comprehend what 
a cloud actually is.176 ‘Many users’ lawyers’ approached cloud contracts as software 
licenses or technology acquisitions, rather than as contracts for services. Others treated 
them as classic information technology outsourcing, without taking proper account of 
cloud computing’s unique features’.177 As the lack of place is central to the cloud, it is 
aiding lawyers’ confusion. If appropriate terms are not sought and data privacy or 
regulatory issues arise, not only will the law firm suffer, the client will suffer too. 
 
 
VI ETHICAL APPROACHES TO CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Solicitors are rationally provided with guidance regarding outsourcing. Directives are 
often issued by law societies to help lawyers act ethically in situations involving 
outsourcing. Recommendations include incorporating a reference to outsourcing in the 
retainer agreement.178 A lawyer may also inform the client that they require express 
authority to outsource their information. Contained within the directive is a risk 
assessment checklist to alert lawyers to areas they need to consider when using an 
outsourcing provider.  These areas include conducting due diligence on the provider; 
checking that there is no conflict of interest; ensuring the client will benefit from the 
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agreement, and that their information will not be disclosed to third parties; and 
supervising the quality of the work.  
 
Codes may also be produced to outline conduct requirements that are ‘outcome-focused 
and risk-based’ to best serve clients.179 Further guidance is found within the guide and 
on their website in quick guide section. Confidentiality raises the most questions in 
ethical codes relating to outsourcing. A solicitor must keep their client’s affairs 
confidential and only outsource pertinent details if they have ensured that the 
outsourcing company will keep the information confidential.180 This will be achieved 
if an agreement is brokered between the two regarding confidentiality and ensured that 
the outsourcing company is aware of the sensitive nature of the information. There is 
also a burden of responsibility on the lawyer to ensure outsourcing does not affect the 
duty to provide legal services to the client with reasonable care, or outsource to 
someone not authorised to handle the information.  
 
Commissions have also been held to propose changes that encompass technology into 
professional practice conduct rules.181 Outsourcing is often a focus of the inquiry. 
Proposed rules relating to Nonlawyer Assistance were passed in the United States that 
required a lawyer to guarantee that the services rendered would be to the same standard 
as the lawyer’s, provided in a professional manner. 182  Guidance is provided by 
professional conduct rules relating to work carried out by non-lawyers. 183  The 
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managing lawyer has to take reasonable steps to ensure that the non-lawyer’s conduct 
is compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligation, 184  or, they must exercise 
reasonable supervision over all employees engaged in the provision of legal services.185 
 
The lawyer must also ensure that the people to whom they are outsourcing do not 
engage in the unauthorised practice of law. Some conduct rules do not specifically refer 
to outsourcing. However there are multiple sections that can relate to it, such as the 
duty to avoid conflict, and the duty to exercise supervision over all employees engaged 
in the legal work. 186 
 
There is also the ethical consideration that outsourcing basic discovery and document 
management is affecting junior lawyers who could start their careers learning these 
skills and providing a service. As other industries and professions have found, 
outsourcing necessarily removes employment opportunities away from the home 
jurisdiction. In the legal profession, junior lawyers are no longer witness to a wide 
variety of matters that require discovery, and this promotes specialisation instead of 
building a broad range of legal skills. Specialisation has already been a noted 
contributing factor to confidentiality breaches.187 In the global profession, it is also 
expected that lawyers must be business savvy, and take commercial repurcussions into 
consideration before providing legal advice. Since the place of the lawyer and the client 
are no longer grounded, it is possible that legal advice could be compromised because 
of the increasingly business oriented nature of the work lawyers engage in. 
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VII CONCLUSION 
 
Place is integral to maintaining confidences between the client and the lawyer. 
Technology, whilst contributing to the demise of place, is also facilitating potential 
confidentiality breaches through the use of cloud computing and outsourcing.  
 
Heidegger’s concept of revealing demonstrates how important it is to allow technology 
to assist with the lawyer’s Being. To reveal something is to demonstrate truth. And the 
truth and true essence of a thing contributes to the construction of place, which allows 
Dasein to exist in their place. They are not just being, but being there. Technology does 
not have to be a simple means to an end, but can be used to bring forth the true nature 
of being. Subsequently, technology can highlight and unconceal the world and place.  
 
Yet technologies such as cloud are always on standby, waiting for a command. When 
the cloud is standing reserve, one cannot properly unconceal it, which leads to one 
becoming standing reserve themselves. When Being is compromised by technology, it 
follows that place is similarly compromised. To ensure that place is not lost entirely, 
lawyers need to constantly question and evaluate to experience the essential unfolding 
of technology. This process of enframing will assist the lawyer to have the truth of their 
being-in-the-world revealed to them. 
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Confidentiality is at the core of legal practice.  It is sourced in contract,188 equity189 and 
professional rules. 190  Yet technology is facilitating breaches and not adequately 
protecting clients and their information from concurrent or consecutive representation. 
This can be explained by the fact that the client is becoming subject to multiple places, 
such as their lawyer’s place, the firm’s place and the place of the cloud provider or the 
outsourcer. By introducing competing places, the place of the individual is 
compromised. Thus, there is a chance that their confidential information is threatened. 
Law firms are growing in size, as is the size of their corporate clients. Global firms are 
challenged to maintain confidences when one branch may work for a client whose 
confidential information is already on file from a prior dispute. The multiple places of 
the firm and the lawyer conflict with the place of the client and, as such, ethical 
standards such as confidentiality are susceptible to challenges. 
 
To adhere to and maintain confidences, place needs to be recognised as a contributing 
factor to lawyers’ ethical development. For example, the test of reasonability cannot be 
fulfilled without first recognising the place of the reasonable person. Information 
barriers cannot be established without knowing the place of the information and the 
place of the client. Place quietly exists in the background of these transactions. Finally, 
place will assist in preserving confidences by grounding the lawyer and setting 
boundaries in place. Cloud computing and outsourcing pose a threat to this.  
 
In the next chapter, communication will be examined as an ethical concept in line with 
lawyer-lawyer and lawyer-client correspondence, law firm advertising and social media 
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use. Heideggerian thought will again help to demonstrate how communication is more 
effective and ethical when grounded in place. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LAWYER COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
‘All that with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail, and drive 
human beings’.1 
 
This chapter addresses communication theories and professional conduct rules relating 
to lawyer communication. Social media use within the profession is discussed as an 
example of how technological advances may challenge the place of the lawyer.  
 
The first part of this chapter will deal with medium theory, technological determinism 
and the social construction of technology. The legal profession is built on 
communication through various mediums. Technology helps to facilitate the work 
lawyers engage with on a daily basis, but the effect on ethics has not yet been examined 
in depth. The second part of this chapter will consider lawyer communication in 
practice and outline the ethical rules that regulate communication with the client and 
advertising of legal services.  
 
There are multiple theories that explain how technology develops or how the medium 
affects different workflows.  By adopting a Heideggerian position relying on place and 
Dasein, it is possible to identify a unifying thread that explains why modern technology 
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use and communication requires in-depth analysis. To effectively communicate with 
other lawyers and clients, there is a strong expectation of honesty on the part of the 
lawyer. A theory of place will be used to evaluate whether or not technology assists 
lawyers to reach this expectation.  
 
II COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIUM THEORIES 
 
In order to philosophically reflect on technology, the nature and meaning of how things 
are made and used need to be considered. There is often a tension between the hard 
engineering and technical aspect of each technology and the softer societal view found 
in the humanities. Debate exists between whether technology drives society and 
whether the opposite occurs.2 There is also a distinction between philosophers who see 
technology as a negative force that requires limitation and those who celebrate and 
propel free technology development and use. This is progressed further when the 
communication aspects of technology are considered rather than simply the practical 
and technical application of non-communicative wares.  
 
Heidegger did not actively contribute to a body of work relating to communication, but 
his work with technology can be built on and added to works of place to demonstrate 
the issues that technology use is bringing to the legal profession. While many 
technology and subsequent communication theories rest on Enlightenment or Romantic 
assumptions, Heideggerian thought  presents a contrast to those, and creates a new 
narrative that will best serve lawyers’ ethics.  
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Although only discussed briefly, Jacques Derrida’s contribution to thinking about 
communication has common ground with the broad nature of Heidegger’s theories, and 
how they may be applied to different areas of study.  
 
Building on Heidegger’s notion that all revealing involves a simultaneous concealing, 
Derrida proposes to deconstruct specific concepts, methods and disciplinary formations 
precisely to bring to light their hidden aspects, that on which they depend without 
knowing or acknowledging it.3  
 
‘Heidegger and Derrida thus revalidate the creative significance of metaphor – it is 
precisely a play with such irrational connections that facilitates advances in information 
technology designs’.4 The idea of metaphor constructs our understanding of social 
media and some technologies. For example the cloud is practically a series of codes 
and designs, but in order to package it, a metaphor – ‘cloud’ - is employed to help the 
consumer understand what they are using.5  
 
A Medium Theory 
 
Medium theory is concerned with each unique characteristic of different forms of 
communication. By examining how each medium is experienced and how it is used, it 
is possible to determine the social and psychological impact it has on the user.6 The 
																																																								
3 Carl Mitcham, 'Philosophy of Information Technology' in Luciano Floridi (ed), The Blackwell Guide 
to the Philosophy of Computing and Information (John Wiley and Sons, 2008) 327, 335. 
4 Ibid. 
5 CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT III CONFIDENTIALITY. 
6 Donald Ellis, 'Medium Theory' in Stephen W Littlejohn and Karen A Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory (SAGE Publications, 2009) 645. 
	 219
content of the media does not need to be factored into the analysis, as the nature and 
structure provide the best grounds for assessing the impact.7  
 
Medium theory is useful as it can be used to explain developments on individual as well 
as social levels.8 This is the first indicator that it will be useful in assisting Heidegger’s 
theories that relate to lawyers’ ethics and space and place. On an individual level, 
medium choice may influence the communication between people.9 For example, if a 
lawyer communicates with a client via email, that will be a different experience and 
activate different senses compared with talking to the client face to face, even if the 
content of the message is the same.  
 
On a social level, if social interaction is altered because of advances in technology, the 
social structure is changed. ‘The Internet has altered the speed, storage, and availability 
of information and created an information class including changed patterns of 
reading’. 10  This is relevant to the three aspects of place – history, location and 
community. Scholars have created a concept of media epistemology by integrating 
culture and history into the theory.11 Historically ‘all knowledge was based on sensory 
information and that the frequency and intensity of sensory stimulation determined the 
nature of knowledge and experience’.12 Interaction with the world around them is a 
common theme in phenomenology, which indicates that medium theory can help build 
place theory, especially the historical aspect of place theory.  
 
																																																								
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid 644-645. 
10 Ibid 645. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. This is a concept formulated by Marshall McLuhan.  
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History is divided into oral, print and electronic periods in medium theory, indicating 
how each affects the cultural structure. 13  ‘Orality is the first stage of human 
development’.14 As knowledge develops through direct experience, memory has to be 
the primary mechanism for storage. In oral culture change is slow and traditional. In 
the print culture, writing and printing influenced how information was distributed and 
how it was stored. ‘Print was a first step in splitting consciousness and alienating 
individuals from communities’.15 Both oral and print records can help to structure 
language in context. ‘Words and language are not wrapping in which things are packed 
for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things 
first come into being and are’.16 The language can only be conveyed through the 
medium, indicating its importance when assessing lawyers’ ethics whilst using 
technology.  
 
With the introduction of print and paper records, different characteristics emerged and 
this subsequently had an effect on society and the people who inhabited that society. 
‘Unlike the member of the oral culture, who is immersed in his or her group reality, the 
typographic person is more individualist and associated with rationality or step-by-step 
reasoning’.17  
 
The advent of electronic media has proved to instigate another societal shift, with an 
increase in speed of communication and volume of storage eliminating distance 
between people. ‘The Internet… and the applications of these technologies spawn 
																																																								
13 Ibid 645. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 646. 
16 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (R Manheim trans, Yale University Press, 1959) 
13. 
17 Ellis, above n 6, 646.  
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isolated senses of reality and assemble an organised bricolage, or interconnected set, of 
experience that constructs feelings, identifications, empathy and emotional response’.18  
 
A key theme emerging here is the place, or lack thereof, influencing people and society. 
By eliminating place, the Internet is altering people’s feelings and perception, which in 
turn is altering the Heideggerian notion of Being and being-there. Medium theory refers 
to this concept as ‘distant present’.19 Communication media have the power to provide 
an experience to an individual that is not local. Compared with the local and real time 
experiences felt in the oral tradition, the electronic tradition usually occurs across 
distance without any need for immediate contact. Where the literary tradition is 
‘associated with linguistic complexity, rationality and coherence’, the electronic 
medium emphasises ‘brevity, speed, titillation and visual impact’.20 Although society 
does not currently experience these things independently, by recognising the individual 
characteristics of each medium it is possible to assess how the electronic features can 
influence place.  
 
The abolition of distance between users means that activities are completed without the 
user knowing exactly how it occurs. For example, a lawyer may know how to use a 
cloud service, but they do not know exactly how the code to create the service was 
written. The social structure is thus reorganised.21 For example, a media created public 
occurs when everyone who watches a certain television program are categorised 
together. It is easy to categorise together lawyers who all use a certain software or who 
work on certain transactions. The category is based on their method of communicating, 
																																																								
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid 647. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
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which is subsequently linked to how they work.  New technologies remove and adjust 
the boundaries that once contained people.  
 
 Medium theory also recognises that modern media changes the values of the 
communication. For example, entertainment is often the sole motivation for television 
programs. ‘When a medium treats subject matter as entertaining, it changes the attitudes 
and meanings that audiences have for the subject matter’.22 By treating a serious subject 
such as news as entertainment, the viewer experiences a visually appealing, exciting 
moment which leads them to expect further stimulation when engaging in non visual 
communicative experiences.23 An important consequence of this insight is that, if a 
lawyer’s motivation is to be honest and ethical in the communication, it is best to look 
to the medium to determine whether it will help or hinder the lawyer’s aims.  
 
Media influences development through four processes. Information can revise issues, 
control records, modernise culture and influence democratisation. 24  Each of these 
information characteristics not only influences ethical development, but influences the 
place as well. Information contributes to the construction of place. For place to be 
grounded in location with a strong community and history, information needs to be 
exchanged between the place participants.  
 
 
B Technological Determinism 
 
																																																								
22 Ibid 648. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
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An alternative theory to medium theory is technological determinism. This dictates that 
technology is the main force driving the development of social structure and values.25 
Various versions of technological determinism exist, most commonly on the spectrum 
of soft or hard determinism. 26  Soft determinism holds that technology will drive 
societal change, but still bends and responds to relevant social pressure. By contrast, 
hard determinism sees any development of technology as a force independent from 
social force.27 Both enthusiastic and critical views gained from the Enlightenment 
helped to shape the movement.28 
 
Jacques Ellul made several claims that shaped technological determinism in The 
Technological Society29 and The Technological Order.30 ‘In the modern world, the 
most dangerous form of determinism is the technological phenomenon. It is not a 
question of getting rid of it, but, but an act of freedom, of transcending it’.31 Ellul 
conceded that he did not yet know how best to transcend technology.32 Similarly to 
Heidegger, Ellul stated that the first step to freedom is awareness. This parallels 
Heidegger’s notion of revealing and the essence of things being brought-forth. ‘If man 
were to say “These are not necessities; I am free because of technique or despite 
technique” this would prove that he is totally determined. However, by grasping the 
																																																								
25 Merritt Roe Smith, 'Technological Determinism In American Culture' in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo 
Marx (eds), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (MIT Press, 
1994) 2. 
26 Thomas J Misa, 'How Machines Make History and How Historians (and Others) Help Them to Do So' 
(1988) 13 Science, Technology and Human Values 308, 309. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Smith, above n 25, 3. 
29 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1967). 
30 Jacques Ellul, 'The Technological Order' (1962) 3 Technology and Culture 10.  
31 Ellul, above n 29, xxxiii. 
32 Ibid. 
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real nature of the technological phenomenon, and the extent to which it is robbing him 
of freedom, he confronts the blind mechanisms as a conscious being’.33  
 
Technological determinism is not useful in constructing place for two reasons. So far 
as the legal profession is concerned, the first is that by accepting technology as a driver 
of society, it removes the autonomy of the lawyer and their ability to make ethical 
decisions. The second is that lawyers and their work have driven the introduction of 
technology, rather than the alternative. The next section will outline why the social 
construction of technology is not useful either in constructing place and a new 
perspective on lawyers’ ethics.  
 
C Social Construction of Technology 
 
The social construction of technology (SCOT) dictates that human action shapes 
technology, rather than technology shaping human action. Social context is also 
important for determining how technology is used. SCOT can be used as a methodology 
when analysing the reason a technology succeeds or fails.  
 
There are two core stages of the SCOT methodology. The first is interpretive flexibility. 
By taking into account the fact that each technology may be interpreted differently by 
different social groups, new problems are generated and demand solutions. Closure is 
the next stage, representing how interpretive flexibility is stunted when the right 
technology suits the situation and appeases the group. Closure is achieved when the 
social group witnesses the problem being solved, or when the new problem is created.  
																																																								
33 Ibid. 
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SCOT and social constructivists have faced criticism for being a narrow and limited 
area of sociology. 34  There is no discussion of the consequences linked to the 
technologies, which eliminates the possibility of addressing the broader context around 
the technology and the users. Context is highly important in assessing lawyers’ ethics, 
which conflicts with SCOT.35 SCOT also focuses on the creators of the technology 
rather than the users and relies on the immediate problems within the social group over 
any long-term deeper social choices. Finally, there is no moral stance taken on 
alternative interpretations of technology. For these reasons, SCOT is not helpful in 
assisting to construct place. 
 
III LAWYER COMMUNICATION 
 
A Forming and Maintaining the Lawyer-Client Relationship 
 
The principles of neutrality and partisanship help in a broad sense to address the nature 
of the relationship between a lawyer and their client. The lawyer must advance the 
client’s case without judgment or personal opinion. This guarantees that they are not 
‘personally, legally, professionally or morally’ accountable for the client’s case.36  
 
																																																								
34 Wiebe E Bijker et al (eds), The Social Construction of Technology (MIT Press, 2012) 24-5. 
35 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS III VIRTUE ETHICS and IV ETHICS OF 
CARE. 
36 Andrew Boon, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales (Hart Publishing, 3rd ed, 
2014)177. See generally, Christine Parker, 'A Critical Morality For Lawyers: Four Approaches to 
Lawyers' Ethics' (2004) 30(1) Monash University Law Review 49. There is debate within legal ethics as 
to whether lawyers can pass judgment on client’s cases.  
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The retainer must specify authority to act.37 A lawyer must also ensure that their client 
has capacity to provide competent instruction and they follow it as such.38  Upon 
commencement of instruction from the client, the retainer should be prepared and will 
often determine the scope of the work.39 The scope of the retainer is also best clarified, 
to cover areas such as costs.40 
 
An area which may prove to be problematic for lawyers working with technology and 
attracting attention on social media is the creation of a retainer without much 
clarification of the terms of the retention, or whether a retainer has even been entered 
into.41 A retainer may be based on the conduct of both parties; a written agreement is 
not required. ‘A contractual relationship of solicitor and client will therefore be 
presumed if it is proved that the relationship of solicitor and client existed de facto 
between a solicitor and another person’.42 Furthermore, ‘the de-facto relationship of 
solicitor and client has to be a necessary and clear inference from the proved factor 
before a retainer will be presumed’.43 Whether or not a contract of retainer exists will 
be determined by reference to an objective test, rather than the mere beliefs of lawyer 
or client.44  
 
																																																								
37 Hawksford v Hawksford (2005) 191 FLR 173. [57] – [58].  
38 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012)rule 8.1. 
39 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1. 
40 Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) pt 5; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) div 3; Legal Profession 
Uniform Law 2015 (NSW) div 4; Solicitors Act 1974 (UK) c 47, s 57. 
41 See R v Williams [1999] QSC 185 for a discussion of the blurring of social and professional interaction. 
42 Pegrum v Fatharly (1996) 14 WAR 92, 95. See also Blyth v Fladgate [1891] 1 Ch 337, 355 ‘[it’s] 
existence may be inferred from the acts of the parties’. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Burke v LFOT Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1155 [85]. 
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Thus the questions whether any contract of retainer was made between the parties and, 
if it was, what were its terms, were to be determined according to an objective test, not 
according to what the parties themselves may have believed or intended.45 
 
The lawyer must also take reasonable steps to confirm the client’s identity before 
accepting instruction.46 There are terms that are implied between the lawyer and client 
at the creation of the retainer. Reasonable care and skill must be exercised by the 
lawyer, a requirement implied by both the law of contract and tort.47  
 
A solicitor exercising reasonable care and skill in the context of the retainer in this case 
would: (a) advise his clients on all matters relevant to his retainer, so far as may be 
reasonably necessary; (b) carry out his instructions by all proper means;(c) consult 
with his clients on all questions which do not fall within the express or implied 
discretion left to him;(d) keep his clients informed to such an extent as may be 
reasonably necessary;(e) carry out the defendants' instructions by all proper means 
within a reasonable time.48 
 
A lawyer should be explicit in outlining their duties.49 The relationship between the 
lawyer and client is not just protected at common law and under professional rules, as 
the provision of legal services may be subject to statutory regulation.50 The guarantees 
ensure that services must be rendered with due skill and care,51 that the services will be 
																																																								
45 Australian Broadcasting Commission v 14th Commonwealth Games (1980) 18 NSWLR 540, 550. 
46 Ford v Financial Services Authority [2012] 1 All ER 1238, [39]. 
47 Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, 580. 
48 Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Locel & Anor [2004] WASC 61, 56. 
49 Bridge Products Inc v Quantum Chamical Corporation 1990 WL 70857, 4-6. 
50 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2; s18. 
51 Ibid s 60. 
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fit for purpose,52 that the services will achieve a result made known to the supplier,53 
and that the services will be completed in reasonable time.54  
 
Technology may assist the lawyer to fulfill these statutory duties, however place needs 
to exist in order for the guarantees to be determined. Due skill and care, fit for purpose 
and achievable result are all based on an underlying notion of place.55 Each of these 
ethical duties relies on community standards, grounded in location and history in order 
to be fulfilled. 
 
If the lawyer fails to carry out the retainer, they may be liable under principles of 
contract and tort, as well as being exposed to discipline under the professional rules. In 
order to limit liability in regards to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, 
‘it is open to the defendant to make a bargain with the plaintiff to achieve that end’.56 
Although there are many reasons why a lawyer may fail to carry out a retainer, by 
maintaining a grounding in place, it is possible that the lawyer has greater potential to 
complete the work successfully because a clear relationship forms. 
 
It is prudent for a lawyer to always confirm the client’s instructions. This is an ongoing 
obligation.57 Lawyers also need to keep records and notes of all instructions received 
and matters communicated.58 The important factor is that communication must take 
place and be constant.  
																																																								
52 Ibid s 61 (1). 
53 Ibid s 61 (2). 
54 Ibid s 63. 
55 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS I INTRODUCTION. 
56 Astley v Austrust Ltd (1999) 197 CLR 1 [86]. 
57 Stephen Corones, Nigel Stobbs and Mark Thomas, Professional Responsibility and Legal Ethics in 
Queensland (Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2014) 197.  
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The level of communication required should be consistent with the client’s knowledge 
and sophistication.59  A complicated matter will also require more communication on 
the part of the lawyer, as will the severity of any possible legal consequences.60 A 
significant delay in communication, such as 15 months, or ignoring 42 different 
attempts at contact, will constitute professional misconduct.61 In order to fulfill the 
fiduciary duty owed to the clients, effective communication is necessary. In the United 
Kingdom, the Solicitors Regulation Authority Code of Conduct focuses on client care 
in the first chapter.62 In order to achieve set outcomes, it recommends communication 
levels are appropriate in terms of type and frequency.63 
 
In dealing with opponents, a lawyer must not make false statements and must correct 
any statements they discover to be false after they have been made.64 
 
B Privileged Communications 
 
The narrow concept of legal professional privilege applies to communication between 
the lawyer and the client. In chapter five, the concept of privilege was discussed in 
relation to confidentiality and evidence law,65 but it will be expanded in this section to 
deal with its significance as an incentive for open communication.  
 
																																																								
59 Legal Services Commissioner v Baker [2005] LPT 002 at [32]-[34] per Moynihan J. 
60 Corones, Stobbs and Thomas, above n 56, 200. 
61 Legal Services Commissioner v Williams [2005] LPT 008 per De Jersey CJ. 
62 Solicitors Regulation Authority Handbook 2011. 
63 Ibid IB(1.1). See also Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012) rr 
6-20. 
64 Ibid r 22.1-22.2. 
65 CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT III CONFIDENTIALITY. 
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Legal professional privilege is both ‘the oldest and best established privilege in our 
law’66 and ‘the highest privilege recognised by the court’67 as well as ‘a fundamental 
basis of the administration of justice which cannot be overridden by general statutory 
words’.68 It has existed in English law for over 400 years,69 and has a strong history in 
the United States.70 Legislation has codified privilege as a rule of evidence.71 Privilege 
belongs to the client, rather than the lawyer72 and in the case of in-house lawyers, 
privilege belongs to the employer. Whilst once an honour of the lawyer as a 
gentleman, 73  privilege is ‘a necessary corollary of fundamental, constitutional or 
human rights. 74  Two forms of privileged communication exist at common law in 
Australia. The first is to protect ‘from disclosure any oral or written statement or other 
material, which has been created solely for the purpose of advice’ and the second is ‘for 
the purpose of use in existing or anticipated litigation’.75 Compared with the United 
Kingdom, the scope of the law is fairly narrow, as it is enough that ‘the dominant 
purpose for coming into existence of the material is legal advice or litigation’.76  
 
The purpose of privilege is to encourage full and frank disclosure from clients and to 
foster a relationship of trust between the lawyer and client.77 As privilege is grounded 
																																																								
66 General Accident Assurance Co v Chrusz (2000) 180 DLR (4th) 241, 271. 
67 R v Claus (2000) 181 DLR (4th) 759, 767.  
68 General Mediterranean Holdings v Patel [1993] 3 All ER 673. 
69 See for example Berd v Lovelace [1576] EngR 9 and Dennis v Codrington [1579] EngR 24. 
70 Hunt v Blackburn (1888) 128 US 464, 470 and United States v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co 
(1915) 236 US 318, 336. 
71 See for example Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s121. 
72 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 85. 
73  Radin, 'The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client' (1928) 16 
California Law Review 487. 
74A.M & S Europe Ltd v Commission of The European Communities (1983) QB 941.  
75 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 85-86. See also, Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, 682. 
76 Waugh v British Railways Board (1980) AC 521. 
77 Bullivant v Attorney General (Vic) [1901] AC 196, 200-201. 
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in the public interest and public policy, there is no need for an explicit contractual clause 
required to ensure communications remain privileged.78  
 
Not all communication is protected by privilege. It is limited to confidential 
communications that arise out of the lawyer-client relationship.79  
 
However, within the lawyer-client relationship, it is important to note that legal 
professional privilege applies to communications, rather than simple documents.80 All 
different forms of communication such as ‘notes, drafts, charts, diagrams, photographs, 
spreadsheets and the like prepared by a client as a way of marshalling information to 
be the subject of confidential communication to her or his lawyers’ may be covered by 
privilege.81 As discussed in chapter six, the recording method of the communication 
required for privilege is broad, as oral, mechanical, electronic or video recordings will 
be accepted by the courts.82 Material that is not literally or manifestly a communication 
may still have privilege attached. For example, handwritten notes may be privileged, as 
well as file notes and draft statements.83  
 
In the Telstra Corporation Limited v Minister for Communications, Information 
Technology and the Arts (No 2), the Federal Court of Australia considered whether or 
not emails and draft documents prepared by in-house legal advisors were subject to 
legal professional privilege.84  Telstra claimed privilege based on the fact that the 
																																																								
78 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v West-Walker [1954] NZLR 191, 206 and 219. 
79 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132, 133. 
80 G E Dal Pont, Lawyers' Professional Responsibility (Thomson Reuters, 5th ed, 2013) 369. 
81 Ibid 369-370. 
82 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52, 85, 112. 
83 Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301 [71]-[89]. 
84 Telstra Corporation Limited v Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 
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documents were prepared by a Telstra legal adviser for the purpose of providing legal 
advice.85 Telstra did not provide any evidence which established the role of the legal 
advisors, nor did they present evidence as to the independent nature of the legal 
advice.86 
 
In my opinion an in-house lawyer will lack the requisite measure of independence if 
his or her advice is at risk of being compromised by virtue of the nature of his 
employment relationship with his employer. On the other hand, if the personal 
loyalties, duties and interests of the in-house lawyer do not influence the professional 
legal advice which he gives, the requirement for independence will be satisfied.87 
 
Ultimately the claim for legal professional privilege was rejected due to the nature of 
relief sought.88 However, based on this case, it may be harder for in-house lawyers to 
claim privilege, even though it is accepted that the communications can otherwise 
attract privilege. This case exemplified the ambiguity of place. The important factor is 
that of the independence of the legal advice, which may unfairly compromise place. 
The place of the in-house lawyer is closer to the client than that of a lawyer acting for 
a party outside of their office, city or jurisdiction.  
 
Lawyers no longer rely solely on hardcopies of files, with many embracing online 
document storage in the cloud.89 This indicates that there will be multiple copies of any 
																																																								
85 Ibid [11]. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid [35]. 
88 Ibid [46]. If information going to the ability of a person in the position of Telstra to make a decision 
whether to commence a proceeding in the Court against the Minister as a prospective respondent included 
information contained in documents which may otherwise enjoy legal professional privilege, it would 
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bare all of the information which it had, whether privileged or not. 
89 Cross reference chapter 4. 
	 233
one document available in cyberspace, be it in the cloud, or attached to an email, or 
stored on a hard drive in the office. Whether or not privilege attaches to a copy of a 
document in this form has been subject to judicial discussion. Copies of privileged 
documents remain privileged.90 In the case of non-privileged documents, if a copy is 
made and given to a lawyer for the purpose of giving legal advice, then it will become 
privileged.91 However, this does not change the status of the original document.92  
 
Whether or not communication is privileged also depends on the lawyer-client 
relationship. Communications between parties must be made in the context of the 
lawyer-client relationship.93 If a person acts as his or her own lawyer, then no privilege 
shall arise, as there is no professional relationship.94 If the relationship is yet to be 
formalised, such as with a retainer, so long as the communications meet all the 
requirements of privilege, privilege shall be recognised. 95  Since the basis of the 
relationship lies with the client’s perspective, if the client believes a relationship existed 
between themselves and the lawyer, then the protection will be afforded to the 
communications.96 In addition to the need for the client-lawyer relationship to exist, the 
communication must be made within the lawyer’s professional capacity and related to 
that relationship.97 This ensures that information that arises out of a social context or 
extra information that a client may volunteer to a lawyer is not covered by privilege. 
The communication occurs outside of the relationship.98 As social media blurs the lines 
in the lawyer-client relationship, lawyers need to be cautious of information they 
																																																								
90 Cole v Elders Finance & Investment Co Ltd [1993] 2 VR 356. 
91 Commissioner, Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, 509. 
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93 Rosenberg v Jaine [1983] NZLR 1, 8. 
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publish online. Although communications ‘in the course of seeking or receiving 
business, financial, or other clearly non-legal advice’ are not eligible for protection of 
privilege, as lawyers take on more of their client affairs, these sorts of communications 
become a murky area.99 It must be ascertained whether or not the basic advice related 
to the clients legal rights, liabilities, obligations or remedies. The matter at hand must 
also be assessed to ascertain whether or not it is a matter that would reasonably require 
the client to engage the special professional knowledge and skills of the lawyer.  
 
In assessing privilege, the focus is mostly on independence and competence. Admission 
to practise law is a sufficient condition to attracting privilege. If this was not the case, 
privilege could extend to all people providing legal advice, without satisfying all the 
necessary qualities of becoming a legal practitioner. In case law, people such as a 
legally trained accountant and an in-house counsel not admitted to practice have had 
privilege denied. Practising certificates may be used to contribute to the competence 
requirement, however the lack of a certificate should not automatically deny the scope 
of privilege.100  
 
However, by not holding a practising certificate, a person cannot necessarily be seen 
as independent or as necessarily acting in a legal professional capacity as a person who 
holds one, so as to give the quality of that person’s advice the description of “legal 
advice”. 101 
 
																																																								
99 Dal Pont, above n 79, 378. See also Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185, [38]. 
100 Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 235 ALR 127, [37]. 
101 Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 224 FLR 243 [20], [21]. 
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The distinction between lawyer and person providing legal advice may implicate people 
acting as lawyers on social media or lawyers with lapsed certificates providing advice 
on an account they considered personal.   
 
In the case of inadvertently disclosed material, professional conduct rules state that the 
lawyer must not use the material and return, destroy or delete the material upon 
becoming aware of the inadvertent disclosure.102 They must also notify the other lawyer 
or person who disclosed the information. 103  Similarly, they must notify opposing 
counsel immediately if they read confidential material and stop reading or engaging 
with the material. 104 
 
Lawyers mostly communicate through electronic media such as emails, and that has led 
to the issue of mining files for metadata.105 This allows lawyers to examine documents 
to see if there are prior changes to the document or to see if there is information which 
has since been deleted. The United States bar associations are divided on the issue from 
state to state, with some taking a more liberal approach than others.106 Further analysis 
of this issue will be found in chapter seven, however the ethical issue is that it may 
amount to a lawyer knowingly trying to acquire privileged material. There is a 
heightened potential for lawyers to inadvertently disclosure material and communicate 
																																																								
102 Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules (at June 2012) r 31.1; Federation of 
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104 Ibid. 
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inappropriately when place is compromised.107 Place provides a grounding for the 
lawyer. It is possible for lawyers to inadvertently disclosure material over email, as it 
is instantaneous. Similarly, the depth of information that is seemingly easy to acquire 
from an electronic document far exceeds the information stored in a physical document. 
The removal of place from electronic file storage is contributing to potential ethical 
breaches.   
 
IV SOCIAL MEDIA USE AND ADVERTISING 
 
To many young and future lawyers, using social media and reaching out to a global 
audience is second nature. Yet professional rules on the whole remain stagnant, not 
updating their terminology or rules to provide guidance. This lag is creating tension 
between lawyers and their ethics because there are many grey areas. For example, 
should lawyers ‘friend’ clients, lawyers or judges on social media? Does a ‘tweet’ 
constitute advertising? What if a lawyer inadvertently engages in legal practice in a 
foreign jurisdiction owing to the use of technology?  
 
As of March 2013, in Australia there were 11,489,600 Facebook users, 3,000,000 
Blogspot users, 2,167,849 Twitter users and 2,757,000 LinkedIn users.108 Each of these 
media forms requires user engagement ranging from low to high, but this engagement 
has yet to receive a definitive name.109 Some mooted terms include ‘user-generated 
content’, ‘participatory media’ and ‘web 2.0’.110 
																																																								
107 Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty 
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109 Michael Mandiberg (ed), The Social Media Reader (NYU Press, 2012) 2. 
110 Ibid. For further discussion, see text accompanying above nn 2-12. 
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In the United States, advertising and solicitation rules apply to posts made on social 
media.111 As social media is not usually just directed at one single person, but rather a 
group, or even the world at large, it may constitute ‘attorney advertising’.112 If the social 
media profile is purely personal, it will not be subject to advertising rules. However, 
where an account has multiple purposes, it will be prudent to assume advertising rules 
apply.113 If a social media post promotes the lawyer’s services, commonly recognised 
abbreviations of information that is required in lawyer’s advertisements may be used.114 
 
A lawyer must also constantly monitor their social media profile for comments and 
interaction with others to ensure ethical rules are complied with. 115  It is the 
responsibility of the lawyer to remove any content or request that the content be 
removed, if it does not comply with ethical rules.  
 
The New York Bar Association requires that, if a lawyer engages in ‘live’ or real-time 
‘computer-accessed communication’ (which include communications made via a blog, 
search engine, chat room or instant messenger), they must not solicit business via these 
means.116 A lawyer may respond to a request made to retain the lawyer, but this must 
be sent through non-public means and remain confidential. Emails and solicitation on 
a website will not be considered a real-time interaction.117 It is evident that professional 
guidelines have been adjusted in order to maintain the position that lawyers were 
																																																								
111  Social Media Ethics Guidelines of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of the New York 
Bar Association March 18 2014. 
112 Ibid Guideline 1. 
113 Ibid NYPRC 1.0, 7.1, 7.3. 
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subject to before the advent of technologies that facilitate online communication. Place 
is being preserved, without explicit recognition. 
 
 
 
 
 
A Social Media Use Personally 
 
Recently a law graduate pleaded guilty to engaging in legal practice when he was not 
entitled to and for wrongly representing himself as a lawyer.118 The graduate119 claimed 
he was a solicitor in his email signature and posted images of himself to social media 
accounts after he appeared on television news as a ‘lawyer’. He chose to use the 
hashtags ‘#lawyer, #younglawyer and #criminallawyers’ on Instagram. By doing so, he 
breached the state legal profession legislation.120 It was acknowledged that although 
these claims were made ‘for the benefit of [his] family’, the broad reach of social media 
meant it was impossible to contain those claims to their intended recipients. The lack 
of place that comes with social media use extended the reach of the claims. Although 
the magistrate suggested that the graduate was perhaps ‘mesmerised by eagerness at the 
prospect of joining the legal fraternity’, he had to pay a fine and costs to the regulator.121 
It should be noted that as part of the Magistrate’s reasoning, reference was specifically 
made to the graduate’s location and removal from his community. As the graduate was 
																																																								
118 Transcript of Proceedings, Legal Services Commission v Jacob Lazar Reichman (Magistrates Court 
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living away from home, he was viewed as ‘isolated from mature advice’ which ‘should 
be reflected in the penalty’. A lack of place not only contributed to the graduate’s 
unethical conduct, but was also indirectly revealed as contributing factor to the 
graduate’s ethical development.  
 
Social media gives users the ability to adjust privacy settings that can protect tweets or 
limit status updates to be delivered only to followers. This may give users a sense of 
privacy that is not traditionally afforded by the common law. In New York again, it has 
been held that, if Twitter is subpoenaed to provide user information and tweets, there 
will be no standing to quash the subpoena.122 In making their decisions, the court 
focused on the public nature of Twitter and compared the service and records to that of 
a bank.123 In New York it has also been held that the records belong to the bank, rather 
than becoming the property of the customer.124 In referring to the Twitter Terms of 
Service, which states that Twitter has a ‘worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license 
to copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute 
such Content in any and all media or distribution methods’, the court held that the terms 
lead to a lack of proprietary interest in one’s own tweets.125  
 
In relation to the question of privacy, the court found that the defendant had no right to 
privacy, but his assertion was ‘understandable but without merit’.126 Again relying on 
the Terms of Service, the court fixed on the fact that all tweets are made available to 
the world at large and are immediately viewable by others.127 
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While the Fourth Amendment provides protection for our physical homes, we do not have a 
physical “home” on the Internet.  What an Internet user simply has is a network account 
consisting of a block of computer storage that is owned by a network service provider.  As a 
user, we may think that storage space to be like a “virtual home,” and with that strong privacy 
protection similar to our physical homes.  However, that “home” is a block of ones and zeroes 
stored somewhere on someone’s computer.  As a consequence, some of our most private 
information is sent to third parties and held far away on remote network servers.  A Twitter user 
may think that the same “home” principle may be applied to their Twitter account. When in 
reality the user is sending information to the third party, Twitter.  
 
In coming to these conclusions, the court has distinguished between online and offline 
locations. Location is one of the key features that help to construct the idea and meaning 
of place. The court is actively acknowledging that the online world is without a place, 
and as such, different laws and rules will apply.  The idea that there is no place on the 
internet introduces all sorts of repercussions, such as Dasein being unable to fully 
recognise themselves. If there is no place, Dasein would experience being-in-the-world 
with concealment, which clouds their ability to make themselves available to the world 
and contribute to the world in a positive manner.  
 
It is imperative that lawyers protect privileged and confidential client information, 
which includes the identity of current and former clients. In the United States, formal 
opinion dictates that a lawyer must not post information about the client on a website 
without explicit consent.128 In the context of social media, where a lawyer may be 
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making comments about their day, the lawyer must be aware of inadvertently revealing 
identifying information that may occur in a photo, or a geo-tag.129  
 
The courts do not view blogging about clients favourably.130 For example, a lawyer 
who disclosed information about a former client who left negative reviews of the lawyer 
on consumer websites had their application for voluntary reprimand rejected in favour 
of a harsher penalty.131 Another lawyer was suspended from practice after implying on 
their personal blog that their client had committed perjury.132 The lawyer blogged about 
her thoughts and experiences and she did not think there was any risk of disclosing 
confidential information as she thought she adequately concealed her client’ identities. 
When the issue was brought to the lawyer’s attention, she removed all blog entries that 
related to her client. Although the lawyer ‘misunderstood her ethical obligations’ she 
was still suspended from practice for 60 days. Reciprocal discipline was invoked 
against this lawyer for the same misconduct. The borderless nature of the internet 
worked against the lawyer, as she was disciplined in multiple places.133 As place had 
been removed from her actions, it compromised her ethical behaviour and provided an 
easier avenue for her to exercise unethical beahviour. It appears as though the laws are 
not catching up to the new digital age. The disciplined lawyer was punished in place, 
even though her actions arose from engaging in distanceless-ness.  
 
When making its decision regarding blogging, one American court weighed up the 
obligations of confidentiality against the First Amendment right to free speech.134 By 
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adopting a two pronged approach, the court held that the Virginia Bar could not prohibit 
a lawyer from positing a blog providing that, first, the information did not relate to a 
closed case and, secondly, that the information was available on a public court 
record.135 If those two requirements are fulfilled, then a lawyer may go ahead and 
discuss the case like any other citizen. The two pronged approach opens the door to 
lawyers’ personal social media use, even if it has the potential to jeopardise their 
professional work. For example, in Texas, a lawyer posted an account of her highly 
enjoyable week of drinking and partying, yet asked the Judge for a continuance due to 
the death of her father. The Judge saw her Facebook posts and the continuance was not 
granted. 136  Again, the removal of place could have affected the lawyers’ ethical 
foundations by facilitating the unethical conduct. 
 
B Social Media Use Professionally 
 
A Perth lawyer has been struck off the roll of legal practitioners for setting up a 
misleading website.137 It was found by the Western Australian State Administrative 
Tribunal138 that the lawyer engaged in professional misconduct139 after ‘intentionally 
causing publication of a webpage that was likely to mislead and deceive persons using 
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it’.140 The webpage that was in question was designed to make users believe that they 
were dealing with the Legal Aid Commission of Western Australia directly, when in 
actual fact, their submission to the website would go to a lawyer who would then submit 
an application to Legal Aid on the person’s behalf. The lawyer also went so far as to 
falsely represent that a person had consulted him and submitted a request for legal aid 
with answers he had falsified himself.141 The misleading webpage contained Legal Aid 
logos, a document entitled ‘Legal Aid Application Form’ and the lawyer requested that 
the webpage developer exclude his email address from being visible on the page.142 
The Tribunal found that: 
 
The Practitioner had failed to treat a client fairly and to protect that client's interest, that 
he fell short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public 
is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent legal practitioner and that he acted 
recklessly and contrary to instructions from a third party in order to advance his own 
interests. 143 
 
The decision to strike off the lawyer rather than merely suspend him was based on 
reasoning from a Queensland disciplinary precedent: 
 
Striking off is of course reserved for the very serious cases where the character and 
conduct of the practitioner is seen to be inconsistent with the privileges of further 
practice. Suspension is a less serious result, firstly because a limited period is specified 
and secondly because the right to resume practice is then preserved without any further 
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onus upon the practitioner to prove that he or she is now a fit and proper person to 
practise.144 
 
A lawyer should not provide specific legal advice on social media as it may create a 
lawyer-client relationship. The advice may also publicly disclose information that 
would otherwise be protected by legal professional privilege.  
 
‘Friending’ peers and colleagues is a contentious issue that is an increasingly common 
issue that has divided ethical opinions in the United States. Being ‘friends’ on Facebook 
with other lawyers in the office could constitute workplace bullying should 
‘unfriending occur’. 145  Although the action was part of a wider bullying claim, 
‘unfriending’ was found to be unreasonable behaviour. For members of the judiciary, 
there are unique ethical constraints put upon their online activities in line with the Code 
of Judicial Conduct.146 Whereas some states, such as Tennessee147and Maryland148 
have adopted a similar stance to the American Bar Association to encourage judges to 
proceed with caution, states such as Massachusetts149 and Oklahoma150 place more 
stringent requirements on their members, stating that a judge should not friend a lawyer 
who may appear before them in litigation, but friending someone who is a lawyer who 
will not appear before them is acceptable. In regards to Twitter, a judge may hold an 
account that is not publicly accessible (an account that is private based on security 
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settings) and is ‘followable’ by anyone. Equally, they may have a manager to maintain 
their Twitter account also.151  
 
In the United States, the law is moving towards allowing counsel, before trial, to 
research jurors during voir dire. Some guidelines are in place, such as ensuring that 
parties cannot make unauthorsed contact with prospective jurors, ensuring that 
prospective jurors do not know that searches are being conducted on them and that if 
counsel finds information that impacts on the juror’s capacity to serve as a fit candidate, 
they must share that information with the court and opposing counsel.152 
 
Social media use is also relevant to litigation lawyers when jurors are involved and the 
‘explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous pressure on one of the 
most fundamental of American institutions – the impartial jury’.153 The effect of social 
media is also felt in the judicial system when juries may be influenced by online 
postings. Owing to a jury member’s Twitter use, United States Senator Vincent Fumo 
filed a motion for a new trial following his criminal convictions.154 ‘Juror 1’ had posted 
on Facebook and Twitter from jury selection through to verdict.155 On the night before 
the jury returned its verdict, ‘Juror 1’ realised the media had been following his online 
updates and were reporting on them.156 Fumo moved to disqualify the Juror. When 
questioned, he explained he ‘had not discussed the substance of the case with anyone’ 
and had made the comments ‘for my benefit to just get it out of my head, similar to a 
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blog posting or somebody journaling something’. 157  The court determined that, 
although these posts were in violation of the instructions to not discuss the case, the 
posts were ‘nothing more than harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect. They 
were so vague as to be virtually meaningless’.158  The motion was denied, with the court 
concluding that there was no substantial prejudice.159 
 
There is simply no plausible theory for how Fumo suffered any prejudice, let alone 
substantial prejudice, from Juror 1’s Facebook and Twitter commnets. Nor does Fumo 
provide a plausible theory for how the fact that other jurors may have learned of Juror 
1’s “vague” and “virtually meaningless” comments on Facebook could have led to 
substantial prejudice against him.160 
 
Although the court did not conclude that Juror 1’s behaviour prejudiced the trial, they 
acknowledged that jurors are cautioned against the use of social media and not using 
websites and blogs to research the case.161 They ‘must not talk to anyone about the 
case… you may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, 
through e-mail… or on Twitter, through any blog or website… or by way of any other 
social networking websites.’162 Going further, the court stated that ‘if anything, the risk 
of such prejudicial communication may be greater when a juror comments on a blog or 
social media website… given that the universe of individuals who are able to see and 
respond to a comment on Facebook or a blog is significantly larger’.163 The impact of 
place on the juror’s conduct is discretely recognised. The online nature of the 
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communication has created a greater risk of prejudicial conduct, since the juror’s place 
is no longer providing safe boundaries. It is noted that the ‘courts can no longer ignore 
the impact of social media on the judicial system, the cornerstone of which is trial by 
jury’.164 This must be recognised by reference to place as well. The abolition of distance 
caused by placeless-ness has created a new threat to the jury system. ‘The availability 
of the Internet and the abiding presence of social networking now dwarf the previously 
held concern that a juror may be exposed to a newspaper article or television 
program’.165  
 
Fumo is not an isolated case, with a juror in Arkansas tweeting consistently throughout 
a capital murder trial.166 The appellant argued that the circuit court erred in failing to 
dismiss the juror who continued to tweet, even after being questioned by the court.167 
The lower court did not see the tweet as a failure to follow instructions as it ‘was not a 
material breach of my instruction or of his oath’. 168  The specific instructions 
acknowledged that jurors could call home or call their workplaces, but not to ‘Twitter 
anybody about this case. That did happen down in Washington County and almost had 
a $15 million law verdict overthrown’.169 Arkansas Administrative Order No 6, was 
specifically amended and applied to the jurors, which stated clearly that electronic 
devices shall not be used in the courtroom.170 ‘The possibility for prejudice is too 
high’.171 Ultimately a new trial was ordered. In this instance, the court has inadvertently 
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recognised through case law and direction that the removal of place has created a 
heightened danger for prejudice.  
 
After a Kentucky trial, two jurors were found to be Facebook friends with the mother 
of the victim.172 On appeal the court deliberated as to who was a friend as opposed to a 
mere connection and noted that social networking sites do not carry the same weight as 
friendships between true friends or family members. The court found that alone, a 
Facebook friendship is not necessarily enough to render a juror unfit for duty. In the 
United Kingdom, a juror created a poll on her Facebook page so that her friends could 
vote on the defendant’s innocence or guilt. All of these instances of inappropriate 
communication were facilitated by the juror’s lack of place. They were able to cross 
boundaries and instantly connect with others which each had the potential to prejudice 
the trial. It has been suggested that the best way to combat this rising issue is to engage 
in ‘better practice for trial judges to be proactive in warning jurors about the risk 
attending their use of social media’.173 
 
C Advertising 
 
There has traditionally been a divide between those who believe advertising the legal 
profession cheapens the image and reduces law to a mere business and those who 
believe the public should be informed of their options when they consume legal 
services.174 In Australia, previously strict conditions on advertising have been loosened 
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to align with the minimum required by consumer protection law.175 Currently the 
Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules rule 36 states: 
 
A solicitor or principal of a law practice must ensure that any advertising, marketing, 
or promotion in connection with the solicitor or law practice is not: false; misleading 
or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive; offensive; or prohibited by law.176  
 
This also aligns with international codes that permit and regulate advertising. The 
British Bar Standards Board has permitted advertising since 1989 provided that it is in 
accordance with the standard advertising codes available. 177   The American Bar 
Association provides similar guidance and permits lawyers to advertise through 
electronic communication and public media.178  
 
Guidance from England and Wales states that a barrister should not ‘knowingly or 
recklessly publish advertising material which is inaccurate or likely to mislead… you 
should be particularly careful about making comparisons with other persons as these 
may often be regarded as misleading’.179 There is also a core duty to ‘not behave in a 
way which is likely to diminish the trust and confidence which the public places in you 
or in the profession’.180 Solicitors face similar duties in regards to ‘publicity’. Publicity 
must not be misleading and any reference to charges must be clearly expressed. 
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Prospective clients may not be approached unsolicited. One outcome that would pose 
difficult for social media is O(8.5):181 
 
Your letterhead, website and e-mails show the words “authorized and regulated by the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority” and either the firm’s registered name and number if it is an LLP or 
company or, if the firm is a partnership or sole practitioner, the name under which it is 
licensed/authorized by the SRA and the number allocated to it by the SRA. 
 
This section indicates that all communication needs to inform current and prospective 
clients of the law firm that the Solicitors Regulation Authority approves of the business. 
In Australia, there are various regulations regarding lawyers’ stationery that require the 
names and status of the partners and lawyers of the firm, though sometimes it may 
extend to practice managers, as long as their title is also specified.182 Correspondence 
needs to contain the name of the firm and the name of the lawyer, along with their status 
so as not to mislead. Although not contained in conduct rules, it is also unethical for a 
lawyer’s letterhead to be used for purposes unrelated to commercial practice.  For 
example, if a lawyer uses her law firm letterhead to send to a neighbour over a fence 
dispute, it may be held to be improper use and a means of intimidation.183 
 
To not specify that social media should be held to the same standard, its worth as a 
valuable advertising tool could be compromised. It is easier on social media for a 
lawyer to inadvertently develop a relationship with prospective clients as it is not 
practical to include the details required in O(8.5) in each tweet or status update. The 
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American Bar Association guidelines provide similar guidance, stating that ‘any 
communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name and office address of 
at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content’.184 This may be more 
applicable to social media since the social media account would clearly state the name 
of the firm – however it is often unclear as to who specifically is running the account. 
In the case of global law firms the account is more than likely managed by a marketing 
department rather than a lawyer.  Another impractical measure is prescribed by the 
American Bar Association in rule 7.3(c): 
 
Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting 
professional employment from anyone known to be in need of legal services in a 
particular matter shall include the words “Advertising Material” on the outside 
envelope, if any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic 
communication.185 
 
It has been noted that lawyer advertising rules are ‘overly restrictive’ and ‘incapable of 
compliance given today’s technology and sophisticated methods of marketing and 
advertising’.186 In 1977, the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of lawyers 
to advertise.187 The court found that barring lawyers from advertising was ‘highly 
paternalistic’ and kept the public in a state of ignorance.188 Following this, the Central 
Hudson standard was developed which uses a four-part analysis to balance First 
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Amendment rights with interests of professional standards.189 Many cases of lawyer 
advertising have been tested against the Central Hudson elements and have failed.190 
This leads some to conclude that ‘attorney advertising regulations are, in many cases, 
unconstitutional and unsustainable’.191 The lack of place is causing confusion and the 
law needs to adapt, to address the ethical issues that have arisen with the rise of the 
Internet. A trend has been to lean towards greater regulation, which can be ‘unduly 
restrictive’.192 
 
Lawyers no longer rely solely on print and television advertisements, with many now 
making use of social media and websites to get their message across. For example, 
global firms such as Linklaters, Herbert Smith Freehills and DLA Piper all have a 
sophisticated social media portfolio aimed at delivering their brand message. The global 
reach of the Internet is well suited to firms that operate in 30 countries with more than 
80 offices across them.193  A simple Google search of DLA Piper resulted in links to 
their website, Wikipedia entry, graduate portal, Google+ profile and LinkedIn profile. 
Once on the DLA Piper homepage, there is an instant link to the firm’s Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, SlideShare and WeChat accounts.194 Most 
pages have an ‘Add This’ +Share button installed, which allows website users to 
instantly share the page they are on with their social media followers. Alternatively, 
there is also an ‘email’ button, which opens the user’s email client and inserts the link 
of the page they are on into a new email.   
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On the bottom of each page is a footer which, among other things, simply states 
‘attorney advertising’. A cookie and privacy policy are alongside, with the cookie 
policy taking up over 1400 words.195 This covers the purpose of the cookies and 
instructs users how to remove cookies from their system if they withdraw their consent. 
The cookies fall into performance and targeting cookies to allow DLA Piper control 
over web analytics and error management.  
 
Because there is potential for a lawyer-client relationship to form online, DLA Piper 
requires a box to be ticked on the ‘contact us’ form before a contact request is submitted. 
This states: 
 
Use of this form does not create an attorney-client relationship and information 
transmitted will not necessarily be treated as privileged or confidential. Do not send us 
any information regarding any current or potential legal matters unless you have a 
written statement confirming our engagement by you as your legal counsel.196  
 
This disclaimer demonstrates that DLA Piper are aware of the hyper-connected world 
that Heidegger predicted,197 and are taking reasonable steps to mitigate the issues that 
have been discussed throughout this chapter. 
 
 
 
																																																								
195 Cookie Policy (2015) DLA Piper <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/australia/cookie-policy/>. 
196 Contact Us (2015) DLA Piper <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/australia/contactuspage/>.  
197 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESSIV THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON 
SPACE, PLACE AND COMMUNITY. 
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V CONCLUSION 
 
Place is central to communication. Communication always derives from a place. Yet 
each new and different medium of communication is contributing to the abolition of 
distance, by allowing people to cross borders instantly. In earlier chapters it has been 
established that place is required, not only to construct the identity of the lawyer as 
Dasein, but to ground ethical decision-making. Communication is central to lawyers’ 
jobs and is explicitly referred to in professional conduct rules as an ethical obligation.198  
 
Lawyers are increasingly relying on online communication and social media in their 
personal and professional lives. Engagement with technologies such as email, and 
social media such as Twitter, Facebook and blogging platforms can heighten the danger 
of disclosing privileged information and forming and maintaining the lawyer client 
relationship.  
 
As technology erodes place, yet increases communication, each specific medium must 
be addressed in order to assess how it will affect the lawyer’s ethics. Medium theory 
read in conjunction with Heideggerian philosophy assesses each medium in 
conjunction with place and concludes that lawyers must do the same in order to 
successfully adhere to their ethical duties. 
 
 
																																																								
198 For example see Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (at 
10 March 2016) rules 7.24-7.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
BRIDGES TO THEIR OWN ANSWERING: 
USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter addresses technological and ethical issues that may be found in relation to 
the adversary system. In doing so, the concept of place will be illuminated to 
demonstrate how integral it is in order for lawyers, judges and the courts to function 
successfully.  The role of the judge as well as the lawyer will be compared to establish 
how ethical frameworks are defined and conditioned by the role at hand. With a 
significant number of moral agents uniting in the place of the courtroom, the role of 
each and their interaction with technology will help to frame the importance and impact 
of place.  
 
The issues considered in this chapter include the nature of litigation, the role that judges 
and lawyers play in the legal system, the technology the courts and lawyers employ to 
effectively litigate and how the elements of place enhance the swift delivery of justice. 
Technology defines the significance of place, which also suggests that ethics cannot be 
considered as medium neutral. Technology is impacting and reducing place, which has 
been argued throughout to be a defining feature in constructing an ethical person.   
 
First, a background to dispute resolution will be provided to establish the basis on which 
lawyers’ and judges’ ethics are developed. Although the thesis so far has addressed 
	 256
lawyers’ ethics, judicial ethics will be introduced as a counterpoint to demonstrate the 
different responsibilities and attributes that are integral to the process. In order for 
litigation and dispute resolution to work effectively, all parties, such as the lawyer, the 
judge, witnesses and participants coming from different places must reconcile their 
backgrounds through place to achieve a just and ethical ordering.  
 
Secondly, the philosophical idea of impartiality will be considered, as judicial 
impartiality is the opposite but balancing notion to the partisanship ethic that is placed 
on the lawyer. Place may assist in constructing impartiality.  
 
Thirdly, electronic discovery will be addressed. Before taking a matter to trial, copious 
amounts of documents must be sifted and logged. The advent of electronic processing 
and electronic storage is placing added pressure on the system, as well as the lawyers 
involved, and often requiring external agents’ input. Their place is also disregarded in 
electronic discovery and technology seems to have the potential to disregard the 
importance of place.  
 
Finally, technology that is used inside and outside the courtroom will be studied. 
Technology use is vital to ensure that courts are efficiently run. In the courtroom, it is 
now possible to hold an eTrial and have witnesses video link their testimony from 
anywhere in the world.1 The location element of place is no longer a hindrance or 
disturbance to the process. There is a question, though, of whether this is a positive or 
																																																								
1  See for example Electronic Trials (eTrials) Queensland Courts (5 October 2012) The State of 
Queensland (Queensland Courts) <http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/information-for-lawyers/electronic-
trials-etrials>; Electronic Trials (2 July 2014) District Court of Western Australia 
<http://www.districtcourt.wa.gov.au/E/electronictrials.aspx?uid=7989-5270-7024-3843>; and 
eCourtroom Federal Law Homepage Federal Court of Australia 
<https://www.ecourtroom.fedcourt.gov.au/ecourtroom/default.aspx>.  
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negative development. Anecdotal evidence provides that judges remain reluctant to 
embrace technology, even when the courts at an official level appropriately adopt it.2 
There is great potential for new technologies to be integrated into courtrooms to 
produce a proper virtual court. With new generations of lawyers driving demand for 
technology, this will soon be a reality.  
 
The court setting provides clear examples of advantages and disadvantages that come 
from the erosions and disruption of place. There are also many questions of balance 
that arise. The democratic role of the court means that efficiency and cost-cutting 
considerations have to be balanced with the duty to provide a fair trial to accused 
persons that results in open and impartial justice.3 This chapter aims to balance the two 
views and determine the effect it has on lawyers’ and judges’ ethics relevant to the 
impartial administration of justice.   
 
II LITIGATION AND ETHICS 
 
The adversary system and litigation are central to the identity of the lawyer. 
Historically, lawyers shaped the justice system in common law jurisdictions and still 
																																																								
2 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren 'Embracing Technology: The Way Forward for the Courts'(Speech 
delivered at the 23rd Biennial Conference of District and County Court Judges, Langham Hotel 
Melbourne, 19 April 2015). See also, Martin Felsky, Facebook and Social Media Security Canadian 
Judicial Council <https://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/Facebook%20security%202014-01-
17%20E%20v1.pdf>; Martin Felsky, Model Wireless Networking Policy for Canadian Courts Canadian 
Judicial Council <https://www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/Model%20Wireless%20Networking%20Policy%20for%20Canadian%20Cou
rts%202014-0%20E%20v2.pdf>. 
3 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren 'Embracing Technology: The Way Forward for the Courts'(Speech 
delivered at the 23rd Biennial Conference of District and County Court Judges, Langham Hotel 
Melbourne, 19 April 2015). 
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need to preserve it in order to continue working to uphold an efficient and fair litigation 
system. This underpins a rights-based society.4  
 
The rise of alternative dispute resolution came from costly delays that were widespread 
in the litigation system.5 Alternative dispute resolution also resulted in a different set 
of ethics for lawyers.6  Legal aid cuts also stimulated the creation of a system that would 
reduce costs and processing times.  
 
Lawyers have a statutory duty to act in the interests of justice and to comply with 
professional conduct rules.7 A duty to the court was developed under the common law 
- prior to legislation - and maintained a separation of duties to the court and to the client. 
The court has inherent jurisdiction to ensure the proper administration of justice, in 
order to regulate lawyer behaviour.8 If there is a breach of duty to the court, the lawyer 
may be reported to the relevant regulatory body, a new trial may be ordered or costs 
may be ordered against the lawyer. 
 
The duty to the court affects every area of ethics. David Ipp suggests that English and 
Australian cases may be coherently categorised and organised into four areas. These 
are cases involving a duty of disclosure (and an advocate’s duty to the court), avoiding 
abuse of process, conducting the case expeditiously and avoiding the corruption of the 
																																																								
4 For a general discussion, see Richard S Markovits, 'Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the 
Corrective-Justice Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society' (2006) 2006(2) University of 
Illinois Law Review 243 and John B Attanasio, 'A Duty-Oriented Procedure in a Rights-Oriented Society' 
(1988) 63 Notre Dame Law Review 597. 
5 Wendy Faulkes, 'The Modern Development of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia' (1990) 1 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 61-63, 65. 
6  See for example Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 'Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of Professional 
Responsibility and Dispute Resolution' (2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 979 – 981. 
7 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 UK s28 (2A); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s125; Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (ACT) s115. 
8 Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282, 319. 
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administration of justice.9 This contributes to a person holding the right to have charges 
and processing brought in an expedient manner10 and the right to a fair and public 
hearing with adequate defence. 11  These rights come from a long history of the 
courtroom and judges being deeply seated in their place. This has remained 
unchallenged and unaffected with little to no outside influence for many years. The 
following sections will address the changes that have occurred as a result of the near 
obliteration of place and increase in virtual space that have the potential to influence 
lawyers’ ethics.  
 
A Lawyers’ Duties of Disclosure 
 
A lawyer’s duty to the court must prevail in all circumstances.12  This extends to 
document disclosure as far as ‘[it] cannot be too clearly understood that solicitors owe 
a duty to the court, as officers of the court to make sure, as far as possible, that no 
relevant documents have been omitted from their client’s list.’13 
 
In Australia, ‘The duty to the court is paramount and must be performed, even if the 
client gives instructions to the contrary’.14 This duty stems from the public interest.15 
In terms of competing interests, the courts give explicit instruction to value the court 
over the client. As such, the court’s place is more important than the client’s. However, 
this statement was revisited by the Australian High Court to clarify the nature of the 
																																																								
9 David Ipp, 'Lawyers' Duties to the Court' (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 63-65. 
10 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c42 art 5. 
11 Ibid art 6. 
12 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 [10-12]. 
13 Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 QB 55, 60. 
14 Giannerelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 556. 
15 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227. 
	 260
relationship between the duties: ‘The [above] matter assumes, wrongly, that the duties 
might conflict. They do not; the duty to the court is paramount’.16 An example of the 
way an advocate may act contrary to the client’s interests is in the situation that requires 
an advocate to inform the court of all legal authorities that relate to the case – even if 
they do not further the client’s case.17 Advocates leading the defence may, in practice, 
have a higher duty to the court, a duty that takes precedence over procedural rules of 
effective collaboration between the parties. If the client wishes to ‘delay, prevaricate or 
obscure the real issues in the trial’, the lawyer must prioritise the successful 
administration of justice over the client.18 
 
Each jurisdiction expresses the duty to the court differently. The Japanese code 
provides that ‘an attorney shall endeavor to realize a fair trial and proper procedure. An 
attorney shall not entice a witness into committing perjury or making a false statement, 
nor shall he or she submit false evidence’.19 In Canada, the professional code states 
‘The advocate’s duty …must always be discharged by fair and honourable means.. and 
in a manner consistent with the lawyer’s duty to treat the court with candour, fairness 
and respect’.20 In Singapore, the duty to the court prevails over the duty to the client, 
whenever the two are conflicted.21 
 
																																																								
16 D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1 [26]. 
17 Glebe Sugar Refining Company Limited v Trustees of Port and Harbours of Greenock (1921) 125 LT 
578, 579-81. 
18  Andrew Hall, 'Where Do the Advocates Stand When the Goal Posts Are Moved?' (2010) 14 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 107, 114. 
19 Japan Federation of Bar Associations The Code of Ethics for Practicing Attorneys (1990) Article 54. 
20 Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct (2009) 234.  
21 Then Khek Koon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 and Law Society of Singapore v 
Nor'ain Abu Bakar [2009] 1 SLR(R) 753. 
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The duty of the court includes ‘candour, honesty and fairness’.22 This duty may be 
breached by an advocate deceiving the court, 23  breaching rules concerned with 
discovery24 (or electronic discovery, as will be discussed later this chapter), as well as 
exposing the lawyer’s firm to liability.25 
 
If the duty to the court is breached, it may constitute unlawful conduct, but it may not 
be unethical – just as unethical conduct may not be unlawful.26 The duty is imposed by 
general law. The courts have a right and duty to uphold the standards of the court and 
to discipline advocates who act in such a way that defeats justice.27 And, we will see, 
technological developments are both assisting the court in upholding the lawyers’ duty 
and creating new threats to that duty. One area that is particularly relevant to litigation 
is electronic discovery.  
 
The courts are increasingly aware of changes in technology when it comes to 
discoverable material. ‘Since 2000 most key contemporaneous commercial documents 
are contained in Electronically Stored Information [“ESI”]  - today over 90% of 
communications are stored in that form – phone records, texts, email, bank records 
etc… The abundance of this ESI in cyberspace means that potential litigants, in 
particular organisations… need to anticipate having to give disclosure of specifically 
relevant electronic documentation and the means of doing so efficiently and 
effectively.28  
																																																								
22 The Queensland Law Society Inc v Wright [2001] QCA 58, 67.  See also New South Wales Bar 
Association v Livesey [1982] 2 NSWLR 231. 
23 Amalfitano v Rosenberg 533 F.3d 117, 126 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
24 Rock City Sound v Bashian & Farber  83 A.D.3d 685 (2d Dep't 2011). 
25 Scarborough v Napoli Kaiser and Bern 63 A.D.3d 1531 (4th Dep't 2009). 
26 Harrison v Tew [1990] 2 AC 523, 525. 
27 Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282, 319. 
28 Earles v Baclays Bank Plc [2009] EWHC 2500 (Mercantile) (08 October 2009) [21]. 
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B Judicial Ethics 
 
Traditional ethics cannot be considered without looking at the different agents and their 
different roles in a well organised system of justice. Both lawyers and judges feed into 
legal process and the successful administration of justice. A judge’s role is steeped in 
independence. 29  The judiciary remains independent from the legislature and the 
executive. ‘Judicial independence does not exist to serve the judiciary; nor to serve the 
interests of the other two branches of government. It exists to serve and protect not the 
governors but the governed’.30 Independence allows the judge to not only judge, but to 
protect. ‘There is a lack of awareness of the extent to which the peace and order of our 
society depend upon the maintenance of a strong and independent judiciary as the third 
arm of government’.31 In order to protect the public, judges require the protection of 
independence. ‘The protection that the Australian community enjoys from its judges is 
therefore the starting point of any discussion of fundamental changes to the system.’32 
 
However, this independence is also present in the administration of the role and is the 
basis of other qualities in a judge’s ethical framework. Independence assists the judge 
to exercise their power for the benefit of the community and to maintain the 
community’s trust.33 For example, a judge must remain impartial between disputing 
																																																								
29 James Thomas, Judicial Ethics in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2009) 303. 
30 The Hon Sir Gerard Brennan AC KBE, 'Judicial Independence' (Speech delivered at The Australian 
Judicial Conference, University House Australian National University, 2 November 1996). 
31 Ibid 
32 Thomas, above n 29, 303. 
33 Ibid 10. 
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parties, whereas a lawyer has an ethical duty to represent one party with zealous 
enthusiasm and marked partisanship. 34  A judge only maintains confidentiality of 
information that has not been publicly disclosed to the court, yet a lawyer must keep all 
information relating to the client confidential. Impartiality is the fundamental ethical 
priority for the judge,35 and loyalty is the fundamental ethical priority for the lawyer. 36 
 
Judicial ethics involves a balance of law and morality. Judges have recognised that the 
two are inextricably interwoven and must figure out how to identify community values 
whilst shaping the law.37 Judges form a particular group in the community that remains 
detached from other members of society.38 It is possible for judges to become too 
involved in society, when their impartiality comes from their detachment.39 Impartiality 
shapes the role of the judge, with independence of the judiciary reinforcing their 
impartiality.  As technological developments have resulted in a highly intrusive 
environment, the need for detachment becomes harder to achieve. ‘In the inter-
connected global community that we now inhabit, international values (as best as they 
can be defined) are an increasingly relevant consideration’.40 
 
																																																								
34 See generally, Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the 
Lawyer's Role (Ashgate Publishing 2009) and Monroe Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics (Lexis 
Nexis, 4th ed, 2010).  
35 For example United States Courts, Code of Conduct for United States Judges (at 20 March 2014) 
canon 3. 
36 See for example Cholmondeley v Lord Clinton (1815) 34 ER 515; Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software 
Pty Ltd (2001) 4 VR 501; and professional rules such as Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors 
Conduct Rules (at June 2012) r 4.1. 
37 See for example Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd [1996] 
4 All ER 769, 790. 
38 Thomas, above n 29, 9. 
39 However, it is necessary for judges to keep abreast of racial, sexual or religious bias, as evidenced by 
Equal Treatment Benchbooks available in various jurisdictions such as England and Australia.  
40 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'Judicial Ethics in the 21st Century' (Speech delivered at the Judicial 
College of Victoria Forum on Legal Ethics, Judicial College of Victoria, Melbourne, 11 February 2005) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/journals/VicJSchol/2005/2.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=%22judicial%20ethics
%22>. 
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But in the ultimate, judicial independence rests on the calibre and the character of the 
judges themselves. Judicial independence is not a quality that is picked up with the 
judicial gown or conferred by the judicial commission. It is a cast of mind that is a 
feature of personal character honed, however, by exposure to those judicial officers and 
professional colleagues who possess that quality and, on fortunately rare occasions, by 
reaction against some instance where independence has been compromised.41 
 
Their place has always been a contributing factor in developing ‘the calibre and the 
character’ of their judicial role. The process of applying place to the judge is twofold: 
first, in forming their character as a person, and secondly, by taking on a role that is 
steeped in history and has such strong standing in the community. By embracing the 
process, judges are developing the place of the judge further. By acknowledging that 
their role is for the good of the community and ‘service to humanity’, 42  judges 
strengthen the community aspect of place. This role relies on independence and 
impartiality to achieve the purpose of the role successfully.  
 
III PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF IMPARTIALITY 
 
In dissecting the meaning of judicial impartiality, the first distinction that must be made 
is that it is not automatically equivalent to moral impartiality. Even if the moral concept 
is referred to, often it will not be explicitly qualified and is assumed. An impartial action 
can occur that is entirely detached from morality. Obligations of impartiality are not 
removed from a judge’s ethical framework – impartiality feeds into the relevant ethics 
instead. Many other qualities that relate to the role of a judge are also structured around 
																																																								
41 The Hon Sir Gerard Brennan AC KBE, 'Judicial Independence' (Speech delivered at The Australian 
Judicial Conference, University House Australian National University, 2 November 1996). 
42 Thomas, above n 29, 11. 
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impartiality. ‘In other areas of jurisdiction involving the citizen and government, the 
impartial application of the rule of law demands independence of the judicial branch’.43 
Impartiality is informed by moral considerations.  
 
In order to be impartial a certain set of requirements must be ignored. In the case of a 
judge, the judge must make their decision based on the facts of the case and the law 
that applies. They cannot award judgment to a party whom they simply prefer based on 
a personal connection or mere preference of personal characteristics. It has been 
recognised that; ‘perhaps the independence that is most difficult for a judge to achieve 
is independence from those influences which unconsciously affect our attitudes to 
particular classes of people’.44 They also cannot rule in favour of a company they may 
have an interest in, or against a company they do not agree with. ‘Indeed, too vocal a 
judicial protest of impartiality may bespeak an overreaction to prejudice in one 
direction by forming prejudice in the other’.45 
 
Bernard Gert proposed that impartiality consists of a set of decisions made by an agent 
concentrating towards a certain group of people. He expressed this concept by holding 
that ‘‘A’ is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if A’s actions in 
respect R are not influenced at all by which member(s) of G benefit or are harmed by 
these actions’.46 So it is impossible to be impartial in a vacuum. That is how place 
enhances impartiality. If technology has brought an endless space with no defined 
boundaries, impartiality will be harder to achieve.  
																																																								
43 The Hon Sir Gerard Brennan AC KBE, 'Judicial Independence' (Speech delivered at The Australian 
Judicial Conference, University House Australian National University, 2 November 1996). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Bernard Gert, 'Moral Impartiality' (1995) XX Midwest Studies in Philosophy 102, 102. 
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As a general term, impartiality is ambiguous and can be viewed in a positive light. For 
example, one might treat everyone they meet with respect and remain impartial on the 
grounds of gender or social and economic background. The positivity may come from 
empathy and emotional response that is formed when the individual’s place is stable 
and secure. If the impartial agent does not come from this place, a place that can help 
to structure and develop positive traits, then the connotations may be negative and 
people may assume the impartial agent is insensitive or insincere. Place is highly 
important to constructing impartiality. 
 
If morality and impartiality and their respective views remain linked, it follows that 
partiality or partisanship may take some form of moral priority.47 It has already been 
mentioned, so far as the client is concerned, that loyalty is the virtue most important to 
the lawyer. They must be loyal to their client under no uncertain terms. In fact, they 
must show a partiality and partisanship that requires detachment for the lawyer-client 
relationship to work effectively.48 Detachment will allow a lawyer to better understand 
‘controversy’ as well as having a stronger interest in reducing it.49 Detachment is also 
necessary to facilitate the judicial process. ‘Through this combination of compassion 
and detachment a person engaged in deliberation comes as close to actually adopting 
the choices that confront him as the independence required for judgment will allow’.50  
Loyalty is specific to the lawyer’s role of a lawyer, just as impartiality is specific to the 
																																																								
47 This is assuming that the formal duty to the court is fulfilled first, as is the priority in common law 
jurisdictions. 
48 ‘In our view, the oral status of a person’s professional detachment from others in carrying out their 
role is importantly determined by whether their detachment serves the goal of their profession, and by 
the appropriateness of that professional goal itself’. Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, Virtue Ethics and 
Professional Roles (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 145. 
49 Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 1993) 98. 
50 Ibid 73. 
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judge’s role as a judge. To assume impartiality is the superior moral virtue is 
contradictory to the partial nature of the lawyer.  
 
In discussing judicial independence, the influences to which judges are exposed need 
to be considered. Technology is an emerging force on the judiciary. External influences 
are the easiest to analyse since ‘the nature and extent of any internal ‘judicial culture’ 
and its effect on individual members of the judiciary are difficult matters to identity or 
quantify’.51 Technologies that have resulted in paperless courtrooms and technologies 
that pose a threat to place will be discussed later in order to ascertain the effect on the 
judiciary and its ethics.  
 
IV TECHNOLOGY AND THE COURTS 
 
Over the past few decades, the courts have progressed to maintain a link with evolving 
technology. Technological evolution has reached the point whereby a paperless, as well 
as a virtual, court could become a reality. The question that needs to be asked is how 
the judiciary can best embrace these technologies ‘in a way which aligns with our 
democratic role in modern society, that ensures efficient and affordable access and 
observes the principles of natural and open justice’.52 The second question that needs 
to be asked is how paperless and virtual courts can maintain the closest connection to 
the traditional court, which is identified as a norm. Carefully constructed over centuries, 
the traditional, physical courtroom has been maintained as a contributor to justice, just 
																																																								
51 John M Williams, 'Judicial Independence in Australia' in Peter H Russell and David M O'Brien (eds), 
Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy (University of Virginia Press, 173, 181. 
52 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren 'Embracing Technology: The Way Forward for the Courts'(Speech 
delivered at the 23rd Biennial Conference of District and County Court Judges, Langham Hotel 
Melbourne, 19 April 2015). 
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like the judges and lawyers who work in them. Technology use may result in a more 
efficient or cost effective court, but it need not be at the expensive of the courtroom. 
The value of the courtroom in contributing to litigation should not be underestimated. 
‘Judicial ceremony has been understudied and underappreciated as a source of (or 
barrier to) the legitimacy of judicial institutions’.53 There are many benefits to studying 
courtroom ceremony, such as leading to improvements in ‘both judicial proceedings 
and alternative dispute resolution’.54 Symbols that are representative of the formal 
ceremony of the court have been identified as: 
 
 Distinctive architectural features of the building in which the court is housed; 
 Distinctive decorative elements of the courtroom; 
 Distinctive furniture arrangement in the courtroom, such as a raised “bench” from which 
the judge or judges preside; 
 Distinctive apparel customarily worn by the judge and advocates; 
 Distinctive forms of address used when speaking to the judge; and 
 Distinctive customary modes of deportment in the courtroom.55 
 
In certain studies, the location of the courtroom was said to be highly influential on the 
perception of justice – ‘courtrooms were perceived to be more dignified than both 
conference rooms and moot courtrooms… Moreover, those arguing in courtrooms 
perceived the judge to be more respectful’.56 This finding indicates that the increasingly 
virtual nature of the modern courtroom could potentially create profound changes in 
the way justice is delivered and received. Technology that interferes with this core 
element of place requires examination to ensure ethical development is not similarly 
changed. The community aspect of the architecture of the courtroom has also been 
																																																								
53  Oscar G Chase and Jonathan Thong, 'Judging Judges: The Effect of Courtroom Ceremony on 
Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-Related Factors' (2012) 24 Yale Journal of Law and 
Humanities 221. 
54 Ibid 223. 
55 Ibid 224-225. This particular study focused on the impact of location and judicial attire, as it was 
deemed impractical to study forms of addresses and deportment. 
56 Ibid 236. 
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identified, with the engagement of the community that comes with the building being 
the focus.57 This is the same engagement with the community that judges maintain in 
administering their duties.58 In discussing the Boston Federal Courthouse, Woodlock 
identifies the design as reinvigorating civil life.59 There is a shared sense of community 
undertaking embodied by the arches and each arch is the same size above each area of 
the courtroom – indicating that each arch is equal and comes together to form a circle 
which heightens the collaborative nature of the process. 60  Elaborating further, 
Woodlock states that ‘discerning the countenance of desires or needs case by case is 
not the stuff of metrics. It is the accommodation of diverse community sentiments’.61 
Thus, technology also poses a threat to the community of the court.  The design of the 
court is central to encouraging citizens in the community to ‘make claims on justice as 
well as to seek justice’.62 
 
 Most of the technology reduces the costs and time spent in court and other technologies 
(such as video links) grant access to justice in rural areas and facilitates cross-border 
litigation. 63  The virtual court is becoming a reality. What is currently remaining 
unprioritised in the literature is the fact that the courtroom itself arguably contributes 
to the quality of justice. The courtroom is a carefully designed place that affects the 
space that video technology exists in. Practice directions and rules currently seek to 
restrict space in order to keep the place in tact. The place of the courtroom is of utmost 
importance. A courtroom may be described as a large room, with bench, bar table, area 
																																																								
57 Douglas P Woodlock, 'Communities and the Courthouses They Deserve. And Vice Versa' (2012) 24 
Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 271, 278. 
58 See text accompanying above nn 29-42.  
59 Woodlock, above n 56, 279. 
60 Ibid 280. 
61 Ibid 281. 
62 Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtin, Representing Justice (Yale University Press, 2011) 377. 
63  Frederika De Wilde, 'Courtroom Technology in Australian Courts: An Exploration into its 
Availability, Use and Acceptance' (2006) 26 Queensland Lawyer 303, 311. 
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for spectators, jury box opening to jury room and a witness box among other things. 
Some areas like the witness box are elevated from the floor and the bench is elevated 
higher than the witness box.64  
 
The traditional courtroom, like the traditional court dress and the traditional rituals of 
the court, encourage people to understand they are in a different environment, and 
perhaps even may give some people a glimmer of recognition of the significance of the 
justice system to a democratic community.65 
 
As tradition and history are key factors that make up place, in order for the place of the 
courtroom to remain, tradition must continue to be observed. Technology must 
accommodate tradition, rather than the other way around. If not, it has the potential to 
dehumanise the processes it comes into contact with. Concerns have been raised 
regarding video sentencing and remote defendants. There is the potential for ‘less 
inhibited behaviour by remote defendants, fears judicial officers might be more 
disposed to impose harsher sentences and a perception that a sentence delivered in that 
fashion had less impact’.66 These issues are solely based on the fact that the physical 
environment of the courtroom is removed from the remote participant. The effect of 
these issues is that a less inhibited defendant may indulge in behaviour that is 
detrimental to the outcome of their case. The formality of the courtroom and the dignity 
and solemnity within which it operates are contributors to the final outcome. Care must 
be given to the place of the remote participant, in order to preserve the place of the 
courtroom. ‘The significant contribution of design to achieve effective remote 
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participation has been underestimated…when this space is split across multiple sites, 
more careful attention to the design of remote spaces is warranted’.67 
 
Although there are concerns regarding the place of the court, there are also many 
benefits to pursuing technology use in the courts by lawyers, the judiciary and the 
public. Primarily, technology can save time, increase access to justice in rural and 
regional areas, complement community expectations and actions and remain consistent 
with developments in fields such as forensic pathology and medical cases.68 
 
In Australia, there is a range of technologies available to enhance and facilitate the 
administration of justice. Litigants as well as lawyers benefit from these systems. 
Whilst the technology may be available to make drastic changes to the courtroom, ‘the 
uptake… has been slow and far from uniform’.69 
 
To follow the proceedings of one Australian court - before a civil or criminal 
proceeding begins, courtroom technology may be booked by a form available online, 
to be emailed back to the court.70 An example of the technology available for booking 
in the court includes: CTV for remove witness rooms, DVD player, Laptops (although 
counsel must provide their own laptop, VGA and audio socket connections), Document 
Camera, Video Link, Electronic Whiteboard, CD player, VHS player, Audio 
Conference facility, or an eTrial.71  
																																																								
67 Ibid 382. 
68 Chief Justice Marilyn Warren 'Embracing Technology: The Way Forward for the Courts'(Speech 
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69 Ibid. 
70  Court Technology Booking Form Supreme Court of Western Australia 
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Before a matter receives a hearing date, the parties and the court have the ability to 
decide if the hearing is to take the form of an eTrial.72 If it is agreed that technology is 
to be used, then all the relevant documents must be lodged and submitted. An eTrial 
typically involves ‘all exhibits and potential exhibits entered into the Court’s eTrial 
database’ which are then linked with the database to allow the presentation of 
documents in an electronic format.73 
 
eCourtroom is available in the Federal Court of Australia and is described as: 
 
 An online courtroom used by Judges and Registrars to assist with the management and 
hearing of some matters before the Federal Court of Australia… such matters include 
ex parte applications for substituted service in bankruptcy proceedings and application 
for examination summonses, however eCourtroom may also be used for the purpose of 
the giving of directions and other orders, in general Federal Law matters.74 
 
Rules and practice directions make reference to electronic devices. For example, the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (WA) provide for the lodgment of documents 
electronically. Documents may be scanned as a PDF and emailed to the relevant 
registry.75 
 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia has produced some of the most 
comprehensive guides to technology use in court and claims to have keenly embraced 
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new technologies. It references the use of electronic materials in trials and appeals in 
the consolidated practice directions.76 The court is able to support electronic litigation 
and can electronically format the material provided by parties into its own case book. 
Processes require all electronic material to be formatted the same way for consistency 
and ensure that all material presented is acceptable. Separate protocols exist for 
classification, naming and numbering issues.77 These allow for a seamless electronic 
search and locate facility. The document naming and numbering system must be used 
consistently throughout trials. 
 
In relation to discovery, directions may be made where the material will be used and 
sourced in electronic format.  
 
When a large discovery is to be given and it would be efficient to do all or part of this 
by an electronic exchange because a large quantity of documents is already 
electronically stored, including emails, webpages, word processing files, images, sound 
recordings, videos and databases. It is then timely to adopt a protocol for numbering of 
each party’s discoverable electronic documents.78 
 
There are three key areas of courtroom interaction that have changed and benefited 
from technological developments: evidence, communication and file management.79 
Evidence is increasingly interactive and can be documented as never before. Advances 
in communication have resulted in greater engagement in litigation, with different 
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locations and people converging in the place of the court. Files are often filed online 
without requiring a hardcopy, which has streamlined case management systems.  
 
Technology may also be used in the court to facilitate the presentation of evidence.80 
This may ‘enhance the quality of justice delivered by the Court and the efficiency with 
which the Court is able to do so’.81 Laptops may be connected to the audio visual system 
to present evidence, however a printed copy must still be provided to the Judge and 
other parties. 82  A request must be made to use the audio visual system via the 
‘Courtroom Technology Booking Form’ as discussed earlier83. A caveat of technology 
use is that ‘it is critical that proceedings are not disrupted or delayed due to incompatible 
systems and parties intending to present DVD, CD or VHS are to test their material’.84 
Technology has the potential to disrupt proceedings, yet the possible consequence is 
arguably outweighed by the improvement to the quality of justice. There is a danger, 
though, that place is also being disrupted in the process. As place is a significant source 
of the grounding from which lawyers and judges may build their ethical frameworks, 
courts must ensure that technology use resulting in expanded space is not outweighing 
the benefits that place brings.  
 
One practice that is now permissible and accepted during litigation is video and audio 
conferencing. Most Western Australian Supreme Courtrooms are equipped with these 
facilities.85 This sort of technology use is regulated by legislation such as the Evidence 
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Act 1906 (WA).86 Practice directions further state that the use of video link must ‘ensure 
that the dignity and solemnity of the court is maintained’.87 Once the court has directed 
that evidence may be taken or a submission may be received by audio or video link, 
booking procedures must be followed. Although video link is currently available in 
most courtrooms across Australia, its use is reserved for cases involving vulnerable 
witnesses, or those who cannot appear physically in court. 88  There are also 
disadvantages such as ‘clunky and sluggish’ behaviour at times, which results in 
decreased quality of communication.89 This can also affect the behaviour of the witness, 
who may not ‘fully comprehend the gravity of sworn evidence when removed from the 
formality of the courtroom’.90 The place of the courtroom not only provides a location 
for the proceedings, but the history that is created and maintained everyday by judges 
and lawyers contributes to the function and manner of the court. Any disruption to this 
decorum may negatively affect proceedings as well as the quality of justice.  
 
There are certain obligations on the applicant with regards to successful video linking. 
Only the witness may be in the video or audio link room, the quality of the video must 
be sufficient and easily seen and heard and the witness must be dressed appropriately 
as if they were in the courtroom giving evidence, all efforts are made to guarantee that 
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the venue of the video or audio link is seen to be an extension of the court.91  Although 
the location of the room may differ, its place, (which incorporates the location, 
community and history to create one single place) needs to simulate the place of the 
court in order for the judicial process to function successfully. Practice directions 
outline that the venue must maintain the dignity and solemnity of the court and as such 
will be treated as part of the court for this purpose. 92 By outwardly stating that dignity 
and solemnity must be maintained, practice directions anticipate the threat that a 
compromise to the place of the court will introduce differing values and behavioural 
norms to the courtroom.  
 
Video conferencing also applies to persons in custody as a way of reducing unnecessary 
or undesirable transport. 93  Video link appearances are preferable to appearing in 
person, unless the person is self-represented; the person is appearing for a sentence or 
trial; or an order has been made by a judicial officer of the court.94 In New South Wales 
and Victoria, instead of travelling through the State, judges may deal with some civil 
matters by going on ‘virtual circuit’.95  
 
A bridge between the physical and virtual court may come in the form of a distributed 
court. The isolation that is felt when participants appear solely by video link is replaced 
with every participant meeting in the same virtual space, which in turn is located on 
screens in the physical space. Participants are life sized, appearing in real time, in their 
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own designated places (for example, the judge’s screen appears on the bench) to 
facilitate the same open channels of communication.96  
 
An example of technology assisting to save time and preventing resource drain can be 
found in the Kilmore East Bushfire trial in Victoria, which occurred in 2013. In this 
case, Justice Forrest issued an edict banning folders and trolleys. 97  Judicial 
measurements have found that ‘a third of court time was saved due to the effective use 
of technology in the courtroom’.98 The trial was conducted in the new ‘mega-court’ on 
level three of the William Cooper Justice Centre in Melbourne.99 Principal Partner at 
Maurice Blackburn, Martin Hyde, acted for victims of the bushfire and stated that the 
court must become accustomed to available technology.100 The paperless court has 
resulted in faster proceedings as practitioners and judges can annotate documents on 
their computers and no paper is put to witnesses. Instead, an operator can zoom in on 
documents that appear on the screens in the building.101 The Supreme Court of Victoria 
has reported that ‘while many were initially sceptical about such a modern approach, it 
has proved to be an incredibly effective and reliable case-management tool, specially 
for a trial of such magnitude’.102 
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As has been stated, technology cannot be demonised, nor blindly relied upon.103 Thus, 
the fact that this example demonstrates positive results that can occur when technology 
is relied upon can be weighed up against the effect it has on place. It is evident that 
place was still recognised in this case. A new building was constructed, just so the 
technologies would have a place to reside. As long as that place is not entirely 
obliterated through technological advancement and the removal of all boundaries, it can 
apparently coexist with technology.  
 
A Electronic Devices in Court 
 
The use of electronic devices in the courtroom is a relatively new development. Practice 
directions in Australia now provide for electronic device use and restrictions. The 
directions will apply to any electronic device capable of ‘recording, transmitting or 
receiving information whether audio, visual or other data in any format (including but 
not limited to mobile phones, computers, tablets and cameras)’.104 Alternatively, other 
directions list that specific devices such as ‘smartphones, cellular phones, computers, 
laptops, tablets, notebooks, personal digital assistants, or other similar devices’.105 
Some restrictions have been relaxed for members of the media as they may use ‘live 
text-based communications such as mobile email, social media and Internet enabled 
laptops for court’.106  
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There is a distinction between textual media and audio visual media, as the latter is 
prohibited without leave of the presiding judge and applies inside the courtrooms and 
buildings.107 The location of the rooms and buildings is at the core of this practice 
direction. Once the person wishing to make the recording arrives at a different location, 
the rules adjust accordingly. The location element of place is constructing the practice 
direction. Courts want to preserve the traditional model of the court by constricting the 
intrusion of space. 
 
Devices that are disruptive are not to be used within the courtroom as the smooth and 
efficient operation of the court and the comfort and convenience to others takes 
priority.108 The court community and courtroom etiquette that developed over decades, 
if not centuries, prioritises its place over technology. Whilst technology is having the 
effect of disrupting the place of the courtroom, directions have been developed that 
maintain the place of the court, which in turn maintains and develops the court as an 
institution to achieve the goals of justice.  The interests of justice and the weighting of 
the open justice principle are the primary reasons for limiting device use or imposing 
certain conditions on devices.   
 
B Electronic Discovery 
 
Novus Law is an example of a company that has been formed to deal with the volume 
of documents that require management in modern litigation.109 Novus state in their 
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advertising material that they can bring ‘world-class processes’ and ‘technology skills’ 
that they utilised at professional services firms to the legal profession in order to create 
benefits ‘no one had imagined possible’.110 There are more programs available that 
range from simple document management, 111  to advanced client and matter 
management, financial management and risk management platforms.112 Each sell the 
idea that the practice of law is different today and advertise that technology is changing, 
billing is becoming more complex and pressure is building on firms to increase their 
performance.113 
 
Novus advertise that they subscribe to ‘stringent global security standards and business 
practices’ and they comply with international security standards set forth by the 
International Organisation for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission. ISO 27001:2013, or ‘Information technology – security techniques – 
information security management systems – Requirements’. These standards provide 
for organisational management, information security leadership, how to plan and 
support information security and risk assessment and reviewing performance.114  
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Novus also claim to comply with the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and they follow guidelines set by the National Fire Protection 
Association to ensure that data is protected in case of emergency or natural disaster.115 
Compliance with these bodies is an apparent demonstration of commitment to data 
security, but there is an argument that there needs to be a more prominent recognition 
of place.  
 
It has already been established that place encompasses location, community and 
history.116 These are the three elements that contribute towards developing a sound 
ethical framework. By recognising and respecting boundaries, the people within those 
boundaries and the history created by the people and location, ethics can exist as the 
Dasein exists. If there is no place, there can be no ethics. Professional services firms 
may need to consider the obliteration of place caused by technologies powered by the 
Internet such as cloud computing and online communication in order to deal with the 
issues technology shall bring to ethics.  
 
 
C Electronic Discovery in Practice 
 
The United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that ‘Parties may obtain 
discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense – including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location 
of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons who 
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know of any discoverable matter.117 This open ended approach to discovery also results 
in negative effects, especially in regards to expense. ‘The expense involved in discovery 
can be horrendous’.118 
 
Although electronic discovery is now covered by rules relating to discovery, the 
difference between discovery and electronic discovery and the issue of proportionality 
still must be addressed to demonstrate the ethical issues it can pose and how place can 
assist in rectifying those issues. On the balance of convenience, electronic discovery 
allows more documents to be found; yet it is creating mega files that the courts need to 
have sifted in order to find relevant information.  
 
The differences between paper and electronic records may appear to be minimal, 
however the courts have recognised (since the 1990s) unique differences. ‘Simply put, 
electronic communications are rarely identical to their paper counterparts; they are 
records unique and distinct from printed versions of the same record’. 119  Hidden 
information known as metadata or embedded data does not exist in paper records. It is 
impossible to tell when a paper record was created, by whom and with how many 
revisions. A letter will only make the most obvious information available, such as the 
content and whom the letter is between. An electronic word document also contains 
information such as who has viewed the document, who has edited the document, time 
and date stamps indicating when revisions or changes were made and in some instances, 
the metadata will record what those changes were. Often a file can have hundreds of 
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different pieces of metadata.120 Although the specific term ‘metadata’ is not recognised 
in United States Federal Rules, it is still subject to general rules of discovery.121  
 
Questions relating to the history of the document no longer have to be answered by a 
witness statement that must be deemed credible. The document may exist as its own 
witness, often providing indisputable facts. The nature of cross-examination has 
changed due to this advance in technology as the electronic documents are used to 
substantiate claims of falsified evidence or to demonstrate an individual’s 
understanding and awareness of the existence of the file. Intent in contract disputes can 
also be established based on draft versions of the agreement.122  
 
Another difference between a paper record and an electronic record is the ability or lack 
thereof to completely dispose of the document. Whilst easily editable, it is almost 
impossible to delete the existence of an electronic document entirely. There are many 
different software packages on the market that can retrieve deleted files and obtain the 
residual data left over from documents being deleted or being rewritten. Compared with 
a paper document that can be shredded, an electronic document may never be entirely 
lost. Courts have observed that files have the capability of being recovered, even if the 
computer or the computer user is oblivious to the file’s existence.123 
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A final point on the difference between paper and electronic discovery is the twofold 
issue of file management. By using a computer or computer program in the quest for 
discovery, it is easier to trawl through seemingly endless repositories of information. 
For example, there are approximately four billion worldwide email accounts with 
business email accounts accounting for one billion.124 By the end of 2017, it is predicted 
that businesses will send and receive over 132 billion emails.125 What once may have 
been a simple quest to discover a few files in the office can easily turn into a mammoth 
production requiring thousands of emails and documents to be considered. 
 
Once the information is obtained it can easily be managed and categorised. However, 
the sheer volume of information can be a burden in regards to the time it takes to find 
relevant information as well as the cost of finding the relevant information.126 This is a 
widespread problem, not just isolated to one jurisdiction.127 Either advanced software, 
forensic experts, or consultants who specialise in electronic discovery need to be 
retained in order to complete the job to the highest standard.  
 
Because of an electronic document’s capacity to store ‘hidden’ information as 
mentioned above, concerns may arise when a party discloses a document without being 
wholly aware of the information contained within. If raw computer data is produced, it 
is difficult to censor information that may relate to client privilege or protected 
information such as trade secrets. In order to combat this, some courts have 
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recommended a two-step approach which involves the computer or discovery expert 
duplicating the document, then providing it to the lawyers who can then remove and 
redact any privileged information. 128  Another protection method is to have an 
agreement between parties that any unintentional disclosure of information may be 
recalled at a later date.  
 
Laws have also been adjusted to compel public companies, corporate counsel and 
accounting professionals to retain documents for records and to consider the impact of 
electronic evidence.129 If an individual destroys documents, criminal penalties may be 
suffered and if a party to litigation does not allow discovery requests to be investigated, 
a judgment may be lost.130 If information has failed to be protected, even if it is 
unintentional, a court may recommend action be taken to determine whether or not lost 
data may be retrieved.131  
 
Electronically Stored Information (ESI) describes data such as emails, digital images 
and metadata.  Just as there is a question of proportionality when discovering 
information, a similar question exists in the duty to preserve documents and retain 
information. The courts recognise the burden ESI places upon large institutions that are 
routinely litigating, thus the duty usually only extends to relevant or potentially relevant 
material. The balance must be struck between the reality of litigation being an ever-
present reality with the ‘legitimate business interest of eliminating unnecessary 
documents and data’.132 Otherwise the material need only be retained for business 
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purposes.133 If ‘destruction or material alteration’ or ‘failure to preserve property’ in 
‘pending or reasonably forseeable litigation’ occurs, this is referred to as ‘spoilation’.134 
Courts have been consistent in demonstrating that the duty to preserve will apply to all 
forms of ESI.135  
 
Emails and memoranda stored online can provide pivotal evidence in a case. Heard 
over ten years ago, the case of State v Marsh & McLennan136  involved the New York 
Attorney General and leading insurance broker Marsh & McLennan Inc. Spitzer alleged 
that the firm solicited rigged bids for insurance contracts and recommended insurers 
that were inappropriate for certain clients because there were lucrative payoff 
agreements in place.  
 
Munich-American Risk Partners entered into contingent commission agreements with 
Marsh and disclosed the existence of the agreement to a significant client. This was 
done to explain the commissions being passed onto the client. Upon hearing this, a 
Munich senior vice-president sent an email to Marsh stating that it was inappropriate 
behaviour and that all documentation electronic or otherwise alluding to the contingent 
commission agreements would be eliminated.137 Another email from a Marsh executive 
specifically stated that their business needed to be placed with those that paid the most 
to the executives. Other emails were similarly incriminating referring to sales targets 
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being met by ‘fatter contingent commission agreements’ and quotes and premiums 
being artificially increased to secure the bid.  
 
Although the invention of email did not solely facilitate the fraud and dishonesty, it 
provided a clean and easily discoverable record of the deceit. Had the space the 
executives were operating in not been so vast, place may have been able to ground their 
ethics personally, but also provide an environment where such deceit may not occur.  
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission considered how the discovery process in civil 
litigation could be improved and ensure that costs of discovery are proportionate to the 
exchange of information and issues to be resolved. This report focused on discovery in 
the Federal Court of Australia. In an earlier report, the ALRC noted ‘in almost all 
studies of litigation, discovery is singled out as the procedure most open to abuse, the 
most costly and the most in need of court supervision and control’.138 
 
As discovery is often the most expensive step in litigation, it has the potential to price 
litigants out of the court system.139 There are no agreed figures of discovery costs and 
there is no data available to suggest the average cost of discovery. A survey undertaken 
in 1998-1999 suggests that the cost can be anywhere from $500-$750,000.  
 
Advances in technology have increased the material available to be discovered which 
in turn increases the cost of discovery. Practice notes have been updated in order to 
address this. 140  Because of the intricate nature of computer forensics, the cost of 
																																																								
138 Australian Law Reform Commission, Discovery in Federal Courts, Discussion Paper 2, 3.50. 
139 Ibid 3.53. 
140 Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM no 6 - Electronic Technology in Litigation, 1 August 
2011. 
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electronic discovery increases because specialists are often hired to ensure that all data 
is recovered.141 ‘The ALRC heard during initial consultations that the discovery of 
information stored on old back-up tapes can require the reconstruction of outmoded 
hardware at great expense in order to read the tapes only to discover completely 
irrelevant information’.142 
 
The issue of increased information unearthed during discovery was addressed in Betfair 
v Racing New South Wales.143 The electronic records of 2.52 million customers were 
held by the company, which occupied over 21 terabytes of memory.144 Each terabyte 
was agreed to be the equivalent of 500 million hard copy pages.  
 
Often, litigation settles before trial although the discovery process has still taken place. 
Judges remain concerned with the disproportionate balance between documents that are 
simply discovered and those documents that are relied upon by counsel and are referred 
to by the litigating parties.145 The value of such deep discovery may be linked to place. 
The place of the documents is integral to deciding what is to be discovered and what is 
not. The court has set standards of reasonableness, to weigh up the benefit of 
discovering the material against the inconvenience and cost to the party.146 ‘The Court 
takes account of such considerations as the value of the discovery to the person seeking 
it and the burden imposed on the party giving it, with a view to restricting the volume 
																																																								
141  The case of  Jarra Creek Central Packing Shed Pty Ltd v Amcor Ltd [2006] FCA 1802 [9] 
demonstrates the sort of cost involved in proceedings. $35,000 was spent in processing fees with an 
anticipated additional $57,000 to be spent on further electronic and hard copy processing. Total costs 
were estimated to be between $240,000 and $320,000.  
142 Australian Law Reform Commission, Discovery in Federal Courts, Discussion Paper 2, 3.57. 
143 Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales [2010] 268 ALR 723. 
144 Ibid [331]. 
145 Rules such as Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) o 15 r 3 have been created in order to limit classes of 
documents and give judges the power to prevent unnecessary discovery.  
146 See for example, Peter Vickery, 'Managing the Paper: Taming the Leviathan' (2012) 22 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 51. 
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of documents and the labour and expense involved to that which is necessary for fairly 
disposing of the issues in the case’.147  
 
As expense is an issue central to the topic of electronic discovery, courts have 
recognised that the responding party need not always comply with the cost of the 
discovery request.148 In the United States, an eight factor balancing test is commonly 
accepted and even referred to as the ‘gold standard’149 to deal with this issue.150 An 
alternative seven factor test151 that is based on the two previous benchmarks has also 
been followed.152 The requirements that the request is ‘specifically tailored’ and the 
‘availability of information from other sources’ are the two most given the most weight 
when considered a discovery request. 153 Once the relevance is determined, the cost of 
discovery may be shifted to the requesting party.154  
 
Proportionality in terms of cost and time is of widespread concern; being addressed in 
Australian as well as foreign jurisdictions. Australian federal rules seek to limit 
discovery ‘if the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefits’.155  For example, a data storage system is assumed to contain information that 
																																																								
147 Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble (No 3) [1990] RPC 498, 503. 
148 Eisenberg, above n 119. 
149 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 319. 
150 Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency Inc  205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The eight 
factors are: the specificity of the discovery requests; the likelihood of a successful search; the availability 
from other sources of the information sought; whether the electronic data is retained for a current business 
purpose; the benefit to the responding party; the total costs; the relative ability of each party to control 
costs; and, the parties’ resources. 
151 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
152 The seven factor Zubulake test considers: the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to 
discover relevant information; the availability of such information from other sources; the total cost of 
production, compared to the amount in controversy; the total cost of production, compared to the 
resources available to each party; the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do 
so; the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and, the relative benefits to the parties obtaining 
the information.  
153 McPeek v Ashcroft 202 F.R.D 31, 10 ILRD 475 (D.D.C 2001). 
154 See for example Couch v Wan No CV F 08-1621, 2011 (E.D. Cal. July 19 2011). 
155 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure r 26(b)(2). 
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may need to be retrieved – otherwise there would be no need to store the information 
in the first place. Even if there are deficiencies in the system, a discovery request made 
in good faith will stand and a new method of obtaining the information must be 
sought.156 
 
There is divided opinion in the judiciary as to the importance of particular items.    
Electronically stored emails can pose as a ‘substantial burden’ as they are stored in 
servers, hard drives and backups across the world. However, in the case of State v 
Marsh and Mclennan157 it was concluded that the emails were not insubstantial, so they 
could not be ignored. Alternatively, the value of deleted emails might be 
disproportionate to the burden placed on the discovering party.  
 
The issue of reasonableness also presents itself in terms of discovery, as it did in terms 
of laws relating to confidentiality. A recurring issue in e-discovery is ascertaining what 
is reasonable. How reasonable is it for a party to undertake the burden of discovery? To 
determine what is reasonable requires the court to look at the discovery process as a 
question of fact and take into account circumstances such as type of discovery to be 
undertaken, what documents will be discovered and proportionality. An issue with 
proportionality is that it may not provide full and frank disclosure of all relevant 
material. ‘The rules do not require that no stone be left unturned. This may mean that a 
relevant document, even a smoking gun is not found’.158 
 
																																																								
156 Kaufman v. Kinko’s Inc. Civ. Action No. 18894-NC (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002). 
157 State v Marsh & McLennan Cos, No 04403342 (N.Y Sup Ct 14 October 2004) [75]. 
158 Digicel v Cable & Wireless [2008] EWHC 2522, [46]. 
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 This attitude is justified by considerations of proportionality. There are times when the 
requirements of a reasonable search are not determined in advance. In this case, the 
expectations of one party fall short of another. Their place is central to their 
expectations. The history, location and community they are in will affect the matter 
they are litigating and subsequently the documents to be discovered.159  
 
There may be competing interests in terms of each party’s understanding of their own 
discovery obligations. For example, if a category is decided and one party does not 
search based on their own belief that it may be too time consuming, the court may order 
further discovery. 160  The court will also provide direction to clarify discovery 
obligations if necessary.161 It is a necessary step, yet can also contribute to the cost and 
time burdens of the discovery process in litigation. The balance must always be 
observed in order to come to the best conclusion.                                                      
 
Because of the large quantities of discoverable material, new technology has had to be 
developed to process the documents.  
 
It is not uncommon to receive lists of categories sought by a party which are 10 to 20 pages 
long where parties seek to formulate, in the most minute detail, every conceivable sort of 
document which might possibly, on a fine day with a following breeze, be of remote assistance 
in the conduct of the litigation.162  
 
																																																								
159 For example, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2006 (US) rule 26(a)(1)(B) and  (b)(2)(c) makes 
reference to location, which is central to discovering relevant material.  
160 Galati v Potato Marketing Corporation of Western Australia (No 2) [2007] FCA 919. 
161 Police Federation of Australia v Nixon [2011] FCAFC 161. 
162 Law Council of Australia, Final Report in Relation to Possible Innovations to Case Management 
(2006) [84].  
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Documents that are in hardcopy format need to be made available electronically. 
Databases need to be created to manage the document details and to add indexing data. 
In the 1990s, the index would be enough and was exchanged between parties. Software 
was consequently developed that would link an electronic copy of the document, often 
in the form of an image, to the index and both those items of data were exchanged. This 
advanced software aids the discovery process and helps to alleviate some of the time 
and expense devoted to discovery.  
 
Since 1998, discovery rules have been amended in order to deal with the issue of the 
disclosure of electronic data. This has evolved to include changes to statute law such as 
amendments made to the Australian Federal Evidence Act163 and the introduction of the 
Electronic Transactions Act in 1999.164 The Electronic Transactions Act recognised 
electronic communications as a valid medium for transactions, which has resulted in 
electronic communication playing a vital role in discovery and evidence.165  
 
The courts are acutely aware of the expenses involved in discovery and seek to 
minimise the excess time and monetary outlay where possible. Various practice 
directions support limited discovery and grant judges the power to grant limiting orders, 
rather than rely on a party to initiate an application. As discovery is now such an 
arduous process, categories may be designated by the court in order to limit discovery. 
When drafting categories, O 15 of the Australian Federal Court rules contains terms 
that can govern the formulation of the categories. Although technology is allowing for 
more thorough discovery, the removal of place from the process has resulted in the need 
																																																								
163 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 
164 Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) and Electronic Transactions Act  2001 (Qld). 
165 See for example, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 71 and 161; Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) ss 
8, 10 and 15. 
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for limitations such as categories. Although it saves time in the discovery process, 
lawyers and clients still must spend time determining the categories. Case management 
is vital to ensure that parties to litigation remain reasonable in the requests and to ensure 
that they make active decisions about what documents may be discovered.  
 
Judges now go to considerable lengths to ensure that time is not wasted and that the 
cost of litigation is minimised. This improved community access to justice and the 
judicial role of case management is now accepted.166 
 
It is still possible for parties not to exercise due diligence and keep categories on the 
broader end of the spectrum.  
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has addressed the effect of place on technology and lawyers’ ethics by 
introducing the setting of the courtroom and contrasting the role of the lawyer with the 
role of the judge.  
 
In litigation, the role of the lawyer is to represent their client and their best interests, 
provided that their duty to the court remains paramount. This is achieved by remaining 
loyal and detached. Similarly, the judge’s role is one of independence that is facilitated 
by detachment and impartiality. These roles help to construct the place of the 
courtroom. 
 
																																																								
166 Thomas, above n 29, 27. 
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The courtroom setting itself arguably is vital to the successful administration of justice. 
The room is carefully constructed and designed to incorporate the elements of place – 
location, community and history. It has been shown that the courtroom contributes to 
the dignity and solemnity of proceedings. Technology interferes and disrupts this place, 
and by introducing competing places through technologies such as video link. Courts 
are responding to these concerns by issuing practice directions and rules that seek to 
preserve the courtroom. If the place of the courtroom disappears, there is a possibility 
that the quality of justice will decline since place assists in constructing the ethics of 
the judge and lawyer.  
 
Technological development has also resulted in discovery processes becoming 
electronic. Although proving to be more thorough, judges must assess the costs and 
benefits when they review proceedings. Costs can escalate excessively without 
necessarily providing worthwhile documents. The availability of such documents is 
also resulting in places colliding with the approach of endless space. When place is 
removed from the discovery process, substantial burden is placed on litigants and the 
court.  
 
Overall, existing places have a claim that they must be preserved in order to ensure 
lawyers’ ethics and judges’ ethics are well developed and to ensure the courtroom 
remains a place that facilitates the administration of justice regardless of technological 
advancement. By upholding the elements of location, community and tradition, the 
court system and the people who litigate within it may have a greater capacity for ethical 
conduct. Technology should not interfere with or take priority over time-honoured 
traditions that ultimately maintain place and ethics.  
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I CONCLUSION 
 
All distances in time and space are shrinking… Man puts the longest distances between him in 
the shortest time… Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness 
does not consist in shortness of time.1 
 
This thesis aimed to develop a coherent ethical perspective on technology and lawyers’ 
ethics based on theories of place. In doing so, it addressed three research questions: 
 
1. What ethical challenges does the use of information technology present to 
lawyers? 
2. How do the concepts of space and place affect lawyers’ ethics? 
3. In light of a theory informed by an ethical account of space and place, how 
can lawyers facilitate ethical practice in light of technological change? 
 
II RECURRING THEMES 
 
This thesis assesses the impact technology has on lawyers’ ethics. Technology is 
constantly changing and evolving and lawyers and law firms are embracing it with 
aplomb. Professional standards and laws are not necessarily developing at the same rate 
at which technology advances, so there is always an element of ‘catch-up’ in play. What 
is more concerning is the fact that the concept of place has remained relatively 
unarticulated in the literature, so much so that the fact that technology has the potential 
to disrupt place is all but ignored.  
 
																																																								
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Joan Stambaugh trans, State University of New York Press, revised 
ed ed, 2010) 163. 
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The second aim of the thesis was to develop a coherent ethical perspective on 
technology and lawyers’ ethics based on theories of place. In doing so, this thesis is 
filling the gap within community based theories of lawyers’ ethics and bridging the gap 
between technology philosophy and ethical theories. By addressing place, this thesis 
has brought to light a framework that may assist the evaluation of lawyers’ ethical 
decisions about technology. 
 
A Place 
 
To achieve the aims of the thesis, place had to be constructed first. If everything is 
equally near as it is far, what happens when ‘everything gets lumped together into 
uniform distanceless-ness’?2 Place played an integral role in grounding the work. As 
there is no single definitive assessment of place in the literature, place was explored 
with its relevance to lawyers’ ethics in mind. The use of simple geographic terms, 
without more, was rejected as place needs to be defined in relational terms as well. 
 
 An account of Heidegger was provided to assist in developing place. Initially, 
existence had to be addressed to explore the fundamental question of being. Heidegger 
could not use common phrases without clarification, since assumptions would 
obfuscate the meaning of existing words such as existence and being.3 Therefore, place 
is primarily explored by Heidegger as a means of addressing existence by way of beings 
and the world around them. Heidegger’s Dasein is then used as a springboard into the 
themes of location, community and spirit. Each of those elements was found in 
																																																								
2 Ibid 164. 
3 Ibid 3. 
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Heidegger’s works, but was developed further by Heidegger’s disciples. However, 
Dasein is the starting point – a literal being-there. Dasein cannot be without having a 
there. ‘Dasein should be understood, within the question of Being, as the place (Stätee) 
which Being requires in order to disclose itself’.4  
 
Place comprised three elements: location, community and a spirit or history.  
 
1 Location 
Location was present in Heidegger’s work as the fundamental concept of the world, 
which exist as ‘that which show itself as being and the structure of being’.5 Heidegger 
believed the world to be a phenomenon unto itself.  
 
Location also defines community as locality creates spatial proximity which fosters the 
sense of belonging.6 Place is constructed by humans, and activities provide a location 
for normative routines to be undertaken. By addressing location, objective phenomena 
are accounted for. Technology and the Internet destroy place and attempt to create a 
place without a location defined by physical boundaries.  
 
A virtual location has potential to fulfill the location requirement of place, provided 
that a tradition or history and community are present alongside it. A virtual location 
does not necessarily reject a physical community as it may facilitate community 
activities.  
																																																								
4 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (R Manheim trans, Yale University Press, 1959) 
205. 
5 Heidegger, above n 1, 63. 
6 Melvin Webber, Explorations into Urban Structures (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1964) 109. 
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2 Community 
Community arose from Heidegger’s introduction to Others and Bewandtnis which is 
involvement – involvement that occurs within the world.  
 
By Others we do not mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the I stands 
out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish 
oneself – those among whom one is too… By reason of this with-like, being-in-the-
world, the world is always the one that I share with Others.7  
 
Communication is a vital prerequisite for community to exist.8 Technology is fast 
tracking communication, making it instantaneous and occurring across multiple places. 
Although it can assist communication, the quality may suffer once all places get 
connected into one large space.  
 
A loss of community may occur due to population and societal change.9 Technology is 
facilitating the change, connecting different communities and different shared norms 
and values. Participation in the community results in shared meaning and experiences, 
which creates shared norms and values.10 Community participation encourages a real 
and effective presence of value in one’s life.  
																																																								
7 Heidegger, above n 1, 115. 
8 John Fiske, Introduction to Communication Studies (Routledge, 2nd ed, 1990) 64. 
9 Joshua Meyrowtiz, 'The Rise of Glocality' (Paper presented at the The Global and the Local in Mobile 
Communication Budapest, 10 June 2004 2004) <http://21st.century.phil-
inst.hu/Passagen_engl4_Meyrowitz.pdf>. 
10 Joseph Grange, 'Community' in Craig Hanks (ed), Technology and Values (Blackwell Publishing, 1st 
ed, 2010) 385, 390. 
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Community assumes place, be it a personal, professional, domestic or commercial 
community. Community is directly linked with place, which is linked to technology. If 
technology has the potential to obliterate place, it could also remove community and 
the positive experience that community contributes to place.   
 
3 Spirit 
Dwelling was another concept of Heidegger’s that was linked to essence and the 
construction of place. Dwelling is the manner by which Dasein finds itself in the world 
and is subsequently described as where one has its place.11 The Dwelling, or place, 
arises from a unity of the fourfold. Once the Dwelling, or place is achieved, it assists 
with revealing truth and essence.  
 
Historically community was referenced by Plato as Koinonia, which implies a sharing 
of kinds and the experience of the community.12 Spiritual meeting is one of the three 
dimensions of Koinonia, the other two being philosophy and shared meaning. History 
motivates discussion of the spirit of the place and tradition shapes the place and the 
people within the place.  
 
As place is the site of ethical reasoning, rather than the object, the discussion turns from 
one of the ethics of place to one of the place of ethics. Cartesian dualism is rejected to 
conclude that place holds both being and knowing within it as a spirit, tradition or 
																																																								
11 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (Albert Hofstadter trans, Harper & Row, 1st ed, 1971) 
21, 157. 
12 Ian M. Krombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines: Plato on Knowledge and Reality (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Ltd, 4th ed, 1979) 358. 
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history.13 Tradition can create inherent knowledge that in turn influences ethics. It is 
also an ever changing and evolving process, which complements the fixed element of 
location and the progressing element of community.  
 
By focusing on these three elements, place is able to successfully address the 
combination of lawyers’ ethics and technology.  
 
B Technology 
 
Various technologies have been assessed to demonstrate how place has the potential to 
be obliterated with increased usage. Technology became a recurring theme in 
Heidegger’s work, which gave this thesis a chance to consider the world and place in 
relation to technology use.  
 
The key theme to come out of Heidegger’s work was that certain characteristics humans 
possess (such as distraction, loss of authority, restlessness and a disconnection from 
reality) would be magnified in the technological age. The essence of Dasein could be 
changed by technology, as could the essence of the world. Essence is integral to 
developing character and ethics and if technology continued to develop, it would 
remove certain skills humans possess that help them interact with society. If 
Heideggerian Things (resources) are removed and replaced with objects, the creators 
themselves eventually become objects.14 The Internet was found to be classed as a 
Heideggerian Thing. Tangibility is an element of the Thing and helps to define 
																																																								
13 See generally, Rene Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (Valentine Miller and Reese Miller trans, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). 
14 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (William Lovitt trans, 
Harper and Row, 1977) 29, 5. 
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nearness. The Internet similarly affects perceptions of nearness, by demonstrating that 
nearness becomes far away. The Internet also functions like a Thing by having a 
purpose. By being a Thing, the Internet has the capacity to turn humans into a mere 
resource, thus destroying their essence.  
 
Dwellings assist in dealing with the changes technology brings. Technology can result 
in the loss of essence, by connecting people across space. If the confines of the dwelling 
do not exist, essence is lost.  
 
The Internet as a technology removes locality as a defining factor of place. It was 
proposed in the thesis that the Internet contributes to the distanceless-ness which 
removes people from their community.  
 
Technology theories were addressed after Heideggerian ideas were discussed. 
Technological determinism and autonomy emerged and built upon Heidegger’s 
technology centric work. The theories acknowledge that technology ‘touches on almost 
everything vital to man’s existence – material, mental and spirital’.15 Jonas recognised 
that technology has the potential to obliterate place and place must be protected in order 
to protect ethics. By maintaining linked, relational concepts of place and technology a 
better understanding of the relationship between them will occur.16 
 
Heidegger also refused to demonise technology, stating that it does not need to be seen 
as purely positive or negative. We do not have to ‘push on blindly with technology’ nor 
																																																								
15 Hans Jonas, 'Toward a Philosophy of Technology' in Craig Hanks (ed), Technology and Values 
(Blackwell Publishing, 1st ed, 2010) 11. 
16 Stephen Graham, 'The end of Geography or the Explosion of Place?' (1998) 22(2) Progress in Human 
Geography 165. 
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‘curse it as the work of the devil’.17 This measured response informs the rest of the 
thesis, which similarly avoids painting each individual technology as positive or 
negative. By focusing on the effect of the technology, rather than its perceived value, 
an ethical framework to approach these technologies could be developed. As 
technology produces places as well as affecting them, society and technology together 
are an intertwined experience. Technology also competes with place and therefore 
contributes to its demise. In order to come to an ethical understanding of the two, one 
cannot be discussed without the other.  
 
C Ethics 
 
An overview of lawyers’ ethics was provided in Chapter Three in order to discover 
whether or not place was prioritised in any accounts of lawyers’ ethics. Ethics relating 
to Heidegger and the elements of place were also addressed, to conclude that place is 
required for sound ethical development.  
 
Ethics arises in Heidegger’s work by the concept of Dasein. Dasein is influenced by 
the world around Dasein, which in turn helps to shape their habits and structures. 
Heidegger pondered whether the study of existence required a study of ethics to occur 
alongside it to supplement it. Dasein’s Authenticity is linked to Heidegger’s notion of 
truth, being something that is not concealed or hidden (Alethia). The Internet has 
potential for inauthenticity that in turn would affect the user’s authenticity.  
 
																																																								
17 Heidegger, above n 11, 157. 
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Lawyers are always working within their own place, due to their connection with 
location, community and historical traditions.  This thesis required the fundamental 
theories of lawyers’ ethics to be evaluated in order to establish the priority of place in 
them. Ethical obligations were subsequently discussed in each chapter to demonstrate 
the impact technology is having on the profession. Technologies such as cloud 
computing affect the dissemination of information outside the lawyer’s control and new 
technology in the courtroom potentially affects the dignity and solemnity of the court. 
Ultimately, established ethical theories fail to address place overtly, which 
compromises their potential to helpfully guide lawyers through issues relating to 
technology use.  
 
III CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
 
A Chapter One – Nearing in the Presencing of Nearness 
 
To build the foundation for the thesis, chapter one provided an overview of Heidegger’s 
theories and theories of community. The theory of place and concepts such as being-
in-the-word, revealing, essence and care are central to discussion. Chapter one framed 
the central proposition of the thesis – a being must have place if they are to successfully 
develop and shape their ethical decision making.  
 
Community theories were also provided to demonstrate the influence of a community 
on a person’s ethics. If community and place are lost, a person’s ethical development 
may disappear with it. Effective participation in the community reinforces the presence 
of value in their lives. As place assists in forming a community, it must be preserved.  
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The main threat to place, as identified in this thesis, is an increased use of technology 
– particularly the use of electronic information technology. Technology has the 
potential to obliterate place by creating an endless vacuum of space. It also has the 
potential to interfere with a person’s ethics. This chapter elaborates on the connection 
technology shares with ethics and demonstrates the unifying factor that place can 
provide by combining location, community and history.  
 
B Chapter Two – Being in Place is Being in Something Superior 
The thesis developed by providing an initial overview of an ethics of place, technology 
and Heideggerian ethics. It was established that geography can affect the ethics of a 
person, therefore if technology interferes with a person’s location, there is potential for 
their ethics to be similarly compromised. In the spirit of Heidegger’s thoughts from 
Being and Time, place can hold its own set of ethics, independently of the people who 
are part of the place. Heidegger’s idea of ethics, whilst not fully developed, 
demonstrates how ethics can stem from the concept of Dasein alone. 
 
Following on from this, an outline of technologies that lawyers use was provided to 
demonstrate the transformative power it holds over lawyers and law firms. For example, 
technology can change communication methods within a place, which subsequently 
may alter a place. Community in this chapter ultimately demonstrates how it can be a 
positive force in lawyers’ ethical development. 
 
In discussing technology and communication, the media naturalness theory was found 
to best assist the discussion because it accounted for context. It also evaluates 
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communication methods based on their level of interaction. Issues arise when place is 
eliminated due to the instantaneous nature of lawyer communication. When place is 
removed, the surrounding community is subject to outside influences which can alter 
the ethics of those within the place. Heidegger addresses this by promoting the 
importance of maintaining the duty to ‘Others’ in order to exist as Dasein. This can be 
achieved by grounding one’s actions in place. 
 
C Chapter Three – The Priority of Place in Lawyers’ Ethics 
 
Chapter Three introduced lawyers’ and the moral and political philosophies that frame 
them. By analysing liberalism and the dominant view, virtue ethics, ethics of care and 
sociological studies, the priority of place in each of these ethical approaches was 
ascertained.  
 
1 Liberalism 
 
Liberalism relies strongly on an autonomy that competes with place. The Kantian 
concept of practical reason forms a foundation of autonomy, by placing the individual 
at the centre of all interactions.18 Place falls into the background and is actively ignored 
by the autonomous individual. Upon viewing the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’, an 
individual’s knowledge of their position in the world is removed. This theory entirely 
discounts place and place does not factor into any moral choice. Liberal legal ethics 
also ignores any theories (such as those by Habermas) that attempt to reconcile location 
																																																								
18 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (P Guyer and A Wood trans, Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Immanual Kant, 'Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals' in Allen W Wood (ed), 
Basic Writings of Kant (The Modern Library 2001).  
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and community with autonomy.19 Theories of zealous advocacy similarly ignored place 
so that the lawyer could maintain an absolute duty to the client.  
 
Theories of contextual judgment gently recognise community by reference to the 
institution the lawyer works in.20 The contextual view searches for an answer that 
allows lawyers to keep the connection between their work and the pursuit of justice. 
Place, if recognised, could strengthen this connection by enhancing the nature of the 
context that impacts conduct.  
 
The impact of specific conduct continues to be explored in modified versions of the 
standard conception. The themes of partisanship, neutrality and non-accountability may 
assist a lawyer to navigate the balance between the obligations of the role of the lawyer 
and the obligations to the community at large and the morality contained within. 
  
Rawlsian influenced moral activism, like Luban’s, approaches lawyers’ ethics as 
general ethics that relies on consequentialist and deontological theories. A more 
generalised view of place emerged due to the element of community values present in 
moral activism. 21 
 
As the theories start to evolve and distance themselves from ideas of absolute 
autonomy, place begins to emerge more freely.  
 
2 Virtue Ethics 
																																																								
19 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (William Rehg trans, The MIT Press, 1998). 
20 William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
21 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS II LIBERALISM AND THE DOMINANT 
VIEW. 
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Virtue ethics and the works of contemporary pre-modernists view tradition and 
community as vital requirements in constructing an ethical framework. Aristotelian 
virtue is featured to create practical wisdom within the profession. The community is 
central to this creation. Place emerges alongside the elements of tradition and location 
that are present when discussing community.  Virtue ethics manages to address multiple 
places coming together, without explicitly recognising the inherent value of place. By 
focusing on the individual, rather than prioritsing relationships, virtue ethics draws 
upon themes that resonate with Dasein, such as the being existing within their place. 
 
3 Ethics of Care 
 
Ethics of care uses normative ethics to construct the moral basis of lawyers’ ethics. 
Conventional judgment is present in order to allow a lawyer to make correct decisions 
to assist their client. The focus is always on personal relationships with context and 
reasoning playing a large part in choosing the right answer. 22 
 
Community is central to ethics of care – ‘no one becomes virtuous alone. We learn in 
the community what virtue is and how to practice it: We learn as we are part of the 
community’.23 When place is recognised, the potential for a more virtuous person and 
community increases greatly. Tradition similarly informs community development.  
 
																																																								
22 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS IV ETHICS OF CARE. 
23 Thomas Shaffer and Mary Shaffer, American Lawyers and Their Communities (University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1991) 84. 
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Virtue ethics alongside ethics of care prioritises place the most. Both accounts of 
lawyers’ ethics rely heavily on the relational aspects of practice. The strong community 
ideals align with place. Virtue ethics accounts for both community and tradition and 
loosely approaches location when discussing the two. Ethics of care by comparison 
reduces the potential for an individual to make ethical decisions when using technology, 
because of such a focus on relationships. There is no limit on the relationships to be 
considered, which mirrors the idea of space, rather than contained place. These 
relationships are not necessarily defined by location, community or tradition. Place 
relies on the idea of Dasein - the being-there. Dasein interacts with technology in order 
to reveal their essence and being. It is not so much the relationship with technology, 
but the way that technology builds the character of Dasein that demonstrate a sympathy 
with virtue ethics. By focusing on the virtue of the lawyer, shaped by location, 
community and tradition, virtue ethics may be best positioned to deal with the issues 
technology brings about.  
 
4 Sociological Theories 
 
Sociological theories were most successful in identifying all the elements of place. It 
was shown that lawyers have greater autonomy when working for an individual in 
regards to developing their ethics. Utilising the idea of hemispheres, community was 
explicitly recognised as being central to the lawyers’ existence. 24  Rural lawyers 
especially benefit from their community and in turn can contribute to their community 
effectively. There is also accountability within the community. However, history and 
																																																								
24 John P. Heinz and Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers (Northwestern University Press, revised ed, 
1994). 
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context would assist in making these works an examination of place, rather than 
limiting it to locational and relational fields.  
 
History and tradition are still present in sociological works, by subtly recognising an 
externally determined profession. The law is rooted in the local economy and human 
institutions in order to structure the profession.  
 
Location is an obvious element in sociological studies, as represented by a relational 
hemisphere. Results of these studies were highly specific to the location in which data 
was collected – Heinz and Laumann explicitly focused on Chicago.25 Community can 
be built within location. An ecological frame of reference was used as a way of 
determining structure within the profession.  
 
Liberalism in all its variations almost ignores place entirely. Disregard is shown for the 
link between lawyers and their community, with place in some theories remaining 
ignored, yet in others there was not enough emphasis placed on the containing 
community. Complete autonomy with little recognition of community would affect the 
whole Dasein, who cannot exist without Others 
 
 By comparison, virtue ethics and ethics of care either explicitly or implicitly recognise 
the role of place in ethics. They share overlapping features such as tradition and 
community. However, despite this recognition, there is still an underplaying of the 
significant role place plays in lawyers’ ethics.  
 
																																																								
25 Ibid. 
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Sociological studies so far provide the greatest insight into the role place plays in 
lawyers’ professional lives, as it recognises community and history to a greater extent. 
Landon, as an example, elevated place and articulated it.26 It is more prominent in the 
way country lawyers shape and frame their values, than in any other theory of lawyers’ 
ethics that is available. 
 
D Chapter Four – Globalisation and Place 
 
Chapter Four provided the bridge between the Heideggerian theories of the past 
chapters and the issues found in legal practice, discussed in subsequent chapters. 
Heidegger valued tradition and predicted the abolition of distance that was to occur 
with the introduction of future technologies. The chapter built on this theme and 
referred to Enlightenment philosophies and modernity in order to explain the societal 
shift that has occurred with increased technology use.  
 
The chapter followed with globalisation theory in the context of lawyers and the 
business of law. No lawyer is immune to the changes brought about by globalisation. It 
has the potential to affect lawyers from all different backgrounds, from sole 
practitioners in rural firms to lawyers who are part of a team of thousands working for 
a global firm. Technology has driven globalisation by providing systems and mediums 
that can abolish all distance. Lawyers are no longer beholden to time zones, standard 
working hours or technological limitations that paper based solutions may have offered 
in the past. These changes have transformed the way that lawyers work, but again, little 
thought has been give to place. 
																																																								
26 Donald Landon, Country Lawyers (Praeger Publishers, 1st ed, 1990). 
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Three main areas were identified to assist in demonstrating how place affects lawyers. 
Confidentiality, communication and litigation were each addressed briefly in this 
chapter, and illustrated how the profession has changed. Primarily, there is a greater 
focus on international practice and technology facilitates lawyers being ‘on call’ at all 
times. The following chapters explored each issue in detail by reference to place.  
 
Heidegger looked to the essence of technology and concluded that Dasein must conquer 
remoteness in order to maintain their fundamental requirement of closeness and 
connection to a place. Although technology may bring places together, it also has an 
isolating effect by removing the locational and relational aspects of place.  
 
E Chapter Five – Confidentiality and Unconcealment 
 
Confidentiality was the first ethical concern to be addressed in its own chapter. As a 
core value of the legal profession, it is generally thought that confidentiality is needed 
for a successful lawyer-client relationship to serve its purposes in current legal systems, 
particularly more in adversarial systems.  
 
The themes of chapter two were elaborated upon in this chapter in order to better 
understand Heidegger’s idea of what is hidden and what is concealed. Concealment 
occurs when technology is utlised. Cloud computing is used as an example of a 
technology that interferes with confidential communications and a technology that 
facilitates the process of outsourcing. Although practical and convenient, the cloud is 
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placeless and allows lawyers to not experience the location or history of the place they 
are in.  
 
Policy considerations were briefly discussed to consider how confidentiality and 
jurisdiction are approached by the profession. The main way of addressing outsourcing 
and the cloud (when they are specifically addressed at all – most of the material 
observed in this thesis did not address specific technologies) is to provide vague 
practice directions and recommend solutions such as informing clients of the 
technological practice and conducting due diligence on the outsourcing provider.  
 
The cloud is contributing to the Heideggerian idea of unconcealment - a requirement 
that Dasein needs to control in order to be connected to place and to act ethically. The 
cloud and similar technologies amount to ‘standing-reserve’ that can cause Dasein to 
become nothing more than standing-reserve. For the lawyer, this prospect is particularly 
dangerous as it compromises their ethics. Heidegger advises that technology must be 
constantly questioned to ensure a free relationship between Dasein, their place, and 
technology. 
 
F Chapter Six -  Lawyer Communication 
 
Chapter Six began by providing an account of communication and medium theories in 
order to determine whether or not alternative theories can provide lawyers with ethical 
assistance when they use technology. The legal profession is built on communication, 
written and oral, and is central to the creation and maintenance of the lawyer-client 
relationship. Technological advances have changed the way lawyers work, as well as 
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changing the influences on their ethics. Communication and medium theories explain 
how the medium affects the workflow through debate over whether technology drives 
societal change, or whether society drives technological change. Heideggerian ideas 
relating to place unified these theories to explain whether or not lawyers achieve their 
ethical demands when using technology.  
 
Advertising and social media are challenging the place of the lawyer. Issues have arisen 
within the profession, such as whether a judge should ‘friend’ a lawyer on Facebook, 
or whether tweets amount to advertising. Lawyers can also potentially be disciplined 
and removed from practice, if they set up a misleading website.   
 
Medium theory provides the greatest insight into the individual and society in the 
context of this thesis, as it acknowledges some of the elements of Heideggerian place. 
Under medium theory, the choice of medium will affect the effectiveness of 
communication. For example, a lawyer may telephone or email a client with the exact 
same message, but the experience and value will differ between each medium. 
Electronic media has instigated a societal shift due to the increase in the speed of 
communication and the volume of storage.  When the societal structure changes, the 
place changes and the place of the lawyer slowly erodes. When the grounding force of 
place is removed, lawyers can face more ethically challenging situations. By 
acknowledging medium theory as the theory that best complements place, lawyers can 
focus on assessing the technological and communicative medium in order to make more 
ethical decisions.  
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G Chapter Seven – Bridges to Their Own Answering: Use of Technology in the 
Courts 
 
Chapter Seven provided the final work and contrasted against earlier chapters by 
incorporating judicial ethics into the discussion. This provided counterpoint and 
balance to lawyers’ ethics and gave a rounded evaluation of the importance of place in 
the courtroom. Technology use inside the courtroom was addressed in order to 
approach the ethical issues that may be present in the adversary system. The concept of 
place was illuminated to demonstrate its worth to lawyers, judges and the courts. Place 
is  beneficial to each member of the system and helps each one to function successfully.  
 
The lawyer’s duties relating to the court and issues such as disclosure were discussed. 
The role of the judge as an impartial character formed the basis of the chapter, as their 
core duties of impartiality and independence allow the lawyer’s role to be fulfilled 
effectively. The place of the judge and the lawyer contribute to their ethical 
development and the increasing use of technology is an emerging force on the judiciary.  
 
The role of the courtroom also required a dialogue since it is the place that is central to 
litigation. It encompasses all three core features of place: location, community and 
history. Its place is currently evolving to encompass technology, which is said to save 
costs and time. Technology could take the courtroom to a virtual location, removing its 
physical presence altogether. However, the physical manifestation of the courtroom 
engages the community and encourages the community to seek justice. The tradition of 
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the courtroom contributes to the quality of justice and the significance of the justice 
system. The place of the courtroom and its participants cannot be ignored. 
 
IV REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. What ethical challenges does the use of information technology present to 
lawyers? 
 
Lawyers are challenged by technology that has evolved as a result of globalisation.27 
As such, the nature of the legal profession is changing. They are challenged in at least 
three respects. First, their obligations relating to confidentiality are challenged. 28 
Technology is facilitating potential confidentiality breaches through the use of cloud 
computing and legal outsourcing.29 Confidentiality exists to protect the clients and the 
right lies with the client to waive confidentiality.30  Issues arise when confidential 
information is passed on to other parties. For example, identifiable information is often 
provided to outsourcing firms operating in another jurisdiction with staff who are not 
held to account the same way lawyers are. 31 
 
Technology also increases the risk of consecutive conflicts of interest, concurrent 
conflicts of interest and conflicting duties of disclosure. 32  Cloud computing may 
contribute to those risks, but also takes one to a jurisdiction separate from one’s own. 
																																																								
27 GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS I INTRODUCTION. 
28 CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT III CONFIDENTIALITY. 
29  Aaron R Harmon, 'The Ethics of Legal Process Outsourcing - Is the Practice of Law a Noble 
Profession, or is it Just Another Business?' (2008) 13(1) Journal of Technology Law and Policy 41. 
30 Above n 28. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Paul Finn, 'Developments in the Law; Conflict of Interest in the Legal Profession' (1980-1981) 94 
Harvard Law Review 1244. 
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Outsourcing also poses a risk in regards to jurisdiction.33 Client details are often stored 
in a server found in an offshore location. There is also the potential for governments 
across the world to access cloud data.  
 
Secondly, lawyers’ communications are challenged. From a theoretical standpoint, 
medium theory demonstrates how different communication methods will result in 
different experiences and different quality.34 Technology has also instigated a shift in 
the speed of communication and quantity of communication.35  This has practical 
ramifications in forming and maintaining the lawyer-client relationship. Issues are also 
raised in regards to privileged communications.36  Technological advancement has 
resulted in debate over whether certain communication is privileged and whether it will 
be admissible as evidence. Issues relating to metadata follow on, as far more 
information is available about an electronic document than there was before for 
physical documents. There remains a divide between jurisdictions as to how to best 
deal with metadata.  
 
Social media use and advertising are another issue that relates to communication. 
Professional rules on the whole remain stagnant on the issue and the lag creates tensions 
between lawyers and their ethics. 37  Social media platforms must be monitored 
constantly to ensure inappropriate conduct does not take place. Personally there remains 
																																																								
33 Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark and Tahlia Gordon, 'Trends and Challenges in Lawyer Regulation: The 
Impact of Globalization and Technology' (2012) 80(6) Fordham Law Review 2661. 
34 LAWYER COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING II COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIUM THEORIES. 
35 Dow Jones and Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, 630. 
36  CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT VI ETHICAL APPROACHES TO 
CONFIDENTIALITY. 
37 LAWYER COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING IV . 
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a risk that lawyers may inadvertently advertise online or via social media in ways that 
do not meet professional standards.38  
 
Finally, lawyers are challenged with information technology when involved in 
litigation. In fact, the whole adversarial system results in ethical challenges when 
technology is used. The courts and lawyers are employing more information 
technologies in the course of litigation than ever before.39 This is especially evident in 
the rise of electronic discovery in litigation.  Technologies such as online booking, 
facilities for DVD players and laptops or even an electronic courtroom are available to 
litigants.40 These changes primarily manifest in the areas of evidence, communication 
and file management.41 Technology has the potential to disrupt proceedings and it was 
shown that video links to witnesses potentially result in the dignity and solemnity of 
the court being disturbed.42 Resource drain is the last issue, which occurs because so 
much material is available to be electronically discovered, that it takes unprecedented 
amounts of time to sift. 
 
2. How do the concepts of space and place affect lawyers’ ethics? 
 
Space and place have been shown to affect lawyers’ ethics to a significant extent.43 In 
the strictest and liberal accounts of autonomy, the three elements of place remain 
																																																								
38 See for example American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct  (at [2002]) 7.2(a). 
39  BRIDGES TO THEIR OWN ANSWERING: USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS IV 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE COURTS. 
40  Court Technology Booking Form Supreme Court of Western Australia 
<http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/court_technology_booking_form.pdf > 
41 Above n 39. 
42 Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions, 9 June 2015, 28; Supreme 
Court of Queensland, Practice Direction 8 of 2014 - Electronic Devices in Courtrooms, 17 February 
2014 5. 
43 THE PRIORITY OF PLACE IN LAWYERS’ ETHICS VI CONCLUSION. 
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entirely unrecognised.44 Technology use aligns the best with the dominant view of 
lawyers’ ethics as both remove boundaries. Place could be featured in order to engage 
lawyers’ ethical development. In virtue ethics and the ethics of care, place is given 
greater significance.45 Still, the recognition is unarticulated, which leaves gaps that 
could be strengthened by the recognition of place. A number of sociological studies 
recognise place the best, by making clear references to location and community and 
weaker references to tradition.46  
 
In order to build the theory of place, the three central elements of location, community 
and history were established and supplementary theories were looked at. 
Communication theories proved most useful in establishing the element of community. 
In chapters two and six, the media naturalness theory was identified to demonstrate how 
instant communication mediums can pose cognitive obstacles to lawyers and reduce 
the effectiveness of the communication.47 Medium theory is the second that recognises 
the importance of place by allowing for context to evaluate the effectiveness of 
communication methods.48 Without effective communication, the community element 
of place erodes. Lawyers need to be aware that each technology they use can affect 
their ethical position in the profession.  
 
The technological theory that follows from the communication theories was found in 
chapter one to be that of technological determinism. Technology is seen as a dominant 
																																																								
44 For example, see works such as Monroe Freedman, 'A Critique of Philosophizing About Lawyers' 
Ethics' (2012) 25 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 91. 
45 See for example Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 1993). 
46 Heinz and Laumann, above n 24. 
47  Ned Kock, 'The Psychobiological Mode: Towards a New Theory of Computer-Mediated 
Communication based on Darwinian Evolution' (2004) 15(3) Organization Science 327. 
48 Donald Ellis, 'Medium Theory' in Stephen W Littlejohn and Karen A Foss (eds), Encyclopedia of 
Communication Theory (SAGE Publications, 2009) 645. 
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force and dictates societal change. The benefit of acknowledging the power of modern 
technology is that ethical use cannot simply be assumed.49 By attempting to preserve 
the dynamic relationship between place and technology, technology can be dealt with 
more ethically. Simple geographic evaluations need to be rejected when evaluating 
technology, as relational terms have greater potential to uncover the intertwining 
relationship between technology and ethics.50  
 
Heidegger’s notion of place reconciles these theories. Ideally, lawyers need to 
recognise Others in order to properly be Being-In-The-World. Heidegger’s place theory 
ensures that control is taken over technology in order to reveal and ensure Dasein is 
complete. Place can adequately take into account each individual technology, plus its 
effect on lawyers. When place is realised, a more ethical lawyer can emerge. By 
acknowledging the three characteristics of place, lawyers can improve their ethical 
decisions when using technology.  
 
3. In light of a theory informed by an ethical account of space and place, how can 
lawyers facilitate ethical practice in light of technological change? 
 
Lawyers can facilitate ethical change by, first and foremost, recognising place. The 
elements of location, community and tradition have been shown to exist in all facets of 
legal practice. Technology has created a new body of challenges for lawyers to face. 
Although it is clear that many technologies assist lawyers to complete their work, the 
same technologies also erode place. By seeking to preserve place, lawyers may uphold 
																																																								
49 Jonas, above n 15. 
50 NEARING IS THE PRESENCING OF NEARNESSIV THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON 
SPACE, PLACE AND COMMUNITY. 
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their ethical duties. By consciously aiming to preserve it, a lawyer’s ethical duties will 
maintain a stronger connection with inherited duties within the profession (which have 
been written) and a clearer understanding of the behaviours needed to confirm with 
them. Certainly as suggested by the account given of the different applied moral 
theories, this seems best justified by forms of virtue ethics and possibly ethics of care 
that, even if only implicitly, prioritise place. Prioritising the elements of the community, 
location and tradition that is present in legal practice, will realise Dasein’s ultimate 
existence as a whole being. Through Dasein, Others will be referenced and the benefits 
of advanced ethical behaviour that come from the closeness will emerge. 
 
The cloud was the first technology discussed at depth in this thesis, and was shown to 
primarily affect lawyers’ duties of confidentiality.51 Confidential information is most 
threatened when its location changes. When the information moves from one location 
to another, or is stored in a location that is controlled by another person in another 
country, the potential for it to become compromised increases.52  The potential is 
heightened further when international bodies may also access the files. Once the 
information is passed on to third parties through outsourcing, not only does the lawyer 
lose control of the information, but also the control of the staff who are accessing the 
information (even though they have a duty to ensure that staff are using the information 
properly).53 Once the information leaves the home jurisdiction it may also be subject 
to different laws relating to privacy and data protection.54 Place can assist this situation 
																																																								
51 CONFIDENTIALITY AND UNCONCEALMENT III CONFIDENTIALITY. 
52 GLOBALISATION, TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS PART TWO – GLOBALISATION AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION. 
53 James Ryan, 'The Uncertain Future: Privacy and Security in Cloud Computing' (2014) 54 Santa Clara 
Law Review 497. 
54 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (European Union Court of Justice, C-362/14, 
6 October 2015).  
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by grounding the information and ensuring that everyone who engages with the 
confidential material is coming from the same place, even if they are spread across 
borders in different communities. As place is present when engaging technology, the 
world in which it exists must be maintained to create Eigentlichkeit –  authenticity and 
responsibility – in the lawyer.  When technology can be used as a revealing power, the 
lawyer will take back control and not become mere ‘standing-reserve’.  
 
The next issue related to lawyers’ communication – with one another, with opposing 
counsel, with their clients and with the word at large.55 Technologies have eliminated 
all barriers that once controlled time, which has resulted in instant communication. 
Social media is affecting lawyers professionally, but increasing the possibility of 
forming an unintended relationship with a client as well as causing possible breaches 
of advertising rules.56 Privileged information is also threatened if a lawyer blogs about 
their cases for the world to read and the independence of the judiciary may be threatened 
if lawyers add judges, lawyers and clients as ‘friends’ on social media.57 Jurors are also 
affected by increased social media use, with trials having to be re-heard due to a 
miscarriage of justice. Place assists lawyers in these situations by strengthening 
medium theory, which examines each unique characteristic of each unique 
communication method and determines the impact on the user.58 The place, or lack 
thereof, is influencing all people as well as society when they engage in new 
																																																								
55  LAWYER COMMUNICATION, SOCIAL MEDIA AND ADVERTISING III LAWYER 
COMMUNICATION. 
56 2015 Report of the Regulation of Lawyer Advertising Committee (22 June 2015) Association of 
Professional Responsibility Lawyers 
<http://www.aprl.net/publications/downloads/APRL_2015_Lawyer-Advertising-Report_06-22-
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57 Sluss v Commonwealth (2012) 381 S.W.3d 215. 
58BEING IN PLACE IS BEING IN SOMETHING SUPERIOR V CONCLUSION; Joshua Meyrowitz, 
'Medium Theory' in David J Crowley and David Mitchell (eds), Communication Theory Today (Stanford 
University Press, 1994) 50. 
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technological communication. By looking at the place of communication technology, 
the best way to deal with it ethically may be ascertained. 
 
The final issue that was examined in this thesis related to courtroom technology and its 
effect on lawyers, judges and justice at large.59 Electronic discovery and technologies 
that are available for use during litigation such as video linking have the probable effect 
of unsettling place.60 In particular, the place of the courtroom itself is being threatened 
by these disruptive technologies. Carefully constructed over centuries, the place of the 
courtroom assists in maintaining the quality of justice that best serves the community.61 
Lawyers and judges need to be mindful of approaching place in a way that continues to 
serve their role. Preserving the place of the traditional courtroom and regulating the 
sheer volume of discoverable electronic material so that it does not pose more of a threat 
than a benefit may assist in maintaining lawyers’ ethics.  By preserving the fourfold, 
the lawyer’s dwelling is preserved, which will assist in constructing and revealing truth 
and essence through the preservation of the ‘thingness’ of technology.  
 
Distanceless-ness has great potential to disrupt ethics, but, so long as we do not ‘push 
on blindly with technology’, nor ‘curse it as the work of the devil’, lawyers can evaluate 
their relationship with place and how it can shape their ethics. 
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